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1

Międzynarodowi terroryści w PRL – historia niewymuszonej współpracy

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Gasztold-Seń P.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2013

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issue 1(21)

275-315

EN

The declassification of many archives of the former secret services of the Eastern bloc countries proved how greatly some authorities were engaged in cooperation with international terrorism. Practically all Soviet bloc countries provided material and financial help to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to its various extremist fractions. Communist Poland was also supporting international terrorist organizations, secessionist or revolutionary movements. The world’s famous terrorists such as Carlos “the Jackal”, Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas or Abu Daud found the safe haven behind the iron curtain. They were using the Polish People’s Republic as a country where they can rest and prepare for another terrorist attack. The authorities of the Polish United Workers’ Party were well aware of the fact who they were really dealing with. Despite this knowledge, the Polish security apparatus allowed them to freely pass the borders and organize various meetings. International terrorists were using the Cold War bipolarization for their own struggle and, what is very important and significant, the Polish governments allowed them also to earn money in Poland. The Polish relations with some Arabic terrorist organizations date back to the seventies. In exchange for scholarships and free pass, radical activists promised not to attack the targets on the Polish soil. Even so, in August 1981, there was an attempt to murder Mohammed Oudeh, better known as Abu Daud – the mastermind of the ’72 Olympics Attack in Munich. He was shot six times in Warsaw’s Victoria hotel but he managed to survive. The files from the investigation show us that the Polish secret services were probably protecting the shooter, who was connected with the Abu Nidal Organization. In my article I present other spheres of cooperation between the Polish security apparatus and the members of international terrorist organizations. I reveal dates, names, and purposes of their visits to Poland. I also discuss other terrorist activities, which were not controlled by Polish counterintelligence. Finally, I attempt to answer the question why Polish authorities agreed to cooperate with terrorist organizations.

2

Polski rok 1956 z perspektywy Poselstwa Kanady

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Gasztold-Seń P.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2016

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issue 28

259-279

PL

Artykuł opisuje reakcje poselstwa Kanady na zmieniającą się sytuację polityczną w PRL w 1956 r. Na podstawie dokumentów znajdujących się w zasobie Library and Archives Canada w Ottawie: raportów, analiz i notatek przesyłanych przez kanadyjskich dyplomatów dla kierownictwa Secretary of State for External Affairs w Ottawie oraz wewnętrznych dokumentów kanadyjskiej służby zagranicznej zrekonstruowano poglądy, opinie oraz komentarze Kanadyjczyków na temat zmian w polityce wewnętrznej PRL. Analizie poddano źródła, z jakich dyplomaci czerpali wiedzę na temat sytuacji w Polsce. Wskazano, że spora część raportów na temat problemów politycznych i ekonomicznych oparta była na tzw. białym wywiadzie, czyli kwerendzie oficjalnej prasy komunistycznej. Kanadyjscy dyplomaci obficie cytowali w swoich notatkach i memorandach m. in. artykuły ukazujące się w tygodniku „Po Prostu”. Dogłębnie analizowali nie tylko przemówienia partyjnych dygnitarzy, czy artykuły z wyraźnym politycznym podtekstem, ale również teksty o bardziej „lekkim” charakterze, jak choćby niektóre dowcipy ukazujące się w gazetach. Spora część raportów opisywała Powstanie Poznańskie z czerwca 1956. Kanadyjscy dyplomaci żywo interesowali się genezą, przebiegiem oraz okolicznościami starć. Ich uwagę przykuwały również procesy ludzi oskarżonych przez komunistyczne władze o udział w manifestacjach. Na podstawie analizy polityki kierownictwa PZPR wobec demonstrantów dyplomaci starali się zrekonstruować obowiązującą linię. Wskazywali, że proces liberalizacji wpłynął na łagodność niektórych wyroków. W artykule opisano również kanadyjskie odczucia związane z polityczną „odwilżą”. Wskazano na kilka przykładów, które zdaniem dyplomatów, zwiastowały powoli nadchodzące zmiany w polityce wewnętrznej. W artykule opisano również politykę informacyjną poselstwa w związku ze zmianami październikowymi i dojściem do władzy Władysława Gomułki oraz zaprezentowano oczekiwania, nadzieje i prognozy na przyszłość, jakie Kanadyjczycy wiązali z nowym kierownictwem PZPR.

3

Biznes z terrorystami. Brudne interesy wywiadu wojskowego PRL z bliskowschodnimi organizacjami terrorystycznymi

100%

Gasztold-Seń P.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2014

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issue 1(23)

165-216

XX

The declassification of the archives of the Polish Military Intelligence services (Zarząd II Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego) proved that this institution had maintained secret relations with some Middle Eastern terrorist organizations during the Cold War period. In my paper, I describe the ties between the Polish Military Intelligence, Abu Nidal’s Organization (ANO), and Monzer Al-Kassar’s group. Their mutual contacts were based on different agendas, among whose those linked to international politics and arms trade were of utmost importance. The members of ANO received scholarships to Polish universities, and could conduct business there. Their company – „S.A.S. Investments Trading Company” was located in Warsaw and was used by the Polish government as arms dealers. Thanks to good relations between ANO and chronologically: the regimes in Iraq, Syria and Libya, those dictatorships were interested in signing contracts to purchase Polish military equipment. ANO got commissions from executed contracts and it was one of their major profits, which later was spent on various terrorist purposes. The chief of ANO network in Poland – Samir Najmeddin – had very good relations with the Polish staff from the Central Engineering Board (Cenzin) – a state company responsible for export of Polish weapons and military advisors. This institution was secretly controlled by the Military Intelligence and Counterin- telligence services. ANO was also used as a provider of embargo goods for Polish secret services. That is why the members of Abu Nidal group were “untouchable” in Poland. Despite the fact that civilian services tried to put them under surveillance, the military services supported and protected terrorists. The relations with Monzer Al-Kassar’s group were based on economic grounds. During the 80s, he was one of the biggest arms dealers in the world. Together with Samir Najmeddin from ANO, they were the most important individual brokers for Cenzin. Kassar’s influence and connections with many Middle Eastern governments was so significant for the Polish government, that Cenzin established

4

Partia zjednoczona czy podzielona? Różne nurty PZPR w ostatniej dekadzie PRL

100%

Gasztold-Seń P.

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Politologica

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2013

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issue 10

174-192

EN

The article describes the fractions and trends that functioned in the Polish United Workers’ Party in the 1980s. Creation of Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” in 1980 and the political crisis connected with the event led to the loosening of the party’s discipline. Groups with a different point of view on the then political and economic situation started to develop. The most recognized fractions included the members of the party that were associated with dogmatism and those associated with liberalism. The former, also known as “hard-headed”, pronounced for dealing with “Solidarity” in a quick and forceful manner, they criticised the followers of Stanisław Kania and gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski for their amicability and took advantage of the verbal and material support of the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Their aim was to seize the power in the party. The liberals who were concentrated in the horizontal structures, on the other hand, strived for a reform of the Polish United Workers’ Party that would involve democratisation of the decision-making process. They were also more willing to dialogue with the opposition than the “hard-headed” were. The imposition of the martial law pacified “Solidarity” and was the onset of clearing the ranks of the party. Fraction activity became forbidden and the most important members of the dogmatic movement were gradually losing their posts and influences.

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3 Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

1 Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Politologica

1 2016

1 2014

2 2013

4 Gasztold-Seń P.

Międzynarodowi terroryści w PRL – historia niewymuszonej współpracy

Polski rok 1956 z perspektywy Poselstwa Kanady

Biznes z terrorystami. Brudne interesy wywiadu wojskowego PRL z bliskowschodnimi organizacjami terrorystycznymi

Partia zjednoczona czy podzielona? Różne nurty PZPR w ostatniej dekadzie PRL