Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The subject of the study is the analysis of two arguments that have appeared in the Czech-Slovak philosophical setting in the context of discussions about the moral evaluation of research into stem cells of human embryos. We have presented various reasons (varied understandings of potentiality and the vagueness of the expression “living human body”), on the basis of which we must reject the argument of P. Volek concerning the unconditional protection of each human zygote. With respect to the argument of A. Doležal, D. Černý a T. Doležal, we have shown that their critique of the conception of non-individuality of the early human embryo relies on the identification of the concept of the “individual” with the concept “particular” which, for ontological reasons, cannot be accepted. In both of the analysed bioethical arguments the key role of metaphysical concepts and conceptions is easily demonstrated.
XX
The aim of this study is to refute the frequent and repeated critical objections to Singer’s almost four-decades-old argument against speciesism. These objections are based, above all, on misunderstanding. There is misunderstanding not only of the argument itself, but also of Singer’s methodological starting point, which we have termed “Singer’s ethical razor”. In the text we show why it is not possible to reject Singer’s utilitarian argument only by rejecting utilitarianism en bloc. In the same way, we show why it is not appropriate to charge Singer with failing to extend his ethics to include plants and lifeless nature. In fact the opposite is true because Singer clearly demonstrates how environmental ethics relating to the protection of the wild can be based on the same principle of the equal consideration of interests which is the basis for the moral unacceptability of speciesism.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.