Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The article explores the possibility of comprehending natural law, together with an alternative to the Schmittean political, through an inquiry into the layers of professional philosophy with a special focus on epistemology and analytic philosophy. The starting point of the research is the controversy surrounding the ideas of Carl Schmitt, in which it is unclear what lies at the origin of law and the political - sovereign decision or the situation (Part I)? The latter possibility directs the inquiry to the conceptual field related to natural law and epistemology. Proceeding via both diachronic and synchronic perspectives, the inquiry further analyses what has happened to natural law in modernity, and what its current status is, theorizing both streams of inquiry under the concept of political exile (Part II). The Schmittean political happens to be very much at home in this context, opening up the coherent ideological framework that may be called modern political ontology, which at first appears to camouflage Schmittean antagonistic political praxis (Part III). However, through inquiry into ideas mostly attributable to analytic philosophy (or philosophy of language), this ontology is also shown to function as an ‘anti-onto’-logy - that is, as a direct (i.e. open, not hidden) ideological basis for modern political praxis. The analysis here also discloses the rivalry inside professional philosophy in relation to ‘anti-onto’-logy, the latter finding its disciplinary origin(s) in language itself. It shows that at the level of professional philosophy there is a general trend that could be helpful in the attempt to revive natural law (Part IV).
EN
Firstly, the article focuses on the ideologies of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, which are, as a matter of stereotype, considered as being in opposition to each other. By revealing the logics of Kelsenian normativism and the conception of law presupposed therein, the paper aims at re-constructing the opposition into a generative affinity of two ideologies and showing that these two great ideological adversaries of the first half of the twentieth century could be considered co-authors of the same ideological construct. The construct could be called the total state of exception, with the inherent political holism and legal nihilism.The second main aim of the article is to widen the scope of this insight by relating it to the applied ideas that frame our modern political world. The ideas are those of democracy and human rights, the former appearing as the form of the total state, the latter as the one possible de-former of the total state. However, the foundation - i.e. natural law - of the de-former appears to be inconceivable and, therefore, lost to the modern mind. In the end, the article attempts to show that Schmitt might have reflected on this much more fundamental aspect of legal nihilism. This reflection provides for the possibility of dissonances in his basically anthropocentric decisionism and the centralization of the problem of natural law.
EN
The paper concentrates, from the critical perspective, on two general ideological themes used to support and welcome judicial activism mainly in the jurisprudence of the highest level courts of the United States and Lithuania. This task is relevant in light of the judicial activism spreading in court practices, as well as its clear embrace in the academic community of Lithuania.The first theme focuses on the practice and ideology of Justice John Marshall. It is rather evident that the Marshallian ideas and activities form an ideological basis for an active and politically powerful constitutional court. However, due regard should be paid to the critique of the Marshallian heritage.The other theme is built on the juxtaposition of reality and the law as text, the former being much more complicated. This allegedly supports the theses either that adjudication could not avoid taking the form of precedent (the creation of law rather than the interpretation of law), or that judicial interpretation is meant to fill the gaps or fix inconsistencies in the legal text (the so-called thesis of interpretative sufficiency). However, due regard should be paid to the consequences of the realization of both theses to the political framework of the state.This article attempts to fill in these aforementioned gaps in critical attention with compensatory critique, as well as to suggest an alternative approach to the propaganda of judicial activism - an ethics of restrained adjudication.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.