The subject of the article is an interesting form of scepticism which appeared in 15 and 16 centuries. My goal is to describe main features of this unique sceptical current and point out the aspects which distinguish it from the Antique (Phyrronian and Academic) scepticism. In discussing the views of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Charron and Francisco Sanchez, I attempt to demonstrate that specific feature of Renaissance scepticism was some kind of fideism. I also show that this current is not as naive, nor as insignificant, as many of historians have been arguing. On the contrary, I indicate that Renaissance scepticism was very important stream of thought and that it exerted a significant influence on modern thought.
In his article I examine some aspects of the conception of negative liberty, mainly in view presented by Isaiah Berlin in his famous Four Essays on Liberty. I try to prove that his dualistic conception of liberty is unsatisfactory and incomplete. It results from his one-sided and in fact incorrect analysis of positive liberty. Berlin wrongly identified positive liberty only with the source of oppression neglecting the fact that this kind of liberty is a necessary condition for liberal negative liberty he wanted to defend.
The presented article deals with two phenomena or two aspects of our consciousness of time: our elementary consciousness of time and the time of consciousness or the temporality of consciousness, especially regarded as consciousness experiencing time. The presentation of these issues serves as the starting point for the layered theory of consciousness.
There is an interesting common feature of all pragmatic philosophers. Their subtle considerations, accurate analysis and brilliant criticism often lead to trivial conclusions. The consequence of this is methodological trivialism whose examples we can find in the leading representatives of pragmatism: James, Dewey, Rorty and Putnam. In this article I am trying to characterize this trivialism as well as to answer a question about its source. I defend the hypothesis that this trivialism results from the fact that pragmatists do not have theoretical goals, but practical ones – very often political. Their attitude can be described as a variant of puritanism, because by promising to liberate from repressive philosophical tradition they ultimately offer a much more doctrinaire position.
The aim of this article is to characterize evolutionary epistemology and to indicate its relation with philosophical realism. I first part of text I examine relation between philosophy and biology as nature science. In second part I draw main assumptions of two main currents of evolutionary epistemology (evolutionary epistemology of mechanisms and evolutionary epistemology of theories). I third part I formulate several arguments against evolutionary epistemology’s demands for epistemological and ontological realism.
In the article I am trying one more time to examine G.E. Moore's Proof of an External World, including new views on the problem. The paper is divided in four parts, in which I am analysing following problems: (1) What is the object Moore's proof. (2) What is purpose of this proof. (3) What are Moore’s mistakes and shortcomings. (4) How it is possible to defend Moore's proof. The main hypothesis underlying these analysis is that if we will assume that Moore wasn't an "idiot" and philosophical ignoramus (how, according to John Greco's, many critics suggest), one should read his receipt out as attempt of the alteration of what is called today "classical” theory of the knowledge.
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