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EN
Legislative policy is understood in this paper as a holistic approach to the law-making process. EU legislative policy is missing the overall idea on how to legislate, a fact which has induced fragmentation, lack of cohesion and improper implementation of EU law. The goal of this study is not a theoretical discussion on the negative aspects of directive functioning, but to focus on selected imperfections of EU legislative policy and to illustrate them with examples of selected directives. My thesis is that EU legislative policy based on directives is far from perfect or even effective and requires definite changes. As a first step, using fragmentary regulations of particular domains (sectors) of socio-economic life should be stopped. Second, the EU legislature needs to make significant progress in terms of the legislative quality of the laws created. Finally, mechanisms requiring the implementation of directives by member states should be strengthened. These measures require prompt application if the EU legal system is to be an effective tool for, rather than obstacle to, European integration.
EN
The paper analyses the financial aspects of the electric Transmission System Operator (TSO-E), ultimately proving that TSO-E performs exclusively public works. Research conducted for the essay shows the disadvantages of the financing methodology and financial duties imposed on TSO-E. These disadvantages are not crucial only now, at a time when TSO-E is not making the necessary investments due to legal barriers and the investment process. However, it must be emphasised that removing the barriers will certainly show that the TSO-E financing system is illogical, the financial duties imposed on TSO-E are too far-reaching and, last but not least, the organisational form of the TSO-E is flawed. These are also the reasons that de lege ferenda proposals have been formulated to improve the current situation.
EN
This paper looks at the procedure for appointing statutory auditors in the context of the role of the audit committee – a new quasi-corporate body of listed companies. The committee was established as one of the elements that were to ensure the transparency of listed companies, particularly as regards balance sheet issues. Therefore, it is meant to be a guarantor of the public interest, ensuring complete correctness of the financial reporting process, which comprises, among other things, the need to appoint an independent and objective external auditor. The authors investigate whether statutory auditor appointment procedures in a group of banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange meet the regulatory requirements and also – even more importantly – whether they really satisfy the demand for the protection of a specific public interest.
PL
W artykule analizowana jest procedura powoływania audytora zewnętrznego w kontekście roli komitetu ds. audytu – nowego quasi-organu korporacyjnego spółek publicznych. Komitet został ustanowiony jako jeden z elementów mających zapewnić przejrzystość spółek publicznych, szczególnie w zakresie sprawozdań finansowych. Oznacza to, że jest on gwarantem interesu publicznego, zapewniającym pełną poprawność procesu sprawozdawczości finansowej, która uwarunkowana jest odpowiednią procedurą powoływania niezależnego i obiektywnego audytora zewnętrznego. Autorzy badają, czy procedura powołania audytora zewnętrznego w grupie banków notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie spełnia wymagania regulacyjne oraz, co jest istotniejsze, czy w rzeczywistości spełniane są wymogi ochrony szczególnego interesu prawnego.
EN
The essay constitutes comparative study of the regulations included in three normative acts: Act on payment of profits by companies totally owned by State, Act on Corporate Income Tax and Code of Commercial Companies. The research shows that payment of profit is similar to the legal construction of corporate tax. The similarity between the payment of profit and dividend is illusory. Current legislation on payment of profits by companies totally owned by State is defective and requires verification. The Act on Payment of profits should be annulled as constitutionally imperfect and detrimental to the market.
PL
Właściwy tryb powołania biegłego rewidenta w obrocie gospodarczym oraz jego kompetencje merytoryczne i etyczne stanowią warunek konieczny efektywności rewizji finansowej. Działalność biegłego rewidenta może być jednak optymalizowana, gdy po stronie badanego podmiotu (jednostki) odnajduje on właściwych partnerów merytorycznych. Poza członkami zarządu dotyczy to również członków rad nadzorczych. Zarysowujący się trend wzmacniania roli organów nadzoru korporacyjnego w szeroko rozumianym procesie sprawozdawczości i rewizji finansowej znajduje wyraz w przepisach ustawy o rachunkowości (np. w art. 4a tej ustawy). Przedmiotem opracowania jest ustalenie podstawowego kryterium pozwalającego przyjąć, że biegły rewident może odnaleźć partnera merytorycznego w procesie rewizji finansowej (kryterium tym jest niezależność członków rad nadzorczych). Celem opracowania jest także zbadanie stopnia występowania zjawiska niezależności członków rad nadzorczych w wybranych grupach spółek publicznych notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie.
EN
Employing an appropriate method of choosing an auditor together with his competence (both knowledge and ethical conduct) constitute conditio sine qua non of the efficient performance of financial audits. It should be noted that an auditor’s performance can be optimised only if he finds appropriate counterparts at the entity he is to audit. Apart from management board members, particular attention should be paid to the supervisory board members. Strengthening the position of the supervisory bodies in financial reporting and audit-related issues is becoming a more and more visible trend in current legislation (e.g. article 4a of the law on accountancy). The first purpose of this paper is to find a substantive criterion by which to determine whether an auditor has an appropriate counterpart within the entity he is auditing (this is the independence of the supervisory board members). The second purpose is to check how common it is for supervisory board members to actually be independent (examples of two groups of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are analysed).
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