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1

Alexander Dubček - československý politik

100%

Tůma O.

Soudobé dějiny (Contemporary History)

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2018

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vol. 25

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issue 3-4

391-399

EN

The author describes the evolution of views of the Czech society on Alexander Dubček (1921–1992) between 1968 and now in connection with political events in which Dubček himself participated. He sees the principal difference between the Czechs and the Slovaks in that the former do not perceive Dubček as a Slovak politician, but rather as a Czechoslovak one, in a broader, “common” sense of the word. In Tůma’s opinion, their view on Dubček evolved from initial, rather polite interest in the beginning of 1968, when Dubček became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to growing sympathies in the spring up to admiration and almost adoration the levels of which were, in the tensest moments of August 1968, just as high as those in Slovakia; then to increasing embarrassment mixed with pity, and fi nally to a rather critical and reserved attitude. These different views were previously replacing each other, but now, as the time goes by, they exist alongside each other. At the time when Dubček was banned from public life, during the so-called normalization, the attitude of the society toward him was losing its realistic dimension; while he was still popular among people, the popularity was associated with Dubček as a symbol of “socialism with a human face”, lost hopes, and better times. At the same time, critical refl ections of Dubček’s policy during the Prague Spring appeared among Czech dissidents. Since 1989, the Prague Spring and Dubček became a part of the political fi ght for the form of the ongoing social and economic transformation, which sometimes brought sharp attacks against him. As a rule, Czech historians are more critical toward Dubček than their Slovak counterparts, although there are staunch supporters of Dubček among them as well. The author concludes that today’s Czech society perceives Dubček without any special emotions, with a cool reservation, but also in a differentiated manner. Dubček is perceived as a part of our own history, but perhaps not as a historical fi gure we would like to be proud of.

CS

Autor přibližuje, jak se vyvíjely náhledy české společnosti na Alexandra Dubčeka (1921–1992) od roku 1968 do současnosti v souvislosti s politickými událostmi, jejichž aktérem byl. Základní rozdíl v českém vnímání oproti slovenskému nachází v tom, že Češi nevidí v Dubčekovi politika slovenského, ale československého v širším, „společném“ smyslu slova. Jejich názor na něj se podle Tůmy vyvíjel od původního, spíše zdvořilého zájmu na začátku roku 1968, kdy se Dubček stal prvním tajemníkem Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa, přes rostoucí sympatie během jara až po obdiv a takřka adoraci, jež si v nejvypjatějších momentech srpna 1968 nijak nezadala s pohledem ze Slovenska; a potom přes rostoucí rozpaky, promíšené s jistým politováním, až po poměrně kritický odstup. Tyto různé pohledy na Dubčeka se střídaly, ale s uplývajícím časem už existují souběžně. V době takzvané normalizace, kdy byl Dubček vyloučen z veřejného života, vztah společnosti k němu ztrácel reálnou dimenzi, a jestliže stále mezi lidmi přetrvávala jeho popularita, měla co dělat s Dubčekem jako symbolem „socialismu s lidskou tváří“, dřívějších nadějí a lepších časů. V českém disentu se zároveň objevily kritické reflexe Dubčekovy politiky za pražského jara. Po roce 1989 se pražské jaro a s ním i Dubček stali součástí politického boje o podobu probíhající společenské a ekonomické transformace, z čehož plynuly občas i ostré útoky na jeho osobu. Čeští historikové jsou k Dubčekovi celkově kritičtější než slovenští, i když i mezi nimi se najdou jeho pevní zastánci. Autor uzavírá, že dnes je Dubček v českém prostředí vnímán bez zvláštních emocí, s chladným odstupem, ale zároveň diferencovaně. Je vnímán jako součást našich vlastních dějin, přitom ale asi nikoli jako historická osobnost, jíž bychom se chtěli chlubit

2

Nejhorší možná varianta. Srpen 1968

100%

Tůma O.

Soudobé dějiny (Contemporary History)

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2008

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vol. 15

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issue 2

318-340

EN

This article mostly considers the conditions and reasons that culminated in the Soviet-led military intervention with four other Warsaw Pact states in August 1968 as the primary factor determining future Czechoslovak developments. The author first takes issue with two interpretations that point to the causes of the intervention as being in Soviet policy. The fi rst interpretation is by Jiří Fidler, a Czech historian, who considers paramount the military aspect, that is to say, the endeavour of the Kremlin to change the strategic balance in central Europe by deploying Soviet troops and nuclear weapons in Czechoslovakia. The author of the current article argues that this explanation is based on mere hypotheses unsupported by the archive records. He considers even more vague and unfounded the interpretation, typical of Western Kremlinologists before the Changes of late 1989, which sees the intervention as resulting from a power struggle amongst factions at the top level of the Soviet leadership. The decision to intervene militarily was, he argues, the result of an overall Soviet assessment of the situation in Czechoslovakia and the leadership’s endeavours to maintain the Communist régime here. On this basis, he then considers the circumstances that could – most probably in conjunction with each other – have prevented the intervention. An important factor that would have acted as a brake in this sense, he argues, was the possible involvement of the United States, whose timely warning of the negative consequences of the intervention for the policy of détente would have considerably complicated Soviet decision-making. Certain possible ways to infl uence events were also open to the Czechoslovak Reform Communists led by Alexander Dubček, whose waffling between the demands of the Czechoslovak public and the pressure of the Kremlin provoked the Soviets and also gave them the impression of Czechoslovak helplessness. By contrast, the Czechoslovak leaders could have chosen either to resist Moscow more openly or to retreat tactically to her demands.

3

Ankieta historyczna

33%

Anušauskas A., Dominiczak H., Eisler J., Gieseke J., Grajewski A., Jarosz D., Kratochvil I., Neubert E., Szapował J., Tůma O.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2003

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issue 1(3)

23-50

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Alexander Dubček - československý politik

Nejhorší možná varianta. Srpen 1968

Ankieta historyczna