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Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2019
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vol. 19
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issue 1
189-202
EN
It is generally assumed that the nature of the ban on the drinking of wine by women was customary or religious, although we cannot rule out the possibility of a mythological aetiology. Infringement was punishable, and a husband who caught his wife in the act could mete out severe retribution. In other circumstances the offending woman could be punished by her husband and relatives, probably within the framework of iudicium domesticum, or following her divorce by a judge, perhaps in a iudicium de moribus.
PL
Przyjmuje się, że zakaz picia wina przez kobiety miał charakter obyczajowy czy sakralny, choć nie można wykluczyć, że jego ajtiologia jest mityczna. Naruszenie tego zakazu było surowo karane przez męża, gdy złapał żonę in flagranti. W innych przypadkach kobiety mogły być karane bądź przez męża, ale przy udziale krewnych, prawdopodobnie w ramach iudicium domesticum, bądź po rozwodzie przez sędziego, być może w ramach iudicium de moribus.
Prawo Kanoniczne
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1997
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vol. 40
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issue 1-2
255-262
PL
Dalle informazioni trasmesse da Gellio da un lato risulta che la legge delle dodici tavole considerava postumus un bambino nato al massimo nel decimo mese. Dall’altro, pero, egli riporta che Marco Varro rivolgeva l’attenzione alla necessita di diseredare il postumus sia nato nel decimo che nell’undicesimo mese. Inoltre nel I secolo, il pretore Lucio Papirio assegno l’eredità al postumus nato nel tredicesimo mese. Nello stesso modo si comporto l’imperatore Adriano nel II secolo. Si pone, quindi, la domanda se non esistesse la regola formulata nelle dodici tavole che come erede del morto veniva considerato il bambino nato al massimo nel decimo mese, oppure tra le summenzionate fonti esiste una contraddizione. Sembra che non si tratti ne di uno né dell’altro. Queste apparenti contraddizioni si possono chiarire nel seguente modo. La legge delle dodici tavole stabiliva che come erede dei morto ab intestato veniva considerato il postumus nato al massimo nel decimo mese. Tale postumus, secondo questa legge, veniva trattato al pari dei figli nati durante la vita del padre, di conseguenza era un erede legittimo conformemente al diritto civile. Invece dalla decisione del pretore Lucio Papirio non risulta che egli applicasse il diritto civile. É solo noto che non concede la missio in bona all’agnato decidendo che la hereditas spettava al figlio nato dopo la morte del padre, anche se nel tredicesimo mese. Probabilmente tale soluzione risultava dall’applicazione del cosiddetto nuovo ordine pretorio ereditario, conformemente al quale dal padre ereditavano tutti i figli, non solo quelli che si trovavano sotto la patria potestas. Esso considerava prima di tutto il bene dei figli, e non le rigide norme del diritto civile. Poteva essere applicato anche in quei casi in cui il postumus fosse nato dopo dieci mesi dal momento della morte del padre e non poteva essere considerato un suus heres. La possibilitä che l’eredità venisse concessa dal pretore a coloro che erano nati nell’undicesimo mese era nota probabilmente gia a Marco Varro. Percio nella satira Testamentum consigliava di diseredare chiaramente al momento di fare il testamento tutti i postumi e coloro che erano nati nel decimo e undicesimo mese, per ogni evenienza. I dubbi furono definitivamente risolti dall‘imperatore Adriano che concedesse l‘erédita ad un nato nell’undicesimo mese.
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2017
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vol. 17
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issue 4
13-24
PL
Bibliografa publikacji Świętej Pamięci Profesora Janusza Sondla
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2017
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vol. 17
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issue 4
7-12
PL
Fidelis usque ad vitae exitum’. Świętej Pamięci Profesora Janusza Sondla (30 IV 1937 ‒ 12 IX 2017)
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Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2017
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vol. 17
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issue 4
217-234
PL
Marriage contracted under the provisions of canon law endows the newlyweds with a matrimonial bond which is indissoluble by its very nature; while the recognition of such marriages by the Polish State brings about the legal effects envisaged under the country’s civil law. Thus, if a couple who married in church later divorce, the civil effects of their marriage are terminated. In the event of an ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage its civil effects continue in force, unless the couple are also granted a divorce in a court. Te determination of the or nullity of a marriage contracted under canon law rests entirely with the Church authorities.
EN
Małżeństwo zawarte zgodnie z prawem kanonicznym stwarza miedzy małżonkami węzeł ze swej natury nierozerwalny, a uznanie takiego małżeństwa przez państwo wywołuje również skutki przewidziane w prawie cywilnym. W przypadku zatem rozwodu cywilnego, ustają skutki cywilne małżeństwa. W przypadku zaś stwierdzenia nieważności małżeństwa sakramentalnego, skutki cywilne nie ustają, chyba, że zostanie orzeczony rozwód. Stwierdzenie nieważności małżeństwa kanonicznego należy wyłącznie do kompetentnych instytucji kościelnych.
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Si morbus aevitasve vitium escit

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Prawo Kanoniczne
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1994
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vol. 37
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issue 3-4
47-57
PL
Considering the Twelve Tables today, it seems important to question whether the statute was humanitarian. It became also problematic for Roman lawyers six centuries after its passage. Aulus Gellius in Noctes Atticae (Gell.20.1.1)55) presents the dispute between philosopher Favorinus from Areate and Sextus Caecilius, who was a jurist. One of the main discussed provision was: Si morbus aevitasve vitium escit, [qui in ius vocabit] iumentum dato. Si nolet, arceram ne sternito (tab. 1.2 Gell.20.1.25). The philosopher alleged it was inhuman to interdict the delivery of a comfortable vehicle for a seriously diseased or for an old man who was unable to walk as well as to command the transport in ius on beasts of burden (Gell.20.1.11). Arguing that verbis moribusque sententia legum conprehensa est, the lawyer claimed that the Twelve Tables were humanitarian (Gell.20.1.24). It is because the provision had a different meaning (Gell.20.1.26), as morbus meant not a serious illness, which was called morbus sonticus by Decemviri, but usual problems with walking (Gell.20.1.27). Similarly, the iumentum was not only a beast of burden, but a country waggon as well (Gell.20.1.28). The country waggon should be delivered by a plaintiff to ill or aged dependents. However, if defendants had not been satisfied with the ordinary waggon, the plaintiff did not need to offer the comfortable vehicle (Gell.20.1.29)30). The jurist’s argumentation convinced the philosopher and was accepted by their audience.
Prawo Kanoniczne
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1988
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vol. 31
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issue 3-4
271-282
PL
Initially after the death of patris familias siblings created a community called ercto non cito. The name of this institution, that is ercto non cito appears only in Gellius’ (Gell. 1.9.12) and Servius’ (ad Aen. 8. 642-643). Whereas in the corresponding text of Gaius (G. 3. 154 a) appearing in that place lacuna was supplemented in editio princeps (PSI XI. 1182) with the words erctum non citum. Similar wording erctum citumque can be found in Festus (L. 72) and is likely to be found in Quintilianus (Inst. 7.3.13), while erctum cieri occurs in Cicero (de orat. 1.56.237). Gellius compares consortium ercto non cito with inseparabilis societas of Pitagoreans. Such comparison gives rise to a problem whether antiquum consortium was inseparabile or inseparabilis societas was like ancient consortium. The analysis of the above mentioned sources allows us to assume that erctum is used to mean hereditas destined for division, while citum signifies the activity of dividing hereditas. Thus the phrase ercto non cito would signify duration, and not division of hereditas, which is destined for the division, whereas the phrase erctum citumque (erctum cieri) signifies hereditas in the course of its dividing. As a result it can be stated that assimilation of consortium ercto non cito to societas of Pitagoreans seems not to be justified and moreover it is contrary to the corresponding sources, which treat consortium ercto non cito as community, though not divided but destined for the division. It serves temporarily the purpose of keeping the community of persons and things which existed during patris familias life also after his death.
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Prawo Kanoniczne
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1996
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vol. 39
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issue 3-4
215-226
PL
In the 2nd century B.C. in ancient Rome it was not required of the judges that they were conversant with the law. Every Roman citizen who had certain social status could be enroled on album iudiciorum selectorum. In The Attic Nights (Gell. 14.2) Gellius describes how after being chosen by the paetors among the iudices he sought texts in Greek as well as Latin on duties of a judge. But in complicated cases and in doubts engendered by conflicting opinions, such books simply could not help him. Aulus Gellius mentions one problem that was presented to him and that was a real conundrum. Namely a sun of money was claimed before him which was said to have been paid and counted out (pecunia non numerata) but the plaintiff did not support his case by witness, relying only on slender arguments. However, it was clear that he was on unimpeachable moral character while the defendant had a questionable reputation and was often convicted of mendacity, full of treachery and fraud. Since Gellius did not want to reach verdict precipitately, he consulted some friends of great legal experience. They had no doubt that the defendant should be acquitted and that it was no use retarding the proceedings since the plaintiff could not produce the legal evidence required (either expensilatio, mensae rationes, chirographum, tabulae obsignatae or testes). But Gellius knew well that if he had returned a verdict of not guilty, the plaintiff would have been subject to iudicium de calumnia. Therefore author of The Attic Nights didn’t feel satisfied and consulted Favorinus, a well-know philosopher. The latter proceeded to discuss various aspects of a judge’s function. He pondered, for instance, whether a judge should reach to verdict on the basis of his full knowledge or only in accordance with what has been brought up during the trial. In the end Favorinus advised Gellius a decision in favour of the plaintiff on the ground of his creditable character. Nevertheless Gellius could not make up his mind and accordingly took oath mihi non liquere and in that way he was relieved from rendering a decision.
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Leges de plebiscitis

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Prawo Kanoniczne
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1992
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vol. 35
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issue 1-2
237-246
PL
Nella definizione data da Capitone (Gell. 10. 20. 2) si legge che per lex deve intendersi una delibera di carattere generale votata da popolo о plebe su proposta della magistratura. L’efficacia vincolante dei plebisciti, in quanto votati dai soli plebei senza il concorso dei patrizi, veniva tuttavia messa in dubbio (G. 1. 3). Varie fonti (Plin. Nat. hist. 16. 10. 37; Gell. 15. 27. 4; D. 1. 2. 2. 8; Inst. 1. 2. 4) sostengono che i plebisciti siano stati equiparati alle leggi soltanto con l’emanazione della legge Hortensia. Il racconto di Livio informa tuttavia che l’efficacia dei plebisciti era già stata regolamentata in due leggi anteriori: in primo luogo nella lex de plebiscitis (Liv. 3.54-55), votata sotto il consolato di L. Valerio e. M. Orazio, che avrebbe equiparato alle leggi i plebisciti che erano stati votati subito dopo la secessione della plebe; e in secondo luogo nella lex de plebiscitis (Liv. 8. 12. 14-16), votata su proposta del dittatore Publio Filone, che avrebbe riconosciuto vincolante per tutto il popolo qualsiasi plebiscito cui fosse concessa l’auctoritas patrum. Ma in breve una successiva lex Publilia Philonis statui che l’auctoritas patrum avrebbe dovuto concedersi preventivamente; e per qualche tempo non fu chiaro se tale disposizione riguardasse anche i plebisciti. Il problema fu definitivamente risolto dalla lex Hortensia, emanata nel periodo della dittatura di Ortensio.
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Prawo Kanoniczne
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1989
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vol. 32
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issue 1-2
223-232
PL
Gellius (Gell 10.23..1-2), reffering to the victus and mores of the early Roman women, tells us that the drinking of wine (temetum) was forbidden to women. They were only allowed to drink the lorea, passum, murrina, and other sweet-tasting drinks of that kind. If women drank wine could be punished with the same severity as dultery (Dion. 2.25.6; Gell. 10.23.3). Cato, cited by Gellius (Gell. 10.23.5), has stated that the hasband has right to kill his wife taken in adultery. As regards repudation, says he, in the oration entitled On the Dowry (Gell. 10.23.4), thait iudex has the function of censor. If woman has been guilty of any wrong or shameful act, she is punished (multitatur), (if she has drunk wine or if she has done wrong with another man, she is condemned (condemnatur).
Prawo Kanoniczne
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1995
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vol. 38
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issue 3-4
231-240
PL
Aulus Gellius presented a discussion between a philosopher and a layer in his Noctes Atticae. According to Sextus Caecilius who was the lawyer the talon had been antiquated in the days of the Law of the Twelve Tables and it was substituted by pecuniary penalties. However, the praetor’s activity affected the abandonment of fines with amounts fixed in the Twelve Tables in favour of a penalty for iniuria which was estimated by a judge. It was similar the case of membri ruptio, when an offender had decided to avoid the talon. Yet Favorinus who was the philosopher emphasized that choice o f talon belonged to a sufferer. Nevertheless, he noted its cruelty and problems with the just execution of the talon. His attitude did not surprise: he took no account of social and legal circumstances not only of the time of the Twelve Tables, but of his own days as well. Defending the humanitarianism of the Twelve Tables, the layer analized their clauses in the broad cultural and legal context. He did not allege that the talon had been humanitarian, but he tended to clarify that the penalty had to be accepted by the offender and it was executed only on himself.
EN
The Roman People’s Assemblies differed depending on the fact whether all the citizens or only the plebeian gathered at them. Concilia plebis could vote plebisscita, which were at the beginning not binding for everyone. Finally, the leges and plebisscita became equal on the grounds of the lex Hortensia. The earlier laws had also dealt with this matter: the lex Valeria Horatia gave binding power to the plebiscites voted during the secession on the Mons Sacer, and the lex Publilia Philonis – to the plebiscites accepted by the Senate. The decisions of the assemblies which were not of the general character were called privilegia. In the case of such legal acts as adrogatio, testamentum calatis comitiis or detestatio sacrorum there was no rogatio and accordingly no lex was voted.
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In decem mensibus gigni hominem

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Prawo Kanoniczne
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1992
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vol. 35
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issue 3-4
197-210
PL
Noctes Atticae of Aulus Gellius is a collection of memoranda of a most miscellaneous description, dealing with literatury and grammatical criticism, philosophy, law, history and antiquarian topies. In 3. 16 there are references to the variation in the periods of gestation reported by physician and philosophers; moreover incidentally, to the views also of the ancient poets on that subject many other noteworthy and interesting particulars. To legal students the interest of this book of Aulus Gellius lies chiefly in the references contained therein to the ius trium liberorum and the provision of the XII Tables that a child is born in ten months and not in the eleventh month.
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Prawo Kanoniczne
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1986
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vol. 29
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issue 1-2
265-282
PL
L’expression sacrorum detestatio apparaît seulement deux fois dans les sources (Gell. 7.12.1; 15.27.3) sans explication plus précise. Cela donne lieu au fondement de diverses hypothèses, en la liant avec: le testament, Vadrogatio, la levée de sacra, l’institution de sacra, ou le serment. Cependant les hipothèses n’expliquent pas 1’essentiel de cet acte qu’ on accomplissait au comitia calata. On sait tout de même, qu’étant originaire de la législation royale (Festus, 260 L), ainsi que par la législation de XII tableaux (Servius, Ad Aen. 6.609) la sanction - sacer esto - donnait possibilité de tuer une personne reconnue comme sacer sans commettre parricidium. En voulant éviter la mort, une telle personne avait la possibilité de quitter le pays ou bien de faire des démarches pour la levée de la dé¬cision la reconnaissant comme sacer, en voie de provocatio ad populum. Cette provocatio fut examinée au comitia calata et la levée de l’appréciation en tant que sacer fut justement mentionné dans les sources sacrorum detestatio.
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2022
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vol. 22
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issue 2
267-280
EN
This article presents the questions Aulus Gellius puts in Chapter 20, Title 10 of his Attic Nights on the nature of rogatio, lex, plebiscitum, and privilegium, and the differences between them. He cites Capito’s defnition of lex as a generale iussum populi aut plebis rogante magistrate (“A law ... is a general decree of the people, or of the commons, answering an appeal made to them by a magistrate”) and observes that if this definition is right, then the measures de imperio Cn. Pompei, de reditu M. Ciceronis and de caede Clodii quaestio cannot be considered leges. These resolutions applied to specific persons and should therefore be considered privilegia. Aulus Gellius not only sees a distinction between concepts like lex, plebiscitum, privilegium, and rogatio, but also observes that the parties which contributed to the drafting of a legislative act were the magistrate (magistratus) on the one hand, and the people (populus), or of the commons (plebs) on the other hand.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono pytania stawiane przez Aulusa Gelliusa w rozdziale 20 tytułu 10 jego Noctes Atticae: czym jest rogatio, czym lex, czym plebiscitum, a czym privilegium i czym się one od siebie różnią. Przytaczając defnicję lex podaną przez Capitona jako generale iussum populi aut plebis rogante magistratu, Gelliusa stwierdza, że jeśli przytoczona defnicja jest poprawna, to nie mogą być nazwane leges uchwały: de imperio Cn. Pompei, de reditu M. Ciceronis czy de caede Clodii quaestio. Dotyczą one poszczególnych osób i należy je nazwać privilegia. Należy zauważyć, że Aulus Gellius dokonał nie tylko rozróżnienia takich pojęć, jak: lex, plebiscitum, privilegium, rogatio, lecz także zwrócił uwagę na udział przy tworzeniu ustawy z jednej strony magistratus, z drugiej zaś ludu lub plebsu.
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