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1

'THE APOGEE' OF SOUTH SLAVONIC RAPPROCHEMENT AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THE CONVENTIONS SIGNED BETWEEN BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA IN 1947 (1 AUGUST - IN BLED, AND 27 NOVEMBER - IN EVKSINOGRAD)

100%
Znamierowska-Rakk E.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2005
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issue 2
55-84
EN
Concrete efforts intent on establishing a south Slavonic federation, made by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia during the 1940s, were inaugurated during the last stage of the second world war. Generally speaking, those endeavours followed two courses. The first dated back to November 1944, when Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations initiated by Tito and his closest co-workers were conspicuously attended by the Soviet Union. It must be emphasised that the theme of this complicated and difficult dialogue conducted by Belgrade and Sofia involved not only the construction of a union, but also such questions as the completion of a mutual military-political alliance, and the resolution of the Macedonian question, organically linked with the planned federation. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1945, and chiefly owing to the determined resistance of the Anglo-American powers as well as the necessity of respecting their stand by Moscow, the negotiations between the two Balkans states were suspended. We may accept that the second stage of the route towards implementing the conception of a south Slavonic federation was inaugurated by the conventions signed by Dimitrov and Tito in Bled (1 August 1947). The contents referred to talks interrupted about two and half years ago, and together with the Bulgarian-Yugoslav convention on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, signed in Evksinograd near Varna on 27 November 1947, they comprised an apparent culmination of a several years-long rapprochement of the two south Slavonic states, full of mutual expectation and hope, but also teeming with disillusionment and various claims. The authoress analysed the international and domestic conditions which determined the course and outcome of the negotiations carried out by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations at the 1947 summits in Bled and Evksinograd. Furthermore, she discussed the implementation of the decisions made during those negotiations, pertaining primarily to the Macedonianisation of the Pirin Region.
2

The Determinants and Contents of the Resolutions of the Tenth Expanded Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) Concerning the Macedonian Question - August 1946

100%
Znamierowska-Rakk E.
Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
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2004
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vol. 39
183-218
EN
The establishment of the official stand of the Bulgarian communists as regards the Macedonian question at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (communist) in August 1946 ended an almost two-years long process, marked by the pressure exerted on Sofia by Belgrade and subservient Skopie for the purpose of incorporating the Bulgarian part of Macedonia into the Yugoslav Federation. However, as a result of the tenacious protest expressed by London and Washington, the Yugoslav leaders were compelled to suspend forcing through the direct incorporation of Pirot Macedonia into the People's Republic of Macedonia. Instead, they decided to pursue the profound Macedonianisation of a population, whose overwhelming majority regarded itself as Bulgarian. At the same time, it was planned to Macedonianise the Macedonian émigrés settled in assorted regions of Bulgaria.The instrument of this policy was, according to Belgrade, to assume the form of a national-cultural autonomy of the Bulgarian Macedonians. Nonetheless, this requirement caused among the Bulgarian leaders essential resistance and doubts, being perceived by society and the democratic opposition as contrary to the Bulgarian raison d'état. On the other hand, apart from the Yugoslav pressure on the Bulgarian Workers' Party a great impact was also exerted by the Soviet side, which opted for Macedonianisation. A further factor was the unregulated position of the Bulgarian state on the international arena - in the summer of 1946 the Paris Conference witnessed a struggle for determining the final conditions of the peace treaty with Bulgaria, forcing Sofia to turn for support to Belgrade. Yugoslavia's backing, especially in its capacity as a member of the anti-Nazi coalition, was of prime importance for Bulgarian interests. In this state of things, at the beginning of August 1946, the leaders of the Bulgarian communist party gathered at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers' Party, approved a complex programme of the Macedonianisation of Pirot Macedonia, and a planned incorporation of this territory into the People's Republic of Macedonia as part of Tito's Yugoslavia.
3

The Origin of the Idea of a Bulgarian-Yugoslav Federation and Its Decline (1945-1948)

100%
Znamierowska-Rakk E.
Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
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2006
|
vol. 41
135-153
EN
The article begins with a synthetic assessment of the origin of the idea of a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation, to be realised after the end of World War II. The author placed emphasis on the Macedonian question in view of the fact that one of the most prominent objectives of establishing a joint south Slavonic state was to resolve the persistent controversy between the Bulgars and the Yugoslavs. The article also discusses the supreme role of the Soviet Union in preparations for a south Slavonic union, drawing attention to the unequal political position of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, particularly conspicuous in negotiations held by the representatives of those states, who in 1944-1947 talked about setting up the titular federation and a mutual alliance. On the one hand, the article underlines external and domestic factors conducive (already during the war) for the establishment of a Yugoslav federation under the aegis of the local communist party, as well as the international acclaim of Josip Broz Tito and his prestige at home. On the other hand, the author stressed the difficult situation of Bulgaria on the international arena, caused by the fact that during the war Bulgaria was an ally of the Third Reich, with which the anti-Nazi coalition had not yet signed a peace treaty. The article ends by arguing that despite the differences between the two south Slavonic states directly interested in unification, the primary cause of the failure of the conception of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation was the collision of the political interests pursued by Belgrade and Moscow.
4

The Soviet Union and the Federation Plans of the Balkan States (1942–1948)

100%
Znamierowska-Rakk E.
Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
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2007
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vol. 42
205-220
EN
The authoress discusses the political game conducted by Stalin during the second world war and the early post-war years, and involving the conception of a Balkan federation. The Soviet dictator was a determined opponent of all federation plans concerning Central-Eastern Europe and perceived them as a threat for Soviet expansion in this macro-region. Consequently, in 1942 he brought about the downfall of the already prepared Polish-Czechoslovak confederation and contributed to the failure of the well-advanced Yugoslav-Greek union. Stalin's veto on plans for a post-war configuration of Central-Eastern Europe could not be ignored by the western powers in view of the stronger position held by the Soviet Union in the Big Three. Nonetheless, in order to counterbalance the rejected federation plans and, at the same time, to enjoy strategic, political and economic profits, the Soviet dictator proposed the establishment of a post-war Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, counting on the union's subjugation by the Kremlin. Soon afterwards, he became aware that the political leaders of Yugoslavia did not intend to be controlled by Moscow and tried to conduct an independent foreign policy which could prove to be a infections example for Bulgaria. In this state of things, Stalin, who aimed at thwarting the South Slavic union, embarked upon a tactic of camouflaged and interchangeable support for the divergent negotiation stands represented by Belgrade and Sofia; in 1948 his political game finally torpedoed the idea of a federation.
5

Towards a Decline of the Idea of a South Slavonic Federation (January-December 1948)

100%
Znamierowska-Rakk E.
Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
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2005
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vol. 40
205-244
EN
The presented text depicts the final stage in the attempts made in Bulgarian policies aimed at the realisation of a South Slavonic federation. This conception waned directly after the Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian meeting held at the Kremlin on 10 February 1948. After analysing the motives for the call to come to Moscow, made to the leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria by Stalin in order to admonish them for 'license' and to render them dependent upon the Soviet Union, the author went on to outline the course of the Kremlin debate, composed mainly of the charges and grudges formulated by the Soviet leader and addressed to the representatives of the highest authorities of both south Slavonic states.The outcome of agreements imposed on the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian delegations and dealing with the future 'consultations' by Sofia and Belgrade of all important decisions pertaining to international affairs, together with the tactical move made by the Soviet dictator and involving the immediate creation of a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation under Soviet control, proved to be totally different in the policies of each of the two states. Already at the beginning of March 1948 the party-government authorities of Yugoslavia unanimously rejected the planned union with Bulgaria. They did so particularly in view of the fact that at the time of the already open conflict between Belgrade and Moscow, the Bulgarian leaders openly supported the Soviet stand. On the other hand, the rulers in Sofia continued to accentuate the urgent need for a state union between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; they declared, however, that this step should be made after the 'Tito clique' was toppled by the 'wholesome forces within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia' and the appointment of new Yugoslav authorities, compliant to the Soviet Union. At the same time, Sofia continued the Macedonianisation of the Pirin Region despite the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, within the Yugoslav Federation, the People's Republic of Macedonia was no longer to act the part of Piedmont in the unification of the Pirin, Aegean and Vardar Macedonians; this function was now fulfilled by Pirin Macedonia in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. As the Yugoslavian-Soviet conflict grew more intense, international relations upon the Sofia -Belgrade line deteriorated, and in fact were broken at the end of that year. This development signified a definite decline of the very notion of a south Slavonic federation.
6

THE MACEDONIANISATION OF THE PIRIN REGION (1946-1947)

100%
Znamierowska-Rakk E.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2004
|
issue 4
127-147
EN
The authoress discusses in greater detail the arduous and relatively ineffective implementation of the national-cultural autonomy granted to the inhabitants of the Pirin Region. The population in question, whose overwhelming majority regarded itself as Bulgarians, opposed the administrative steps taken by the party authorities and FO, aimed at a radical and rapid transformation of Bulgarian national identity to Macedonian ethnic identification. It also remained well aware of the fact that the Macedonianisation of the Gornodzhumayski District was the onset of incorporating this territory into the People's Republic of Macedonia, within the Yugoslav federation. This fact was considered by the Pirin Macedonians to be tantamount to subjection to Serbian hegemony, which they ardently wished to avoid. She tries to prove that despite the multi-sided and intensified efforts supported by Belgrade and Skopje, and pursued by the central and local authorities of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communist) and FO, the Macedonianisation of the Region did not bring the anticipated outcome. The only tangible achievement was, in the eyes of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian pro-Macedonians, the result of a universal poll carried out in Pirin Macedonia. True, its reliability was tainted by the manipulations and large-scale forgeries performed during the poll campaign. Nonetheless, numerical data indicated the predominance of the Macedonian element in the Bulgarian part of divided Macedonia. Up to this day, this circumstance has been exploited by the supporters of the Macedonianism doctrine in their controversies with historians recognising the Bulgarian nature of the inhabitants of the Pirin Region.
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