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Rocznik Tomistyczny
|
2020
|
vol. 1
|
issue 9
355-369
EN
The aim of this paper is to show the conception of philosophical superstition understood as something which is without any doubt false but considered as undoubtedly true. The conception is presented in The Short Philosophical Dictionary of Superstitions of fr. Józef Maria Innocenty Bocheński OP. Philosophical superstition differs from superstition in general, understood as beliefs and practices grounded in conviction that there exist cause-effect relationships, which are impossible to be empirically proven but are thought to have supernatural origin. Bocheński draws from philosophical realism, including classical conception of truth, and claims that philosophical superstition is a cognitive distortion characterized by two: obviousness that a claim is false and universal conviction that this false claim is true. In this paper we present not only premises necessary to qualify some ideas as philosophical superstition but also fundaments that initiate the proces of their creation. According to Bocheński, we find remedy for superstitions in growing social significance of philosophers, whose main task would be to search and identify superstitions. For that reason, in this work we speak of topic of the social role of philosophy. Bocheński claims that not every philosophy is equally destined to fulfill this task for many philosophical ideas contributed to create superstitions. The author of the Dictionary made St. Tho-mas a specific guide on the path of searching and identifying superstitions. The additional aim of the paper is to show a historical context of perception of Bocheński’s book on philosophical super-stitions and describe his influence in various environments. We focus on numerous editions (in Polish and foreign languages) and on main revisions.
EN
This paper is an attempt to show the Thomistic approach of the ontic structure of norm for conduct of created rational beings. The basis for the statements is Treatise on Law of St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 90-97). There has been two external causes described, that is a formal cause, which shows the pattern of acceptance for a particular norm, and a material one, which is decisive with regard to its content. Additionally, the formal cause decides on the method of promulgation (announcement of co-ming into force) of the norm and on the method of its enforcement (coercive force, sanction). The content of norm (material cause) who is the object of the above protection cannot be any content, but a derivative of permissions subjected in nature (ius civile, ius gentium) and read out adequately by the intellect in the most possible way. Hence, natural law is the resultant of that what is subjected in the nature and the intellectual activity of man who attempts to cognize and articulate the nature. Such understood natural law is, according to Thomas Aquinas, a common fundament for various normative systems (ethics, morality, statute law and common law). The external causes of norm are hence the final cause which answer to the question on the purpose of norm (why do we establish a norm?) and the efficient cause which shapes the matter (content) of norm, and establishes its validity (form). The feature of the efficient cause is its competence for establishing norms present in its ability to secure the norms with a sanction. According to Aquinas, we find a fundament for any norm in the nature of reality whose reading from the normative perspective establishes a natural law. Any other normative systems are binding only when they participate, as specification for example, in natural law.
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