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1

Consciousness as Individuated Information in Action. A Universal Characterization

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Jonkisz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2016

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vol. 24

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issue 2

95-117

PL

The aim of the article is to formulate a universal characterization of consciousness, despite the conceptual vagueness of that term. The fundamental aspects of this phenomenon as studied by science consist of four features: its being accessible from the inside and the outside (subjectively and objectively), its being about something (referential), its being bodily determined, and its possessing a certain function (being useful). Approached in this way and in broad terms, consciousness seems to be a graded rather than all-or-none phenomenon. However, it is argued that the main problem for the gradational approach is to establish reasonable, empirically justified limits on how extended (locally and globally) the range of a graded consciousness could be. Such constraints should then help to avoid the counterintuitive consequences of IIT (Integrated Information Theory), which ascribes consciousness even to such simple artificial systems as photodiodes. The article introduces global limits for conscious systems by pointing to the ability to individuate information as a necessary developmental condition of subjective perspectives. Local limits, meanwhile, are determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Ultimately, the limits put forward imply that consciousness is to be characterized as individuated information in action.

2

Selected Problems in Consciousness Studies: Some Suggested Solutions

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Jonkisz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2019

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vol. 27

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issue 2

59-85

PL

Contemporary consciousness studies are a field that presents us with a multiplicity of more or less fundamental empirical and theoretical problems. Of these, the most basic concerns the lack of an unambiguous characterization of consciousness itself. There is no universal description of the phenomenon in question, or at least no widely accepted definition, while most working applications of the concept in articles, research projects or empirical trials vary significantly. A closely linked question concerns the relationship between consciousness and subjectivity: are the conscious states of an organism or system coextensive with its subjective states? Such an assumption, though by no means self-evidently valid, seems to be operative in many influential conceptions and theories of consciousness today. Yet another important issue within the current debate concerns the question of whether consciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon. This problem is particularly interesting because some researchers insist that it is very difficult to justify ascribing such gradedness to consciousness given its manifold dimensions. The aim of this article is to present and justify these solutions in a condensed form, while at the same time pointing out their consequences and related issues worthy of further study.

3

Concept of Consciousness in Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind – An Attempt at a Taxonomy

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Jonkisz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2012

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vol. 20

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issue 2

29-55

PL

The paper argues that dozens conceptions of consciousness encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of mind, and other related fields (e.g. phenomenal, access consciousness; sensorimotor, perceptual, self-consciousness; normal, altered and impaired consciousness, visual, tactile, social, body, animal, machine consciousness) can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental criteria i.e. epistemic (dealing with kinds of consciousness), semantic (concerned with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness) and pragmatic (types of consciousness). It is not only hoped that the resulting four-fold taxonomy is exhaustive and clear enough to serve as a sound theoretical framework for further scientific investigations but also that it implies the unity of consciousness. If the latter consequence is true it would mean that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness ultimately refer to a single unified natural phenomenon, analyzed under four just mentioned aspects. Even if the statement of the unity can be questioned the proposed taxonomy is itself an important step towards a proper formulation of a general concept of consciousness accepted in all fields of research.

4

Consciousness, Subjectivity, and Gradedness

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Jonkisz J.

Studia Semiotyczne

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2021

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vol. 35

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issue 1

9-34

EN

The article suggests answers to the questions of how we can arrive at an unambiguous characterization of consciousness, whether conscious states are coextensive with subjective ones, and whether consciousness can be graded and multidimensional at the same time. As regards the first, it is argued that a general characterization of consciousness should be based on its four dimensions: i.e., the phenomenological, semantic, physiological and functional ones. With respect to the second, it is argued that all informational states of a given organism are subjective (as they are biologically individuated), but not all are necessarily conscious. Finally, where the third question is concerned, in each of the four dimensions of consciousness a graded element is identified: quality of information in the phenomenological one, abstractness in the semantic one, complexity in the physiological one, and usefulness in the functional one. The article also considers certain consequences of the solutions proposed, as well as some practical applications of the 4D-view of consciousness.

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Consciousness as Individuated Information in Action. A Universal Characterization

Selected Problems in Consciousness Studies: Some Suggested Solutions

Concept of Consciousness in Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind – An Attempt at a Taxonomy

Consciousness, Subjectivity, and Gradedness