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JEVENÍ A DANOST. POZNÁMKY NA OKRAJ SOUČASNÝCH KONCEPTŮ FENOMENALITY

100%
Novotný K.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 5
434-450
EN
The postclassical conception of phenomenality, which represent the new French phenomenology is marked by an 'expropriation' of phenomena, certain autonomy of appearing as related to the subject of the (intentional) consciousness, as well as by certain autonomy of appearing as related to the world. A twofold question is asked about the appearing as such; it is this question the paper tries to outline: 'a phenomenon and nothing else but it' (M. Richir) and 'giving the phenomena themselves' (donation) (J.-L. Marion). In spite of their different starting points and different ways these and other authors deal with the problems they share one point: fundamentally appearing is an event: in its origin a phenomenon is not an instantiation of something else, i. e. a particular case of becoming, an actualization of some general, structure of potentialities, given in advance (i. g. of world, being, life, consciousness). Therefore it is always its own principle and so, in a sense, an 'ultimate' principle of Phenomenology.
2

Subjectivity and Embodiment of the Event of Appearing

100%
Novotný K.
Dialogue and Universalism
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2016
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issue 3
169-181
EN
The question of the subjective and embodied character of appearing that was an im-portant issue particularly in post-Husserlian phenomenology is posed in different ways and contexts by Edmund Husserl. One can see how—even according to the Ideas Per-taining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. The second book. Phenomenological Investigations of Constitution subjectivity was not grounded in the acts of the I that it lent the body its subjective character—thanks to the originally egoic character of its own experiences my body also can be my own. In the paper this position is confronted with a deeper foundation of subjectivity than the I of acts. Husserl also sees in deeper levels of lived experience an immediate, non-intentional self-immersion in one’s own experiences. The question that we would like to outline here is: in what sense this self-experience is necessarily bodily, what is the mutual relationship between subjectivity and bodiliness in the later Husserl’s works in respect to his con-ception of phenomenality.
3
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Ještě o fenoménech a povaze jevení

100%
Novotný K.
Svět literatury – Časopis pro novodobé literatury (World of Literature – Journal for Modern Literatures)
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2019
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vol. 59
125-134
EN
The paper deals with the fundamental phenomenological difference that one can find in philosophy as analysis and interpretation of the appearing of phenomena, established by Edmund Husserl at the very beginning of his thinking: the difference between the appearing as lived experience, and the phenomena as appearing entities. The paper skeatches some transformations of this motive in the late thinking of Husserl culminating in the analysis and interpretation of the „living presence“.
4

FENOMÉN MEZI INTENCIONALITOU A POČITKEM. LEVINAS A HUSSERL

100%
Novotný K.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 8
221-231
EN
The paper remembers some features of the Husserlian conception of the phenomenon in order to show the ways of the inversion imposed to it by Levinas, namely in his book 'Totalité et infini' and in his article 'Intentionnalité et sensation'. In these texts it is still possible to maintain a fundamental description of the phenomenon as 'experience/vécu/Erlebnis' even with 'intentionality' and 'sensation' as its components. The rejection of the concept of 'representation' as the very fundament of appearance by Levinas does not make obsolete any use of those concepts which locate an important dimension of the phenomenality to the interiority of the experience, in the subjectivity. Even if the subjectivity in Levinas seems to admit no homogeneous unity and seems to be constituted by the different kinds of the relations to an exteriority the phenomena implicated in these relations remain inner sensual experiences.
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