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EN
In early March 1919 the government of Ignacy Paderewski established the office of General Delegate of the Government for Galicia. This ended a stage of provisional management of the post-Austrian district, which resulted from political and systemic changes in the first months of the independent Polish state’s existence. New structures of authority, such as the Polish Liquidation Commission or the Ruling Commission, emerged in opposition to the Polish administration of Austrian times and were based on political and civic rather than professional factors. This complicated the situation so much that the administration of Małopolska by the government in Warsaw became difficult. The appointment of Kazimierz Gałecki as the General Delegate of the Government for Galicia and placing the official structures from the Austrian times at his disposal stabilised administrative relations in the lands of former Galicia, strengthening the authority of the reborn Polish state.
EN
In Poland, the current dispute flared up around the ritual slaughter, both Jewish (shechita) and Muslim (halal), as inhumane method of killing animals, thereby rendering them unnecessary suffering. The prohibition of ritual slaughter – as an example of unacceptable interference of the state in the Constitution‑guaranteed freedom of religion – has a wider dimension. It turns out that modern European liberal and democratic state of law has some trouble with a clear definition of such concepts as “religious freedom” and “independence of churches and religious associations”. This is due to the increasingly progressive ideologies of the modern state, which with reluctance, if not hostility, refer to the religious communities, that live according to the principles of revealed truth. Increasingly widespread belief becomes a fact that every religious community may make its own rules arising from religious orders, but only if they do not go beyond the principle of equality before the law, lifestyle choice or equality between women and men.
EN
The aim of the article is to show that the concentrated system of constitutional protection in the republic of Austria – commonly referred to as the Kelsen sys- tem – was a legacy of the systemic practice and legal thought from the times of the Habsburg monarchy. The model of constitutional protection adopted in 1920 was based principally on the legal structures of old Austria, adapted to the new federal state system. The analysis of legal grounds of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal suggests that there occurred a transfer of legal solutions to the republican constitutional order rather than the emergence of a new type of constitutional judiciary that would protect the objective constitutional order by means of abstract control of the constitutionality of law. The control of the constitutionality of law in Austria at the time was, in principle, concrete. The article also provides justification for the idea that it is Georg Jellinek to whom we owe the idea of abstract control of the constitutionality of law. Even though it was revitalized by H. Kelsen, it did not become part of the constitutional protection model in the First Austrian Republic.
EN
Georg Jellinek, when in 1885 he devised the concept of a constitutional court which was to control the legislative branch of government, was aware that the guard of the constitution would be free from any external control or constraints. Therefore, in that context, he expressed concerns that the judges making decisions in cases touching upon political and systemic issues may themselves be prejudiced due to their political inclinations and consequently violate the rules of impartial judicial decision making. Jellinek was correct in his predictions. In 2015 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment K 34/15, in which it examined the constitutionality of the Constitutional Tribunal Act, transgressed the boundaries of its jurisdiction while falling below the desired standard of objectivity. On numerous occasions the court failed to meet the criteria of rational legal reasoning and includes a significant degree of discretion in its interpretation of constitutional provisions.
EN
In both American and European academic debates on the legal nature of hate speech arguments of historical-legal character are frequently overlooked. In fact, hate speech is not a contemporary “invention”. The content of this term was defined more than 150 years ago in the legal codes of absolutist monarchies, e.g. in the Austrian Criminal Code of 1852. This served as the basis for penal repression aimed in the Austrian constitutional monarchy at opposition media outlets, nationalist as well as socialist. Curbing hate speech in the Habsburg Monarchy had the characteristics of repressive censorship, widely used under what was called the objective criminal procedure that led to limiting the constitutional freedoms of speech and press, authorized by the December Constitution of 1867. The historical example of the Austrian monarchy shows that hate speech as a legal construct is placed in opposition to freedoms of speech and press. Correct construction and accurate application of vague and underdetermined terms employed by legislation penalizing hate speech is contingent upon the „sensitivity” of the judges. Austrian courts were careful in examining allegations of verbal attacks motivated by one’s hostility towards an ethnic, national, religious or political group. Juries, which would often acquit the accused, were motivated by a concern that the authorities may take advantage of the law governing hate speech to contain the spread of opinions disapproved thereby. As a consequence, Austrian prosecution pleaded their case before a court comprised of jurors exceptionally rarely in hate speech cases (so-called subjective procedure). Denouncements of governments’ inadequacy in fighting hate crimes see to overlooked the danger triggered by penal repression founded on laws on hate speech. Troubles induced by construction thereof have been espoused in the judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
PL
1. Wprowadzenie; 2. Ochrona praw narodowości w orzecznictwie Trybunału Państwa; 3. Polscy „glosatorzy” wyroków Trybunału Państwa; 4. Zakończenie.
PL
1. Wprowadzenie; 2. Ochrona konstytucji według koncepcji parlamentu frankfurckiego; 3. Kwestia kontroli konstytucyjności prawa w Niemczech; 4. Austriacki Trybunał Państwa - pierwszy sąd konstytucyjny w Europie; 5. Uwagi końcowe.
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