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PL
W ostatnich latach dużo uwagi poświęcono wynagrodzeniu członków zarządu w spółkach, w szczególności z sektora bankowego. Wiele badań wskazało wpływ niewłaściwej polityki wynagradzania na podejmowanie przez menedżerów nadmiernego ryzyka i skupiania się na krótkookresowych wynikach spółki. Niewiele zaś uwagi poświęcono wynagrodzeniom osób pełniących funkcje w organie nadzorującym. A przecież to do ich kompetencji należy określanie zasad wynagradzania i wynagrodzeń menedżerów. Członkowie rady nadzorczej za swoją pracę otrzymują wynagrodzenie. Jednakże ze względu na specyfikę ich pracy – spotykają się tylko kilka bądź kilkanaście razy w roku – procedury ustalania poziomu ich wynagrodzenia różnią się od tych dla członków zarządu, niższej kadry kierowniczej, czy też szeregowych pracowników. Celem artykułu jest ocena transparentności procedur ustalania oraz wysokości wynagrodzenia członków rad nadzorczych w bankach notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie. Zostanie zbadane jakie czynniki wpływają na wypłacanie przez banki wynagrodzenia członkom rad nadzorczym, a także czy występują różnice w wynagrodzeniach ze względu na pełnione w niej funkcje.
EN
In recent years, much attention was paid to the remuneration of management board members in companies, particularly in the banking sector. Many studies have pointed to the impact of inadequate remuneration policy on excessive risk taking by managers and focusing on short-term results of the company. Little attention, however, has been paid to remuneration of persons performing functions in the supervisory body. Yet, it is their competence to define the principles of managers’ remuneration. Members of the supervisory board receive remuneration for their work. However, due to the nature of their work - they meet only a few or several times a year - the procedures for determining the level of their remuneration are different from those for the members of the board, lower executives or rank and file employees. The aim of this paper is to assess the transparency of the procedures for determining the remuneration and its amount for members of supervisory boards in the banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. This paper examines what factors influence the remuneration paid by the banks to members of the supervisory council, and whether there are differences in remuneration due to the position held by these members.
EN
The ineffective executive compensation policy and excessive risk taking by managers in companies in the banking sector have been considered the main source of the outbreak of the recent financial crisis. These conclusions have led to new regulations which encourage companies to make executive remuneration dependent on the performance of the company in the long term, through the deferred portion of the salary. For this purpose a number of different financial instruments can be used, such as stocks, options and restricted stock, or increasingly used phantom stock plan. Phantom stock is a kind of compensation scheme which entitles its holder to receive a cash payment at a designated time in the future. Thanks to the fact that the amount of payment is linked mostly to the share price, the company can be confident that the actions of top executives will be aimed at achieving good performance over a long period of time. Moreover, this type of remuneration, compared to shares or stock options, does not necessitate the increase of the share capital since employees do not receive actual shares. Owing to these advantages phantom stock plans may become one of the basic elements of variable remuneration. This paper examines whether the Polish public banks use phantom stock plans to remunerate managers and to what extent the banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange use phantom stock plans and what information about them they reveal. The analysis showed little interest in phantom stock plans which can be explained by the fact that the Polish public banks only since 2012 have been required to pay managers also through deferred variable remuneration. Some banks may be only in the process of introducing such plans, and therefore decided not to disclose details. For example Alior Bank, ING and PKO BP, have only mentioned this instrument of remuneration in their reports. In addition, ten banks had other long-term incentive plans which could discourage them from using this form of remuneration. Phantom stock plans as part of the variable remuneration of top executives in the Polish banking sector can be considered a new idea, taking into account the fact that the first information about their use appeared only in 2012. For this reason, it is not yet as popular as stock options. However, it can be assumed that this type of remuneration will gain in importance in the future which will improve the quality of bank disclosures.
EN
Inefficient remuneration policies in the financial sector have been recognized as one of the main causes of the recent financial crisis. This is because it encouraged executives to take excessive risks, and focus on short-term results, which could bring high annual bonuses. The crisis was followed by a series of reforms of the regulation of executive remuneration policy at international and national levels. In Poland, the deepest changes in the executive remuneration policy took place in the banking sector. They resulted from the transfer by the Polish Financial Authority of regulations from the Directive of the European Parliament of 2010, to the Polish Resolutions of 4 October 2011, as well as from the implementation of the regulations from the Directive of the European Parliament of 2013 to the Polish Act of August of 2015. However, little is known about changes in regulations in other companies operating in the financial sector. The aim of this article is to present new regulations regarding remuneration policy of executives in brokerage houses. The study examines the extent to which brokerage houses operating in Poland have implemented new rules. The analysis shows that the variable components remuneration policy in brokerage houses is not widespread (it is not applied by about 40% of financial institutions or they do not provide any information). This may be due to the fact that the Ordinance of the Minister of Finance is the first of this type of regulations addressed to brokerages. Because of that, they may initially approach the concept of remuneration involving variable components with a certain distrust. However, we can assume that from year to year more and more brokerages will decide to use this policy.
PL
Analiza budżetów gmin miejskich prowadzona na tle pozostałych typów administracyjnych gmin daje z jednej strony podstawy, aby pozytywnie ocenić ich sytuację dochodową, ponieważ w ich dochodach ogółem większość stanowią dochody własne. Z drugiej jednak strony niekorzystne zmiany w sytuacji demograficznej i społecznej miast wynikające z procesów suburbanizacji oraz starzenia się ludności negatywnie oddziałują na ich strukturę dochodów. Konsekwencją tego procesu może być spadek ich samodzielności finansowej i w efekcie ograniczenia w rozwoju społeczno- ekonomicznym. Przemiany demograficzno-społeczne zmuszają ponadto władze lokalne do podejmowania wysiłków zapewniających miastom utrzymanie ich atrakcyjności oraz dostosowanie się do nowych oczekiwań ludności. Wiąże się to z koniecznością zwiększenia wydatków inwestycyjnych i często poziomu ich zadłużenia. Celem badań była diagnoza poziomu i zmian w zakresie własnego potencjału dochodowego i zadłużenia gmin miejskich województwa wielkopolskiego latach 2005–2016. Badania przeprowadzono na podstawie danych pochodzących z Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego oraz Ministerstwa Finansów. Badania przeprowadzono dla 226 gmin województwa wielkopolskiego, wśród których było 19 gmin miejskich, w tym 4 gminy na prawach powiatu (Kalisz, Konin, Leszno i Poznań). W wyniku przeprowadzonych badań stwierdzono, że w okresie 2005–2016 nastąpił w gminach miejskich wzrost poziomu własnego potencjału dochodowego, jak również poziomu dochodów własnych per capita. Jednakże ze względu na niższe średnioroczne tempo wzrostu własnego potencjału dochodowego w porównaniu do tempa wzrostu dochodów ogółem w przypadku gmin miejskich można mówić o spadku znaczenia własnego potencjału dochodowego w finansowaniu działalności tych samorządów lokalnych. Wśród rozpatrywanych typów gmin miejskich obsługa zadłużenia w największym stopniu obciążała dochody własne Poznania i pozostałych miast na prawach powiatów.
EN
In comparison with other administrative types the analysis of urban communes’ budgets provides grounds for a positive assessment of their income situation, as the majority of their total income is made up of their own. On the other hand, growth detrimental changes in the demographic and social makeup of towns, resulting from suburbanization and population aging, have a negative impact on their income structure. The consequence of these processes may be a decrease in their financial self-sufficiency and, as a result, a reduction in their socio-economic development. Demographic and social change also forces local authorities to make efforts and ensure that towns remain attractive and adapt to new expectations of their residents. This in turn translates into increasing investment expenditures and often indebtedness. The aim of the research was to diagnose changes of own income potential and indebtedness of Wielkopolska province communes in the years 2005–2016. The survey drew on data from the Central Statistical Office and the Ministry of Finance for 226 communes of Wielkopolska province, among which were 19 urban communes, including 4 communes with county rights (Kalisz, Konin, Leszno and Poznań). The research found that in the period 2005–2016 the level of own income potential as well as the level of own income per capita increased in urban communes. However, due to the lower average annual growth rate of own income potential compared to the total income growth rate, the importance of own income potential in financing the activities of urban communes has decreased. Among the studied types of communes, debt service was the one which most heavily burdened the own income of Poznań and other cities with the rights of county
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