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1

THE COGNITION OF PURELY INTENTIONAL OBJECTS

100%
Krokos J.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2008
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vol. 36
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issue 2
15-23
EN
Roman Ingarden devoted many of his philosophical works to the question of purely intentional objects. According to him, works of art are such objects. He investigated their ontological and epistemological aspects. Taking inspiration from his remarks on the cognition of purely intentional objects, and referring to Edmund Husserl's investigations, this paper sketches a general scheme of the cognition of such objects. The cognition of primarily intentional and secondarily intentional objects is described separately.
2

The Truth of Conscience

100%
Krokos J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2007
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vol. 16
|
issue 1(61)
139-153
EN
Following the lead of Thomas Aquinas and taking phenomenological analyses as his starting point the author undertakes to analyze conscience as a specific form of cognition, a source of knowledge about something. He contends that conscience is an axiological awareness that one's own or somebody else's action is recognized and placed within his/her own internal cognitive horizon. This recognition consists in making use of the first norm of action (synderesis) and by observing other principles of moral knowledge that are honored by the conscionable man for whatever reasons. Recognition of an action by conscience proceeds only vaguely when the subject initially realizes no more than he/she or somebody else has done something. Subsequently the character of the action becomes clearer when the 'beam of intention' attaches to it. In this phase the action is identified as either good or bad, and it elicits a response from the evaluating subject. Thus conscience assesses an action adequately if the action is honestly recognized in its complete structure, if it is placed in the horizon of unabridged moral knowledge of the evaluating subject who holds this knowledge as valid and retains it enduringly.
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