Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 9

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Przestępczość przeciwko mieniu w Polsce w latach 1924–2005 w świetle danych statystyki policyjnej

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
2008
|
issue XXIX-XXX
119-131
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Koncepcja podkultury przemocy a wyjaśnianie przestępczości agresywnej

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
1987
|
issue XIV
7-42
EN
This article dears with some problems related to application of Wolfgang’s and Ferracuti's subculture of violence theory explanation of violent criminal behaviour. Wolfgang and Ferracuti adopted in their concept cultural  approach to explanation of crime in general, and violent crime in  particular. Doing so, they rejected openly usefulness in this particular area of Merton’s anomie theory. They adopted so-called normative theory of culture, when means that they understand under the term culture a normative system consisting of values, norms and behavioral patterns, which exert pressure over individuals being under their influence, what results in uniformity of human behaviour. Application of this concept in criminology means that there may exist specific normative systems containing such values and norms which may lead individuals influenced by them to criminal behaviour. In other words it means, that when we observe within certain social group high criminality rates, higher than the average ones in a given society we may explain  them in terms of  the specific features of the culture of this group. This way of thinking is not totally new in American criminological literature. The best example of it constitutes W.B. Miller’s concept of flower-class culture as a generating milieu of gang delinquency. Wolfgang and Ferracuti claim that disproportionately high rates of violent crimes among and members of American lower-class (especially members of ethnic minorities) result from specific subculture existing within this social group, which they call subculture of violence. This subculture is the specific normative system which is characterized by tolerance and permissiveness which respect to the use of violence in interpersonal relations. The use of violence is  perceived by members of such subculture as something normal and natural, they do not consider it as either illegal or immoral. On the contrary, violent people showing physical prowess and readiness of high enjoy many social rewards, high social status and prestige. People who do not conform to the requirements of such subculture face many troubles within their groups, including even possible ostracism.             Wolfgang's and Ferracuti's concept contains evidently two separate layers. The first one, sociological, deals with subculture of violence as a social phenomenon and the problems related to the existence, functioning and transmission of violence related norms and values within society. The concept of subculture itself plays here a key role. The second one, psychological, deals with psychological consequences for the individuals of being under influence of such subcultural ethos. The main concern here are changes in attitudes and ways of perceiving environment resulting from the adoption of subcultural values, which one observes among violent people. These two layers are connected by very important thesis that aggression and violence constitute learned behaviour deeply internalised in the personalities of individuals. As it was said before subculture of violence thesis was conceived by Wolfgang and Ferracuti primarily to explain excessively high rates of violent crime among members of American lower class. But they point out as well to other examples of such subcultures as for example barbaricino code in Sardinia, customary vendetta in Albanova district in Italy, Colombian violencia or ,,criminal tribes'' in India. All  this means that they treat their concept as a broader integrated criminological theory of violent criminal behaviour not limited to specific American context.      One can point out to many attempts in the USA at empirical verification of the violent subculture thesis. First of all it is necessary to mention researches done by S. Ball-Rokeach and H. Erlanger. They attempted to verify Wolfgang's and Ferracuti's claims that there must exist significant differences in value systems and attitudes towards the use of violence between violent and non-violent persons, and that people who engage very often in violent incidents enjoy within their communities many social rewards including high status and prestige. The subculture of violence thesis was also used to explain a well-known in the American literature phenomenon of excessively high rates of violent crimes, especially homicides in the southern states. Among attempts at cultural explanations of this phenomenon one can point out first of all to contributions by Hackney, Gastill and Erlanger as well. All mentioned above researches hardly brought conclusive results. They involve many methodological shortcomings' and generally speaking seem to be too simply conceived, using too crude tools to pretend to be real tests of the subculture of violence thesis. This concept still awaits real, comprehensive attempt at empirical verification.             When evaluating Wolfgang's and Ferracuti's concept from the theoretical point of view one has to start from the proposition which seems - as it was said before-to constitute the core of the entire concept: aggression and violence constitute learned behaviour. At this moment it is easy to observe similarity with E. D. Sutherland's differential association theory. Sutherland was speaking about conflict between criminal and non-criminal cultures. Existence of this conflict made it possible for an individual to have contacts with patterns of both criminal and law-abiding behaviour.  Prevalence of one of them in the immediate environment of the individual decided about its future behavior. Very similarly Wolfgang and Ferracuti speak about the conflict between dominant culture (which they call non-violent culture) and subculture (which they call subculture of violence). This conflict makes possible differential association in the Sutherland’s meaning of the term. There is however one important difference. Sutherland, as it is well know, was strongly influenced in his thinking by G. H. Mead’s symbolic interactionism and sociology of Ch. H. Cooley, what resulted in particular attention paid to the primary social groups  and direct interaction. For Sutherland the process of learning criminal behaviour could take place only by means of direct interaction within primary social groups. It is not easy to interpret Wolfgang’s and Ferracuti’s theory with respect to this problem, as they are not very explicit within the subculture. It makes it necessary to  carry out a more detailed analysis of what they understand under the term subculture. They say on the one hand that the concept of subculture is strictly connected with the concept of social group. It seems however that this last concept they understand very broadly, when they say that individuals  sharing certain values, norms and behavioral patterns constitute social  groups. This means that under the term subculture they understand just individuals sharing particular norms and values, at least partly distinct from those existing in the dominant culture. This means as well that such sharing of values does not require direct interaction between individuals. It leads finally to a very important statement that subculture may exist widely dispersed spatially. It is necessary to underline that such understanding of the term subculture is not totally alien even to the contemporary adherents  of symbolic interactionism. An article by A. Fine and S. Kleinman constitutes clear example. The essence of this approach is an attempt to avoid ,,reification’’-as above authors call it-of the concept of subculture, what means equaling it with certain social structure, in other words social group. It seems however that one should not press this point of view to the extreme. Interpretation of the meaning of the term culture in terms of individuals behaviour is quite popular in social anthropology, to mention only R. Linton. But it may lead also to certain consequences absurd from sociological and behaviour point of view. It may mean that if somebody behaves in a certain way, he adheres to certain norms and values of which his behaviour is a result. If not, it means that he  does not adhere to them. In fact, it is a great simplification from the point of view of the mechanisms of human behaviour. In such a situation the concept of subculture lacks clear empirical meaning and loses its explaining potential. It seem  that Wolgang's and Ferracuti's stance results from a very individualistic approach paying attention only to the relation culture-individual, while neglecting a very important one: culture-social group.  Very helpful in solving presented above problems may be more detailed analysis of the psychological mechanisms of learning. What is interesting is that Wolfgang and Ferracuti do not go into details with respect to this, and mention only eventual usefulness of either Eysenck's or Bandura’s concepts. This lust one seems to be particularly suitable for the purposes of interpreting subculture of violence concept. Bandura's concepts of observational learning, as well as clear distinction between learning and performance, and analysis of the process of learning from three separate points of view, i.e. acquisition mechanisms instigation mechanism and maintenance mechanisms may be here particularly useful. It means that subculture of violence supplies to individual patterns of violence and aggression which are observed, memorized and in this way learned. It is also obvious that these patterns are not supplied by abstract subculture itself, but by behaviour of other individuals in the immediate environment. It is clear however that there are no people who behave constantly violently, what Wolfgang and Ferracuti admit, but do not elaborate on it. Learned violent patterns may result in violent behaviour only sometimes, when they meet necessary instigating stimuli. They may become more consistent and durable behavioral patterns only when necessary maintaining mechanisms come into being. It is obvious that subculture of violence may, serve as the supplier of both instigating and maintaining mechanisms. Especially these last may be very important. Bandura provides a very important distinction between internal and external control of human behaviour .Internal control means rewards, reinforcements coming from the individual's self. Here internalized values and norms come into action and play on important role. Behaviour, being in accordance with them brings satisfaction to the individual. This aspect of maintaining mechanisms constiutes main subject for Wolfgang and Ferracuti. But there is another one: external control, reinforcements, rewards coming from social environment, from social groups. Wolfgang and Ferracuti pay less attention or almost none to this aspect, because to analyse it one has to connect the meaning of the term subculture with the term social group, what they refuse to do. External control can not be an attribute of subculture itself. It is the function of groups. When one recognizes that subcultural system may be analysed only as a normative system of given- social groups, the possible influence of it becomes much broader. In such an interpretation subcultural influence is not limited only to mechanisms of internal control. Individuals may behave violently because they receive many external rewards for such behaviour. Because of this violent behaviour does not have necessarily to bring special satisfaction to the individual. Such behaviour may result from well known in social psychology mechanisms of group pressure and conformity with group standards.    In sum, it seems to be very profitable to use Bandura’s social learning theory to interpret and to broaden Wolfgang's and Ferracuti’s subculture of violence thesis. It is necesary of course to modify their use of the term subculture and connect it strictly with social structures and groups. In such a situation subcultural influence from the psychological point of view may not be limited to the mechanisms of internal control but extended to the external control by social groups, -what makes possible application of the theory as a theory of violent behaviour in general.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Prawo karne wobec środków odurzających i psychotropowych (z problematyki teorii kryminalizacji)

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
1995
|
issue XXI
41-79
EN
The present policy of all countries of the world  towards narcotic  and psychotropic drugs is in fact prohibitionIST. This means that all circulation of such drugs  ‒ their manufacture, transport, import, export, introduction into trade, giving,  and sometimes also possession – is illegal and carries most severe penal sanctions in some cases. It should be borne in mind, though, that this prohibition is ONLY about eighty years old now. Before, despite a large numer of addicts (not at all smaller than today according to some estimations), purely medical approach to such persons prevailed, and the drugs were subject only (if at all) to some administrative control and rationing at most. The drug prohibition emerged immediately after World War I, chiefly in United Stetes. As can be judged today, the criminalization of drugs and addicts introduced in those days was highly emotional. For this reason, by no means the harmfulness of narcotic and psychotropic drugs on both the individual and the social scale, one should consider the use and reasons of prohibitive policy from the viewpoint of today’s standards of rational criminalization. It is unquestionable that any social policy with respect to drugs should aim first and foremost at reduction of their consumption. The question remains, though, about the extent to which prohibition and penal law can actually serve towards this aim. Universal in the world of today as it is, the prohibitive approach to drugs assumes a variety of forms. There are different models of prohibition which base on different penal law regulations. They can be classified in two dimensions: restrictiveness vs. permissiveness, and repressiveness vs. treatment. Te first of the above dimensions pertains to the extent of criminalization; the other one – to treatment by the law of addicted offenders. Restrictive systems are those which provide for absolute prohibition with no exceptions whatever and ban all circulation of drugs, possession included. Instead, permissive systems provide for  an extent of decriminalization of that circulation, chiefly with respect to possession of drugs. Involved here is usually decriminalization, or even total depenalization of possession of specific amounts of drugs or drugs possessed for a specific purpose as e.g. own consumption. This depenalization can be introduced not only by substantive law but also by procedural provisions law. In this latter case, elements of expediency are introduced, offering the prosecutor or court the possibility to discontinue proceedings or to drop the charge. Repressive systems treat addicted offenders like all the other offenders, applying to them regular penal sanctions both for traditional criminal offenses (as e.g.. theft), and for the “prohibitive” ones (such as possession of drugs). Treatment-oriented systems, instead, reflect a belief as to futility of punishing addicts: within tchem, attempts are made at implementing a principle “tratment instead of punishment”. In most cases, this means that an addict can avoid penal sanction if he submits to withdrawal treatment. The actual application of such provisions on conditional stay of proceedings usually depends on the seriousness of the offense committed. It can be stated that most of today’s European legislations try more or less consistently to combine elements of permissiveness with the treatment orientation. Particularly useful in the analysis of the reason and sense of prohibition are specific economic notions and categories used successfully within so-called economic approach in criminology: demand and supply. Therefore, to what extent are prohibition and penal law capable of reducing the demand for narcotic and psychotropic drugs? First, the demand for those substances is created by a great variety of categories of individuals. The first such category are the consumers. This group, however, is by no means uniform as it consists of both addicted persons, occasional users, and experimenters. Another group which is of great importance in terms of the aims of prohibition are potential consumers, that is practically the whole of socjety if we take the extreme approach. Penal law can influence those groups through its instruments of special and general prevention. The possibilities of applying individual prevention to addicts or occasional users are minimal, though, which results from the very essence of addiction. It is a general opinion today that punishment cannot force an addict to give up his addiction. Only therapy can potentially be successful here; but – an extremely important issue – therapy to which a person submits voluntarily. Today’s spread of this opinion is expressed in the above-mentioned principle of “treatment instead of punishment”. It means that, the very principle of prohibition preserved, penal repression with respect to addicts is avoided. In this interpretation, the individual preventive action of punishment is reserved for the group of persons who experiment with drugs (as it would be simply impossible to criminalize a mere wish to take drugs). The question still remains, though, whether punishment as a form of shock therapy makes any sense here. The general preventive effect of penal law assumes the forms of either deterrence or so-called positive prevention. Deterrence is entirely out of the question in the case of addicted drug consumers due to the considerable rigidity of their demand. Yet deterrence is just as inefficient with respect to potential consumers. This is caused by a huge dark number of “prohibition”, resulting from their specific nature of offenses without no victims: the police encounter immense difficulties trying to disclose such acts. Most legislators try to make up for these weak points introducing severe statutory penalties. This is ineffective in the light of the long-discovered truth that it is rather inevitability than severity of punishment that determines the effectiveness of deterrence. A similar problem arises with respect to potential integrative function of penal law. The question is whether this kind of function – consisting in reinforcement of specific values with the aim to integrate a group – can really be performed by relatively seldom euforced provisions such as no doubt the penal law provisions designed to safeguard prohibition. What remains, therefore, is just the argument, classically used when discussing the problem of decriminalization, that this step might be interpreted as a consent to a specific behavior (here, the taking of drugs) which, in turn, might have disastrous consequences. In this interpretation, prohibition is the last outpost to curb completely unrestrained spread of drug addiction. Penal law's inability to exert any crucial influence on demand considered, it is assumed more and more often today that prohibition aims basically at reducing the supply of drugs. The application of penal law to this area  is justified to the extent that its addressees are not addicts but manufacturers, smugglers, dealers and other such persons most of whom are not drugs consumers themselves but only derive profit from the addiction of others. No doubt, penal law sometimes succeeds to eliminate such persons by means of incapacitation or deterrence.  Generally, though, there is a specific and important internal contradiction involved in prohibition: delegalization of drugs in a situation of continued demand makes the  provision of supply a most attractive activity since it yields immense profits. As a result, not even the most severe penalties can either deter those involved in this activity or prevent the recruitment of their successors, the less so as the risks they run are actually rather small for reasons that have been mentioned above. It might perhaps prove possible to eliminate all supply of drugs, but not without the use of universal terror. This option, however, is out of the question in a democratic state governed by the ruled by law. Therefore, are there any alternatives to prohibition? The answer seems to be yes. First and foremost, one should realize the crucial problem of today’s drug addiction is demand. Admittedly, the demand for drugs can be seen as a apecific cultural constant, something we have to put up with. One should bear in mind, however, the  attempts at influencing that phenomenon with constructive and creative rather than destructive methods. Quite obviously, this is an extremely difficult and entangled  task – as difficult and  entangled as any struggle against the couses and not just the synptoms of a social problem. It seems, however, that work on developing constructive strategies to fight the demand  for drugs is the basic challenge of modern civilization. Namely, if we manage to gain any influence over the couses that make so many young people of today reach for drugs – if we manage to cause a reduction of that demand – departure from prohibition and resumption of the purely medical  approach to drugs might perhaps become possible. For this reason, decriminalization or legalization of drugs should be seen today as a long-term strategic aim; before it can actually be achieved, prolonged preparations, experiments, small steps strategies, and chiefly efforts towards reduction of demand by methods other than  repression are necessary. I believe it would be too risky if we tried to run this operation straight away and to leave the matter to be regulated by nothing but the forces of the free market. Finally, the fact has to be borne in mind that decriminalization can only be sensible if it is done globally; this means that such decision require close international co-operation and co-ordination.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Pozytywizm kryminologiczny i jego krytyka

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
1992
|
issue XVIII
7-50
EN
The origins of criminology as a separate and independent field of scientific research are usually linked to the emergence of the so called positive school of criminology in the second half of the nineteenth century and with the name of its leading representative Cesare Lombroso. Undoubtedly since that time criminological thought went through a long and substantial evolution which produced a variety of new concepts and theories. As a result of this one could assume that contemporary criminology has very little in common with the ideas of its founders. Despite this, there is growing conviction in the literature that the  heritage of Lombroso and Italian positivism still influences significantly contemporary criminological theory. Of course, the essence of this influence lies not in the details of Lombroso’s anthropological ideas which were proven wrong long ago, but in certain quetions asked by him and his school and methods adopted to answer them. Those questions and methods were strictly connected with and resulted from the particular ideas about human society and social world, as well as with the ideas regarding the role, functions and methods of scientific research which prevailed in the social sciences in the second half of the previous century which are commonly referred to as positivism. It justifies the designation as positivist criminology of almost all criminological thought and research since the times of Lombroso up to the late 1950’s.             Positivist criminology is ditinguished first of all by its naturalism, e.g. an assumption that all methodological principles developed in sciences apply equally to social sciences which do not possess any substantial methodical peculiarities. It means also that the main task of scientific research is to discover and formulate causal laws and the assumption of objectivity and value neutrality of science and the scientist. The basic question of such criminology based on the deterministic concept of social world and human behaviour was an etiological one: why do certain people commit crimes while others don’t? It means that the main task of positivist criminology is the search for the causes of crime. Another important feature of positivist criminology is the consensual model of the social order it usually assumes. Such a model implies that the entire social order and the very existence of human society result from the sharing of certain values and norms by the large majority of the members of such society. According to this view, also, criminal law represents an example of such consensus and its norms are subject to widespread acceptance. Criminals represent some unique category of misfits or outsiders somehow different from all other „normal” people, a category which refuses to submit to social consensus. A final result of this way of thinking leads to the conclusion that the explanation of a crime and finding its causes requires concentration on the individual who behaves criminally. Because of this, positivist criminology is a science having as its subject the criminal and his behaviour. Pure accumulation of knowledge was never the sole purpose of criminological research. Positivist criminology tried always to be also an applied science, providing scientific grounds for lawmaking and law enforcement. Results of criminological research, data about the criminal and his behaviour should help to change him: rehabilitate, resocialize, correct or heal. In other words, the main purpose of positivist criminology was to provide scientific methods of bringing known misfits and outsiders back the social consensus they left. This feature of positivist criminology is usually referred to in literature as correctionalism. The above reconstruction of the main features of positivist criminology probably corresponds better to European criminology, which was in fact for many years dominated by the ,,lombrosian myth”. One can doubt however whether American criminology  may also be described in such terms.  The problem is that, because of its clear sociological orientation, American criminology is regarded rather as a heritage of A. Quetelet, A. Guerry or E. Durkheim and not  of Lombroso. Usually it perceived crime as a social phenomenon and not as an individual pathology. But it is equally true that such classical American theories of crime causation as the differential association theory or anomie theory focus their attention on the individual criminal as well. What distinguishes those theories from the European tradition is the conviction that the criminal and his special features are products of an environment. However, in both cases criminals are treated as somehow a different kind of people. All this has important practical implications. The individual approach to crime casuation implies that the proper aim of any correctional influences is the criminal himself. The sociological approach claims that there is also no sense in correcting or changing the criminal unless we do something about the environment which produced him. The natural consequence of such an approach is the preference for social reform and social policy over criminal law as instruments of fighting the crime problem. The former is assigned only a secondary role. This is probably one of the main reasons for  a certain uneasiness and mistrust towards the sociological approach which may be observed criminologists with a legal background; it is considered too abstract and detached from the everyday problems of the criminal justice system as well as too difficult and complicated to implement. Two new criminological currents emerged during last thirty years which remain in opposition towards positivism. The first one, called antinaturalistic criminology, was born during the sixties. It rejected the positivist concept of  social science, asked new and different questions and tried to answer them using different methods. The decisive role in launching this new approach was played by the labelling approach, Its main contribution constituted rejection of the old etiological question and its substitution with the „reactive” one, a question regarding origins and development of the societal reaction to criminal or dewiant behaviour. This meant also an abandonment of positivist methodology of searching for casual laws and a turn towards the methods of humanistic sociology, including understanding, empathy and other similar qualitative methods. According to this trend the main task of the criminological enterprise is to create a sociology law and other forms of social control. Antinaturalistic criminology also adopted an unequivocally pluralistic model of society. Crime and deviance ceased to be perceived as something necessarily pathological. Instead, an attempt was undertaken to treat those phenomena as the result of natural diversity of human beings. To support this stance the labelling approach provided a variety of research on deviant subcultures conducted from what may be called ,,ethnographic positions”, which also denounced the negative effects of punitive social control. The final result was growing scepticism towards the agencies of official social control and such ideas as for example radical nonintervention. The next development can be attributed to radical and critical criminology. These trends assume that social conflict is the main feature of social order and try to understand criminal law and the criminal justice system as the result and manifestation of such conflict. This means that criminalisation processes, e.g. lawmaking and law enforcement, should be explained primarily in terms of political and economic power. Certain groups, because of their access to power, are able to enforce their own values and norms against the will of other groups which may not share them. All this means an unequivocally negative evaluation of the mechanism of social control in contemporary societies which are considered oppressive and unjust. An alternative vision of the society is proposed, a society where facts of human diversity are not subject to the power to criminalize. The way such vision should be implemented are very different and may be placed on the broad continuum from the orthodox Marxism-Leninism and belief in ideal socialism to the humanistic utopias of contemporary abolitionists. Such visions are accompanied by very strong opposition to traditional, mainstream criminology which is accused of being totally and uncritically apologetic and subservient towards the state and institutions of power. According to this view, positivist criminology under the disguise of scientific neutrality and objectivity, in fact legitimizes the existing political and moral order and serves the interests of the privileged groups in society. As a result a new attitude of moral and political commitment is proposed. Science, according to these postulates should be definitely partisan. Such an attitude should break the monopoly of positivist criminology in creating social consciousness about crime and deviance and show the broad audience that alternative are possible. In sum, one can say that the main subject of interest for traditional, positivist criminology constituted always the criminal and that the main problem was to root out his criminal propensities. For antinaturalistic criminology the main problem is the system of social control which requires fundamental change. During the seventies another criminological current emerged, known as neoclassicism, which criticized traditional, positivist criminology from quite different angles. This current, which remains primarily an American phenomenon, constitutes, first of all, opposition against the traditional, in the United States, domination of the sociological approach to the crime problem. Representatives of neoclassical criminology are troubled first of all by the above mentioned unclear practical implications of these theories for the criminal justice system. They are, namely, very difficult to translate into the language of policy actions. Moreover, proposed remedies against crime usually remain beyond the reach of traditional measures which the criminal justice system has at its disposal. As a result the turn towards the tradition of the European classical school of criminal law is proposed and enriched by recent achievements of behavioristic psychology and the economic theory of bohaviour. The essence of this approach constitutes the concept of free will and the assumption that criminals are quite normal human individuals making only false decisions. The fact that human behaviour is always guided by the desire to maximize gains and minimize loses makes this behaviour susceptible to external manipulation. The easiest way to influence human decisions is to create a high enough barrier of costs which should eliminate undesired decisions. Criminal law should play a key role in creating such a barrier and preventing criminal behaviour. Moreover, the barrier of costs provided by criminal law constitutes practically the only factor easily accessible to manipulation by any democratic and liberal government. Other ways of influencing crime rates are usually too costly or too difficult to implement. The basic task of criminology is to provide the necessary empirical data on the functioning of criminal law and the criminal justice system, which should be than used to formulate the most effective policies. All three criminological currents discussed above were usually treated as mutually exclusive and competitive paradigms. Today, when the heat of the discussions of the sixties and seventies diminished, there is a good chance to have a less emotional analysis of recent developments in criminology. Probably it will be possible now to come to the conclusion that the emergence during last 150 years of the three distinct paradigms in theoretical criminology may be comprehended not only in terms of consecutive scientific revolutions. Probably it may be also interpreted as the evolutionary process of the cumulation of knowledge about crime. During this process points of view and focuses’ changed as every paradigm considered different aspects of criminal phenomena as being most important and worth of researching. But all three may be considered, at least to a certain extent, complementary ones.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Przestępczość narkotykowa w Polsce w latach 1985-1996 w świetle danych statystyki policyjnej i sądowej

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
2000
|
issue XXV
81-121
EN
In many countries of Western Europe, and of Northern America in particular, drug crime is a most serious problem both in the quantitative and the qualitative terms. This means that oflences of this type engage a considerable portion of the forces and means put at the disposal of law enforcement and criminal justice in those countries. Against this background, the question arises about the recent situation in this respect in Poland. The problem is that for many years after World War II, drug addiction was a problem of minor importance, also from the viewpoint of the police and courts. It was only in the latter half of the seventies, that a considerable drug subculture emerged in Poland, which resulted from propagation of homemade Polish heroin. And yet there was in Poland no "real'' black drug market or the division into dealers and consumers, as the addicts usually manufactured Polish heroin for themselves. Bigger changes only took place in the nineties, when Poland became a significant manufacturer of amphetamine for Western markets and an important transit country, especially for heroin smugglers from the so-called Balkan route. What remains unclear, instead, is the impact of those phenomena on the internal drug market. The extent of opiates subculture does not seem to have grown considerably, and Polish heroin still plevails, the "real" one being too expensive. What did go up, and significantly at that, is consumption of other drugs, especially amphetamine and marihuana. Yet against the general "moral panic" related to amphetamine, few epidemiology surveys indicate the greatest popularity of marihuana and not amphetamine among the school youth. The analysis discussed in the present paper aims first and foremost at answering the question as to the extent to which the above changes in drug addiction and traffic have been reflected in the functioning of law enforcement and criminal justice in Poland. To this aim, analyzed in the first place have been data on detected drug offences from police statistics, as well as date on convictions for such offences from court statistics. Basically, the analysis concerns the years 1985-1996 when the 1985 Drug Control Act was in force. With respect to the police statistics, analyzed have also been data for 1991-1998, that is the period of operation of the new 1997 Act. The major findings of my analysis can be summarized as follows. First and foremost, it has to be stated that in quantitative terms, the role of drug crime in the daily practice of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in Poland in 1985-1996 was in fact of minor importance. Thus both detected drug offences shown in police statistics and convictions for such offences shown in court statistics constituted less than 1% of all offences and convictions as a rule. Admittedly, at the end of the discussed period, an upward trend in drug crime could be noticed in the police statistics in particular, and thus in the overall structure of crime; yet its extent is still much smaller compared to most West-European countries. The question remains largely open to what extent the growth in detected drug crime, particularly noticeable starting from 1994, results from an actual growth in the number of offences, as it may well result also from the Polish police forces' growing efficiency in detecting offences of this type. In 1985-1996, there was in Poland a most specific structure of drug crime. Thus two offences prevailed in the structure of both detected offences shown in police statistics and convictions contained in court statistics: illegal cultivation of poppy and illegal manufacture or processing of narcotic drugs. In some years, the two offences together accounted for over 80% of the bulk of drug crime registered by the police, and for even a greater proportion - up to 90% - of all convictions for such offences. Instead, the share in the overall structure of drug crime in Poland of such "classical'' offences as smuggling, trafficking and dealing in drugs was at the minimum level until 1994. It was only after that year that the proportion started to grow: by 1998, the structure was reversed with 65% of all offences detected that year being cases of dealing in drugs. So far, however, this shift is hardly reflected in the structure of convictions for such offences, which remains largely unchanged compared to previous years. This may demonstrate the Polish police forces' much greater efficiency in detecting drug dealers combined with persisting faults in the area of gathering evidence that would make it possible to indict specific persons in such cases. Another problem that can still be hardly called serious in Poland is punitive policy of courts with respect to drug offenders. Quite the contrary: there was a lot to indicate even in the eighties that the policy towards such offenders was even more liberal compared to the treatment received by other offenders. This was demonstrated by the role of fine as a selfstanding penalty, imposed much more often on drug offenders, and also by the more frequent staying of sentences. Of course, this situation resulted chiefly fiom the above-mentioned specific structure of the Polish drug crime. Traditionally prevailing among those guilty of the offence of illegal poppy cultivation were farmers, who whether intentionally ignored or were not aware of the limitations imposed on poppy cultivation by the 1985 Act. Among the illegal manufacturers of drugs, in turn, a considerable proportion were addicts who manufactured the Polish home-made heroin for themselves. Again, one can hardly speak of drug business in such cases. Most of the offenders were not profit-seekers. This means that under the 1985 Drug Control Act, Polish courts most seldom had to do with the "real" and "serious" drug crime - the long-established everyday routine of courts in most of the developed West-European and North-American countries where that crime absorbs a considerable portion of forces, means and energy of the local law enforcement. What is more, transformations of the Polish drug scene - reported by the police and the media - have so far been but slightly reflected in the work of Polish courts and in their penal policy. Again, the question remains open to what extent this situation might change over the next few years.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Przestępczość w II Rzeczpospolitej w świetle danych statystycznych

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
2012
|
issue XXXIV
531-567
EN
After Poland regained independence in 1918, the system of crime statistics had to be organised from scratch and unified. At the same time, until new criminal code became effective, there were three criminal laws each of them with different scopes and forms of criminalization. Because of this in 1924 – 1934, crime statistics were based on classification drafted by the State Police Headquarters. Only since 1934 the statistics were base on the classification of the new criminal code. There was also a problem of separating statistical data concerning more serious crimes, defined by L. Radzinowicz as “true crime” from petty offences (which today are subject to Offences Code). As far as crime dynamics is concerned, the interwar period should be divided into three subperiods of 1924-1930, 1931-1934, and 1934-1938. In the first period crime intensity fluctuated yet with an overall increasing tendency. In 1931-1943 there was an explicit increase, particularly in 1931 and 1931. Reasons for this should be sought in the influence of the Great Depression. Since 1935 there was a decrease in reported crimes. In the last year of available statistics, that is 1938, crime level was 22,3% lower than in 1934. What draws one’s attention is the differences in reported crime levels before and after the war. Particularly, in the 1950s and 1960s crime levels were comparable to those in 1920s, that is before the Great Depression. It fell below this level only in 1970s, and in 1980s it increased again to the level comparable with 1920s. Reported crime levels throughout the period of communist Poland was however lower than in most of 1930s before the war. At the same time, it is clear that present crime levels are much higher than any of those in the interwar period. Data concerning intensity and dynamics of murders between 1924-1937 are particularly interesting. In 1920s number of murders increased similarly to increase of overall crime figures. After 1930 number of murders fluctuated only and its dynamics diverged from an explicit increase in overall crime. This fact made L. Radzinowicz conclude that the Great Depression – unlike it influenced crimes against property – did not influence violent crimes in an the same way. A decrease in violent crimes during an economic depression can be related, according to the author, with decreased alcohol consumption resulting from lower incomes of the population. There are many signs that murders are related to differences in the level of civilization, economic, and cultural life of particular parts of the country before the war and not to the economy cycle. What is interesting in the light of this is that the number of murders in post-war Poland never approached the number of crimes which were observed before the war. Dynamics of robbery was much different. Number of robberies in 1920s uninterruptedly decreased, and it increased since 1930s. But in comparison to the post-war period, robberies seem almost marginal.
7
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

O wpływie ustawodawstwa karnego na politykę karną

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
2019
|
issue XLI/2
41-80
EN
For many years, Polish penal policy has been considered to be very punitive. This is confirmed by the very high imprisonment rate which was observable even before World War Two. This raises the legitimate question of how to explain this consistent pattern. It is also appropriate to ask whether the reasons for this punitiveness can be found in punitive penal legislation, in the legal code, or in punitive sentencing practice, or at the level of the law in action. This article uses available statistical data to analyse selected trends in Polish penal policy, indicating that on many occasions attempts to diminish punitive sentencing outcomes through legislation produced absolutely opposite results. At the same time, there have been periods of real reduction in this punitiveness which occurred without any specific legislative changes made with such an intention. All of this suggests that the law on the books and the law in action may to a large extent be independent of each other.
PL
Polityka karna w Polsce od lat uchodzi za niezwykle punitywną, o czym świadczą wysokie wartości, jakie przyjmują współczynniki prizonizacji, poczynając od okresu przed II wojną światową. Rodzi to uzasadnione pytanie o przyczyny takiego stanu rzeczy: czy leżą one po stronie punitywnego ustawodawstwa, tj. prawa zapisanego, czy też po stronie praktyki orzekania kar przez sądy, tj. prawa w działaniu. Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie w świetle dostępnych danych statystycznych wybranych zjawisk w polskiej polityce karnej, pokazujących, że w szeregu wypadków reformy zmierzające do obniżenia poziomu punitywności polskiej polityki karnej dawały rezultaty odwrotne od zamierzonych. Równocześnie wskazać można okresy jednoznacznego obniżenia tej punitywności, które nie były warunkowane jakimikolwiek zmianami ustawodawczymi. Pokazuje to względną niezależność płaszczyzn prawa zapisanego i prawa w działaniu.
8
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Kontrolować czy nie, ale jeśli kontrolować, to w jaki sposób? Wyzwania związane ze zjawiskiem nowych substancji psychoaktywnych

100%
Krajewski K.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
2015
|
issue XXXVII
5-50
EN
Definitions of drug offences must remain in agreement with the principle of nullumcrimen sine lege certa, which demands a precise definition of the subject of thesecrimes, namely illegal psychoactive substances. A basic legislative technique in thisregard is the creation of lists of controlled substances determined by annexes to theappropriate legal acts. Their advantage is precision, but the undoubted disadvantageis low elasticity. In the case of the appearance of a new psychoactive substance, itremains legal until it has been placed onto the appropriate list. This did not have muchsignificance when the market was dominated by well-known substances of natural orpolysynthetic character, and the appearance of new substances was rare. Already inthe 1970s, however, the phenomenon of purely synthetic substances began: so-calleddesigner drugs. They were often primarily created to avoid the existing system ofcontrol: sometimes small changes in the molecular chain of an illegal substance yieldeda new substance of similar psychoactive qualities that did not come under scrutiny.This phenomenon accelerated significantly in the 1990s. The phenomenon of so-callednew psychoactive substances (NPS) became a serious problem, specifically when theybegan to be offered for sale on a wider scale in special shops (so-called smart shops),or on the Internet as a legal equivalent of an illegal narcotic (so-called legal highs). Therace between legislators and chemists “inventing” more and more substances entereda new phase at that time.The answer for legislators in many countries of the world was so-called genericdefinitions, or analogue definitions, under which whole groups of substances cameunder control. However, in many countries these raise constitutional objections, due totheir partially-determined character. This is why the dominant method is still makinglists, which requires the phenomenon of ceaseless revision. Accompanying this isthe problem of evaluating the legitimacy of dispersing controls on new psychotropicsubstances that are provided for illegal narcotics. New psychoactive substances are mostoften poorly understood during the moment when a decision is being made about theirillegalisation: not much is clear about their psychoactive qualities, their potential tocause addiction (dependence potential), their acute toxicity, nor their chronic toxicity.This raises questions about the criteria used for making decisions about illegalisation:are these decisions based in reality on scientific evidence (evidence-based decisions), orare they also taken based on a precautionary principle. In the latter case, banning themis essentially of a political nature and is being done just in case.An example of a formalised procedure of risk assessment linked to new psychoactivesubstances is the European early warning system carried out under the supervision of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addition (EMCDDA). Therisk evaluation procedure begins with a technical report prepared by EMCDDA andEuropol, who must provide all scientific information on the subject of the givensubstance. A proper evaluation is performed by a broad scientific committee of theEMCDDA. In its report, the committee presents only the facts. On their basis, a finaldecision is taken by the European Commission. If they decide on the control option,member countries are obliged to add the substance to their national lists of controllednarcotics. Since the number of new psychoactive substances appearing in recent years hasrisen dramatically, this system has begun to reach the limits of its efficiency. Due tothis, even during the previous term of the European Parliament, work had begun ona new directive about the issue, the draft of which proposed abandoning the system ofdichotomous treatment of psychoactive substances as either illegal narcotics or as legalsubstances. It is to be replaced with a tripartite separation of psychoactive substancesinto those which present a low risk to health, society and safety (not subject to anylimiting measures), moderate risk (subject to bans on them entering the market, butnot controlled for research, medical or veterinary goals), and high risk (subject tocontrols designed for narcotics).The problem of new psychoactive substances, so-called legal highs, appeared inPoland on a wider scale around 2007-2008. The initial reaction of the legislature wasof a standard character and consisted of extending the lists of controlled substances.This was done in March 2009, June 2010, and April 2011. It was only in October 2010that new control mechanisms were introduced. Due to the concept of substitute drugs,“legal highs” were put under administrative controls differing from the control systemfor intoxicating agents and psychotropic substances. Eventually in July 2015, anotheramendment to legislation on the prevention of drug addiction, on the one hand,extended the list of intoxicating agents and psychotropic substances by another 114substances (consequently, the lists used in Poland now included 428 substances). Onthe other hand, it expanded new forms of control for these substances. Within thisframework, the Ministry of Health introduced a list of new psychoactive substancesin an annex to the regulations, which eases and speeds up the process of addingamendments. Sanctions associated with the illegal turnover of these substances havean administrative rather than criminal character and do not affect normal possession.Despite attempts to find an indirect way, the consequences of Polish politicstowards legal highs are quite paradoxical. Twice after extending the list of controlledsubstances (in June 2010 and July 2015), an increase appeared (a dramatic one in July2015) of poisoning attributed to legal highs. This was certainly a result of the marketreacting to illegalisation. It was due to the replacement of these newly-illegal substanceswith something often markedly more harmful.
9
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Obraz przestępczości w Niemczech oraz w Polsce w okresie transformacji ustrojowej (wybrane aspekty)

51%
Kury H., Krajewski K., Obergefell-Fuchs J.
Archiwum Kryminologii
|
1996
|
issue XXII
7-41
EN
Among the negative side-effects of the fall of "Realsozialismus" in Central and Eastern Europe and the process of political, social and economic transformations initiated in 1989 there was a deterioration of internal safety in those countries. According to a popular opinion, this was manifested, among other things, by a growth - a rapid one in many instances - in the extent and intensity of crime, and also in negative changes of its structure which consisted in a particularly fast growth of tle most serious crime or emergence of its new and very dangerous forms, hitherto unknown in those countries. From this viewpoint, criminological literature in all those countries without exception has recently been presenting an extremely pessimistic picture of a growing threat of crime which can at any moment get out of control. As a consequence, fear of crime is growing in societies involved, and appeals can be heard more and more often from politicians that “law and order” be instituted. The present paper does not aim at negating either the growth of crime in post-Communist societies itself or the negative changes of the structure of crime. It is our aim first of all to compare the state of crime that follows from the two basic modern sources of information on this area, that is oflicial statistics of crime and victimization surveys, and to point to some related problems. The analysis is limited to two countries, Germany and Poland. Concerned in the former case is, of course, mainly analysis of phenomena found in the new federal lands of united Germany, that is the territory of former GDR, but also consequences of the union for the state of crime in Germany as a whole. One of the basic problems posed by analysis of extent, intensity and dynamics of reported crime, that is crime recorded in oflicial statistics in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is reliability of statistical data from the period of “Realsozialismus” which serve as the point of departure of all comparisons. The growth in reported crime in the territory of former GDR has indeed been dramatic after 1990; yet the point of departure for comparisons involved here are GDR police statistics which showed the extent of reported crime as 10% of that in “old” FRG. Today, German criminologists agree that GDR crime statistics were regularly “improved” for ideological and political reasons, the real extent of crime being much higher there.             Similar problems can be found in Poland where a rapid growth in reported crime took place only once in principle, that is in 1990. Later on, the extent of reported crime became stabilized at the new level “established” in 1990. It is highly improbable that the impact of social and economic reform on crime in Poland was limited to a “big bang” in 1990 and then ceased. Also here, we dealt rather with a specific statistical artifact and not with a single rapid growth in the extent of crime. What also speaks for this thesis is the fact that crime used to be “under-recorded” in police statistics in Poland as well through a policy of extremely selective reception by the police of information about offenses. Abandonment of this practice after 1989 resulted in a serious growth of recorded crime. Appraising the dynamics of reported crime in Central and Eastern Europe, one should also bear it in mind that the growth in crime there not necessarily followed the breakdown of “Realsozialismus”. In many countries, former USSR in particular, the growth in crime actually preceded change. Also in recent years, Central and East-European statistics have by no means been showing a constant and rapid growth in reported crime. There were rather fluctuations (if quite rapid at times), followed by a recent downward trend in some of the countries involved. Still another important problem is comparison of the extent of reported crime in post-Communist and in developed Western societies. Discussing the “flood” of crime in Central and Eastern Europe, one tends to forget that in most cases, the actual extent of crime in the region is still much lower than in most countries of Western Europe. Comparison of the situation in Germany and Poland may serve as an example here. I ulated. As far as possible, the state of crime in post-Communist societies should also be appraised on the basis of sources other than the official statistics. Helpful here can be first of all data from victimization surveys, alas still a rarity in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet basing on available data for Germany and Poland (chiefly from the International Crime Survey of 1992) it can be stated that victimization surveys show an extent of real crime much higher than the one that follows from official statistical data. This means a very high dark number of crime in Poland and elsewhere in the region, caused probably by the people’s very low tendency to report facts of victimization to the police. At any rate, from data on victimization it follows that the extent of real crime in Poland is higher as compared to Germany. This is not to say, though, that crime in Poland “breaks all the records”. With some exceptions concerning chiefly offenses against property such as theft and pickpocketing, Poland has an average extent of crime judging by European “standards'” in this respect. Basing on data from victimization surveys, also the territorial differentiation of the extent of crime in Germany and Poland can be analyzed. The basic problem in Germany is the noticeable difference between southern and northern lands, the latter having a much higher extent of crime, and also the process of the new lands “catching up” with or even “outstripping” the old ones in this respect during the last five years. Quite distinct regularities can also be found in Poland; some of them are known from earlier literature. Thus first of all, there is a noticeably higher extent of crime in Western and Northern Territories of Poland and a low extent in Wielkopolska region. It is interesting to correlate those regularities with selected demographic and socio-economic data on individual regions of the two countries. In Germany, unfavorable values of those indices found in the north of “old” FRG and in former GDR are rather explicitly correlated with a higher extent of crime. In Poland where territorial differentiation of the indices is less distinct, some regularities in this respect can nevertheless be found, too. At the samo time it seems, though, that the extent of crime in Poland is the highest in regions where, due to specific local features, the social costs of reform are the greatest and most painful.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.