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Pojem živelnosti u Merleau – Pontyho a Bachelarda

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Vydra A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
143-155
EN
In a small note in the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty states that he conceives of being and the imaginary as elements rather than objects or entities. Moreover, he adds that those elements are to be understood in Bachelard’s sense. It is precisely the elemental nature which represents one of the characteristics of the flesh (la chair) in Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished last work. If the living body is supposed to open an ontology and to solve certain ontological problems, we need to be careful while analysing its elemental character: the notion of „element“ is not to be taken for granted. Therefore, the author begins by examining Bachelard’s conception of elements, his attitude towards the history of sciences and towards the rupture between modern and contemporary science (for example in relation to non-substanciality and processuality on the micro-level of matter). In the second part of the paper, we return to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the living body, which is, according to him, different from the substancialized body in cartesian philosophy, and we develop the topic of the elemental – a notion derived from that of element – and of inter-elemental relations. After that, we point out several consequences which the reflexion on the elemental nature of the world may imply in relation to non-cartesian medicine. The fundamental axis of the text concerns also the poetic and metaphorical language and its use in the texts of both philosophers.
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Norma a normálne : Canguilhem a Kantovo rozlíšenie školských a svetských pojmov

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Vydra A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2018
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vol. 66
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issue 2
271-283
EN
This article aims to compare the concepts of a norm and the normal in the work of Georges Canguilhem with the duality of scholarly (Schulbegriff) and worldly concepts (Weltbegriff) in the work of Immanuel Kant, against the background of the problematic of sociality and the creation of social structures. Kant’s distinction describes two ways in which philosophical thinking proceeds: either there is a logical, even mechanical or slavish, application of pre-given rules, or thinking is free of such rules and does itself lead to the legislation and determination of new, more effective rules for the attainment of the finite goal of human and social life, which is the general good. Canguilhem, in a similar spirit, proposes that we distinguish between the unification or standardisation of norms which bear on an individual from without, and the creation of individual norms which sometimes depart from the established norms and standards.
DE
Der vorliegende Text befasst sich mit dem Vergleich der Konzepte der Norm und des Normalen bei George Canguilhem mit dem Begriffspaar Schulbegriff/Weltbegriff bei Immanuel Kant vor dem Hintergrund der Problematik der Sozialität und der Bildung gesellschaftlicher Strukturen. Kants Unterscheidung beschreibt zwei philosophische Denkrichtungen: entweder die logische, gar mechanische bis sklavische Anwendung vorgegebener Regeln, oder die Freiheit von diesen Regeln und die eigenständige Entwicklung hin zur Gesetzgebung und zur Bestimmung neuer, effektiver Regeln zur Erreichung des eigentlichen Ziels des menschlichen und gesellschaftlichen Lebens, nämlich des allgemein Guten. Canguilhem schlägt in ähnlichem Geiste eine Unterscheidung zwischen Vereinheitlichung bzw. Standardisierung von Normen vor, die dem Einzelnen von außen vorgegeben werden, und der Bildung individueller Normen, die nicht selten Übertretungen bereist eingeführter Normen sind.
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