Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

SUBJEKTÍVNY VKUS A ARGUMENTÁCIA

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 9
754 – 767
EN
An argumentation is usually used to achieve a state in which one participant of a dialogue brings another participant to accept a belief the former presents. This idea is acceptable when it comes to disputes about (objective) facts. In the case of disputes about subjective tastes, however, the participants usually achieve a different kind of result; it often happens that they end their dialogue in a state in which they take their dispute to be resolved and, yet, retain their initial stand-points. If the disputes about tastes that end up in this state contain arguments, one may wonder what the proper use of argumentation in such disputes is. The present paper addresses this issue. The main idea consists in that the participants coordinate their positions by bringing their opponents to tolerate their respective subjective attitudes toward the items under discussion. This kind of response is framed by a contextualise semantics of predicates of personal taste.
2

POJEM ARGUMENTÁCIE A JEHO DEFINÍCIA

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 8
615 – 627
EN
According to a rather widespread view, the substantive aim of argumentation consists in resolving differences of opinion between disputing parties. This is the core of the pragma-dialectical definition of argumentation. It is argued that the definition is too narrow, if applied outside the scope of the Pragma-Dialectical Theory. It is not the case that every instance of argumentation has to be aimed at resolving an explicit or implicit difference of opinion. This claim is based on situations in which it does not make good sense to construe the instances of argumentation as having the above aim. An alternative definition of argumentation, which is broader in scope, is suggested. Accordingly, argumentation is aimed at giving reasons for a standpoint in order to reach the communicative objectives that are relevant in a given situation.
3

FICTION OF FICTIONALISM

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 8
603 – 615
EN
Fictionalism about fictional entities is an antirealist approach. It suggests that statements of literary criticism are to be understood in the same way as are fictional statements. The latter are naturally understood as being uttered in a pretend mode, i.e. not seriously. Fictionalism has it that the same holds for the former. It is sometimes argued that this is unfaithful to our actual linguistic practice with critical statements. The author ś aim is to strengthen this objection by pointing to some unwelcome consequences of the fictionalise position. It seems plausible that our practice with critical statements allows us: a) to supplement their utterances by remarks such as “And I mean it” or “What I have just said is true”; b) to report on their utterances by using statements such as ‘X asserted that C’ (where X is a speaker and C is a proposition expressed by a critical statement); c) to ask for arguments that would support the truth of critical statements; d) to agree or disagree with other speakers over the truth of critical statements. If fictionalism were correct, our practice with critical statements would not permit moves of these kinds.
4

INDEXICKÁ POVAHA EPISTEMICKÝCH MODALÍT

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2018
|
vol. 73
|
issue 8
589 – 605
EN
The aim of the present paper is defending the idea that epistemic modals like “may”, “might”, “must”, etc. are indexical expressions and providing an out-line of their semantics in terms of Kaplanian semantics for indexicals. It is argued that, though closely similar to ordinary indexicals in having both deictic and anaphoric use, epistemic modals are special in having more complicated meaning. This is because their (Kaplanian) content (as well as their character and extension) is twofold – apart from expressing an ordinary intension, like typical indexicals do. They also express a relation between a proposition and a collection of propositions. In particular, assume that SE is a sentence that contains an epistemic modal E, S is a sentence obtained from SE by deleting E (and making all grammatical amendments that are required in order for S to be grammatical), A is an agent and PA is an epistemic perspective of A (i.e. a (sub)set of A’s beliefs); it holds that a speaker’s utterance of SE (where the speaker may, but need not, be identical with A) expresses as its content (relative to a context of utterance) the proposition according to which the proposition expressed by S (relative to the context of utterance) is in a certain relation (like the compatibility relation or the entailment relation, etc.) with PA. The semantic role of E consists in introducing both the epistemic perspective and the relation into the content of utterances of SE.
5

K NIEKTORÝM SÉMANTICKÝM A KOGNITÍVNYM ASPEKTOM VLASTNÝCH MIEN

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2006
|
vol. 61
|
issue 4
265-280
EN
The paper deals with the understanding of proper names. Though the theme goes across various disciplines - e.g. semantics, epistemology, psychology - the paper examines only selected semantic and cognitive aspects of the problem. The question runs: How should we comprehend the thesis of understanding a proper name as knowing what the name refers to? What kind of knowledge is involved here? The question is posed within the direct reference theory framework enriched by the notion of singular proposition and the compositionality principle. The distinction between an expression and an utterance of it is accepted and the original question is split up accordingly. As for expressions (as ideal signs), to understand a proper name is to grasp a meaning axiom along the lines of D. Davidson and J. McDowell. As for utterances of expressions, to understand an utterance of a proper name is to know a piece of information concerning the referent of the name; ideally, it is a fact that can be expressed by an identity statement claiming that the referent of the name under discussion is identical with the individual about which the speaker has a mental file at her disposal.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.