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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 4
294 – 305
EN
In our country the economy of research has been overlooked in the methodology of science until now. In our article we offer an analysis of Ch. S. Peirce’s ideas on this topic. The problems of choosing hypotheses and research projects support play an important role in contemporary science. In our opinion, Peirce’s ideas on economy of research make an essential contribution to their solution. Peirce offers the answers to the questions such as which hypothesis and under what circumstances should be opted for. In the era of rapid scientific progress, the solutions to these issues become urgent. The basic idea of Peirce’s project is to ensure the greatest return of scientific capital possible for the least input costs required for its acquisition. Although Peirce’s theory has no compact form, it nevertheless constitutes a rich resource base that merits further development.
RU
В статье автор пытается сравнить две значительные фигуры в теории науке, поскольку обнаруживает явную схожесть их концепции научного метода. Он сосредотачивается в основном на методе абдуктивного заключения Пирса, теории познания, воспроизведении научного исследования, умножении знания и на проблемах, которые возникают в контексте концепций Поппера и Пирса. Он анализирует фальсификационную модель теории наук и приходит к заключению, что позиция Поппера с точки зрения достижения цели, которую он выбрал, неудачная, поскольку она не в состоянии продемонстрировать продвижение к истине. С другой стороны, Пирс оказывается эпистемологическим оптимистом и дополнительно допускает вариант судьбы в движении к цели, что делает такую концепцию более приемлемой для научного сообщества.
EN
In the article the author focuses on comparison of two significant figures of theory of science by the reason of the apparent similarities of their conceptions of scientific inquiry. He concentrates mainly on Pierce’s method of discovery represented by abductive inference, epistemology, reconstruction of scientific research, growth of knowledge and problems, which appear in context of Popper’s and Peirce’s conceptions. He analyses Popper’s falsificationistic model of theory of science. He points out that Popper’s account from the aspect of achieving aim, which he determines, is unsuccessful, because he is not able to declare advance to the truth. On the other hand, Peirce appears as an epistemological optimist and accepts additional metaphysical assumption about predestination to aim to the truth, which makes his conception more appealing to scientific community.
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