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Działalność polskiego wywiadu wojskowego w międzywojennym Szczecinie (1919–1939)

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Skóra W.
Przegląd Zachodniopomorski
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2011
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issue 1
7-41
DE
Fast die ganze Zwischenkriegszeit war Stettin der Sitz der polnischen Spionageangestellten (II. Abteilung des Generalstabs des polnischen Heers), deren Aufgabe war, die Nachrichten über die Stadt und die Provinz Pommern zuzustellen. Bis 1934 waren dort Vertreter der Zweig-Exposituren der II. Abteilung in Poznań, Gdańsk und Bydgoszcz tätig. In den letzten Friedensjahren war Szczecin der Sitz der Angestellten der strategischen Spionage, die der Zentrale der II. Abteilung in Warszawa unmittelbar untergeordnet waren. Zusammenfassend arbeiteten in der Zwischenkriegszeit in Stettin vier vollzeitbeschäftigte Offiziere der polnischen Spionage, zwei Reserveoffiziere des polnischen Heers, ein Feldwebel sowie zig Vertreter der II. Abteilung (die hauptsächlich von der polnischen Minderheit in Deutschland kamen). Sie waren ein wichtiger und bisher wenig bekannter Bestandteil „der polnischen Anwesenheit“ in dieser Stadt. Es ist den Leitern der Spionagevertretungen in Stettin gelungen, ein Informatorennetz zu bilden, das den Raum von Ostpreußen bis zur deutschen Hauptstadt umschloss. Die Hauptstadt Westpreußens war neben Königsberg, Breslau und Berlin einer der wichtigsten Punkte beim Erkunden des Reichs durch polnische Spionage. Institutionelle Unterstützung der Spionage war das polnische Konsulat, das von 1925 bis 1939 in Szczecin tätig war.
2

Iwan Iwanowicz Bielanin, wygnaniec rosyjski w Gdańsku. Przyczynek do „międzynarodówki szpiegowskiej” Wolnego Miasta lat 1920–1939

100%
Skóra W.
Studia Historica Gedanensia
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2014
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vol. Volume 5 (2014)
306-328
EN
After the Bolshevik Revolution, 1–2 million political refugees fled from Russia. Some of them (a few thousand) settled in the Free City of Gdańsk. Some people, especially ex‑military – attracted by the special status of the quasi‑state – entered in a kind of an “international espionage” community. They were mercenaries of various secret services. We can sketch the motifs and the ways taken by this interesting faction of refugees taking a perspective of one of them, Ivan Ivanovich Bielanin. He worked for the Polish, German and Soviet secret services, as well as for the “white” Russians. In fact, it was a drama of a rootless man who in other circumstances would probably have taken a better advantage of his inborn talents. Free City was an area conducive to business intelligence, because espionage was not penalized there. The agendas of German and Polish intelligence were particularly active in Gdańsk, as well as, to a lesser extent, the Soviet, French, Lithuanian and English. […] The Free City of Gdańsk in the the period of 1920–1939 there was a strong, staff‑wise, Polish military intelligence agency. It was was to inquire the north‑eastern territories of the Reich and to observe the area of Gdańsk. An officer of outstanding talents, Karol Dubicz‑Penther, was the head of the institution in the period of 1920–1926. We can describe Bielanin’s activities mainly on the basis of his reports. Bielanin was an officer in the tsarist army. After the Bolshevik Revolution, he briefly collaborated with the Communists. Then he fought in anti‑Communist Russian troops. In 1919–1923, he worked for the Polish military intelligence in Gdańsk. He traveled with missions to Berlin and Warsaw. He provided a lot of very valuable information about the German intelligence and Russian emigration environments. But he was not loyal and with time people lost confidence in him. His instability and nihilism can be considered as characteristic for the drama of Russian refugees. To raise funds to maintain themselves and gain the favours of the authorities, they became “mercenaries spies”. Finally, the German, Polish and Soviet services considered Bielanin a traitor.
3
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Pierwszy okres istnienia polskiego Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych 1918–1921 (koncepcje, organizacja, kadry)

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Skóra W.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
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2018
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issue 31
224-261
EN
The article discusses the first two years of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ existence, although it does not include analyses and summaries of Polish foreign policy. The topic is the ministry, its organisational structure, the underlying legal regulations, the development of the cadre, and its changing everyday workings. In other words, it is about the several hundred people who were responsible for the foreign relations of the country in its earliest period: from October 1918, when the Ministry of the Exterior was formally established in Warsaw, until the spring of 1921, when the first organisational structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was adopted and the structure matured, which in general survived until World War II. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was built from scratch. Inspiration was taken from Germany and France, but only to a limited degree. The method consisted in experimenting with various approaches until a solution was adopted that had no simple analogy anywhere in the world. In the latter half of 1921, there were 26 embassies and 4 delegations under the authority of the Ministry. the mission of the General Commissariat of the Republic of Poland in Danzig was accorded special status. The network of consulates was improved and consisted of 49 independent missions, 17 consular departments within embassies, and 19 honorary consulates. In the latter half of 1921, the Ministry employed 632 public servants. After the restoration of independence, the creation of the Polish diplomatic cadre proceeded in two ways as a consequence of there being two centres of foreign policy – the Paris-based Polish National Committee, and the Warsaw-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both used various reserves. Their recruitment methods also differed (they were merged in the spring of 1919). One of the officials taking part in the establishment of the Ministry stated that 90% of the candidates who satisfied the requirements were “counts and Jews”. They were also accepted. The former part of the statement was not far from the truth, but only in the case of principal posts in diplomacy. The Ministry in fact accepted many members of noble and aristocratic families. However, not many Jews were employed.
4
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Czy Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej było zdominowane przez byłych oficerów Wojska Polskiego?

100%
Skóra W.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
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2018
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issue 32
440-481
PL
Po zamachu majowym z 1926 r. do polskiego Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych na stanowiska urzędników etatowych przyjęto kilkudziesięciu (co najmniej 43) zawodowych oficerów, cieszących się zaufaniem Józefa Piłsudskiego. Niemal połowa tej grupy w przeszłości była oficerami wywiadu wojskowego. Z wojska odchodzili na polecenie zwierzchników. Wraz z zatrudnionymi oficjalnie w ministerstwie attachés wojskowymi oraz rezydentami wywiadu wojskowego pracującymi w placówkach MSZ było ich ponad stu. W resorcie, w którym pracowało w latach trzydziestych około 1300 urzędników (etatowych i kontraktowych), tworzyli grupę zauważalną. A ponieważ zajmowali zazwyczaj wysokie stanowiska (włącznie z najwyższym) – również wpływową. W MSZ po 1933 r. można dostrzec zmiany wskazujące na przeniesienie wzorów wojskowych: bezwzględnie egzekwowane żądanie zachowania tajemnicy służbowej, wpływ zwierzchników na wybór małżonka, zatrudnianie wyłącznie obywateli polskich, ograniczenie sprawozdawczości i biurokracji, przenoszenie na inne stanowiska bez uwzględnienia woli zainteresowanego itd. Styl kierowania dyplomacją przez ministra Józefa Becka, daleki od kolegialności, nieco autorytarny, można wiązać z wzorcami panującymi w armii. Sami oficerowie główną wartość swojej obecności w MSZ postrzegali w uczynieniu z resortu sprawniejszego narzędzia do realizacji woli marszałka Piłsudskiego. Wysoko ceniona była „centralizacja” procesu decyzyjnego, odpowiadająca tradycyjnej strukturze wojskowej. Cywilni urzędnicy wskazywali na negatywne skutki pracy wojskowych: dominację wzorów szkodliwych w dyplomacji, takich jak brak szacunku dla indywidualizmu, zwalczanie krytyki (nawet niesłusznych decyzji), kult posłuszeństwa (choćby wbrew zdrowemu rozsądkowi), brak profesjonalizmu i ogłady.
EN
After the May Coup of 1926, a few dozen (at least 43) professional officers, enjoying the trust of Józef Piłsudski, were admitted to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as full-time officials. About half of this group were military intelligence officers in the past. They left the army by orders of their superiors. Along with military attachés officially employed in the Ministry and residents of military intelligence working in the agencies of the MFA, there were over one hundred of them. They formed a noticeable group in the Ministry which in the 30s employed 1300 officials (full-time and contract). And because they usually held high-ranking positions (including the highest) – also an influential group. Changes can be seen in the MFA after 1933 indicating the transfer of military models: strictly enforced demand for professional secrecy, influence of superiors on the choice of a spouse, employment of only Polish citizens, reduction of reporting and bureaucracy, transfer to other positions without consideration of the will of the interested party, etc. The style of management of diplomacy by Minister Józef Beck, far from collegiality, somewhat authoritarian, can be associated with patterns prevailing in the army. The officers saw making the Ministry more efficient tool to implement the will of Marshal Piłsudski as the main value of their presence in the MFA. The “centralisation” of the decision-making process, corresponding to the traditional military structure, was highly valued. Civilian officials pointed to the negative effects of work of the military men: the dominance of patterns harmful in diplomacy, such as the lack of respect for individualism, combating criticism (even of unjust decisions), worship of obedience (even against common sense), the lack of professionalism and good manners.
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