Fashion in philosophy is often a camouflage for spiritual misery. The analysis of what is considered to be fashionable allows us to demystify this camouflage. I conduct this analysis in three stages. In the first stage, I determine phraseological contexts in which the word “fashion” and the related words occur, its synonyms and antonyms of it, and its polisemy. The second stage consists in constructing the contextual definition of a word “fashion”. The aim of the third stage is to formulate 13 theses on fashion; these theses are mostly not strictly general; they use quantifiers of the form “usually” or “often”. Next – in two stages – I deal with philosophical fashion. The first stage of the analysis of philosophical fashion consists in indicating the types of objects of these fashion. In the second stage, I illustrate these types in the possibly most various way. The evaluation of philosophical fashion is the third stage. I do not disavow philosophical fashions as such, but I recommend the attitude of sound reason, moderation and caution to them.
The paper discusses some questions arising on the margins of the article Does Polish law guarantee the conscience clause for physicians? by Father Andrzej Szostek. The author of the paper indicates essential doubts as to the scope of the validity of norms and their limiting clauses even if these norms and clauses are formulated very generally. These doubts concern, in particular, the method of establishing operational definitions for notions that come here into play.
W artykule omawiam idee, które dzielił Marian Przełęcki z przedstawicielami Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej – bądź je modyfikując, bądź lepiej argumentując na ich rzecz. Są to m.in.: antyirracjonalizm (umiarkowany), racjonalizm stymulacyjny (w stosunku do wiary), rekonstrukcjonizm logiczny (powściągliwy), konwencjonalizm (zliberalizowany), indeterminizm ontologiczny (w części negatywnej), uznanie reizmu ontologicznego za hipotezę wyjaśniającą względem reizmu semantycznego, dyrektywa realizmu praktycznego (wobec działań – a nie celów tych działań) i eternalizm etyczny. Jak pokazuje analiza tego rezonansu – modyfikacja miała u Przełęckiego głównie charakter osłabienia odpowiednich idei.
EN
In the article, I discuss the ideas that Marian Przełęcki shared with representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School – either modifying them or giving better argumentation for them. These are, among others: (moderate) anti-irrationalism, stimulative rationalism (in relation to faith), logical (restrained) reconstructionism, (liberalized) conventionalism, ontological indeterminism (in the negative part), recognition of ontological reism as an explanatory hypothesis regarding semantic reism, the directive of practical realism (towards actions – and not towards the goals of these actions) and ethical eternalism. As the analysis of this resonance shows – Przełęcki’s modification was mainly weakening relevant ideas.
The main impulse for this considerations is a beautiful Professor Adam Nowaczyk's text "The spell of Plato. Reflections on Roman Ingarden's ontology". My general (negative) thesis is that no hyper-dietetic, i.e. monocategorial, ontology (meant as the theory of real objects) is not correct. Thus neither the theory of sets (if it assumed the uniqueness of the ontic category of sets), nor reism (if it assumed the uniquenes of the ontic category of things) or eventism (if it assumed the uniqueness of the ontic category of events) are correct ontologies (meant as theses on existence of a certain ontic category). The consequence of this negative thesis is that only non-dietetic, i.e. polycategorial, ontology can be correct. I present a few arguments on account of theses two theses.
Our thesis reads: tolerance is not a moral value. There is no moral obligation of being tolerant. Moreover, sometimes we are morally obliged to be intolerant. We define “tolerance” as follows: A person x tolerates a given action of a person y if (x is convinced that there is a person z such that the action of y is bad for z) and (x consciously does not act counter to this act of y). The essence of tolerance should be distinguished from motives of tolerance which may be very varied. Only some of these motives are positively valuable. In the Gospel, there is no absolute dictate of tolerance. On the contrary, we cannot tolerate acts directed towards our neighbors and causing that something bad happens with them. Tolerance of acts directed towards ourselves is a moral duty but only on some conditions, concerning motives of not counteracting. There are at least three limits of tolerance. The first one is of logical character: we can tolerate everything but not intolerance of other people. The second one is of practical character: tolerance should be adequate to «parameters» of tolerated action. The third one is of psychological character: sometimes tolerated actions appear to be psychologically (or also physically) unbearable.
In the paper, we justify the view that Roman Ingarden was an analytical philosopher. First, we show the close personal ties between Ingarden and Kazimierz Twardowski and his pupils. Second, we compare the research program of the Lvov-Warsaw School with the research program formulated by Ingarden. An important point of this program was the use of a specific research method in its implementation. We show that despite the undoubted differences between the research methods declared and actually used by Ingarden and by representatives of the Twardowski School, both of them were methods characteristic of analytical philosophy.
We assume that the imperative reasoning is a reasoning containing at least one step which is an imperative (or rather its content). At the same time, we understand the term "imperative" as a synonym of "imperative sentence". We assume that in its main usage, imperatives express a certain volitional act: namely, a will of realizing a certain state of affairs. In our opinion, such characterization is related to the contents of imperatives; we call these contents "prescriptions", remembering that in untypical usages prescriptions are not expressed by imperatives. Traditional approach to the processes of reasoning takes into account only these mental processes steps of which are declaratives or declarative sentences (or rather their contents – i.e. judgments). If processes of imperative reasoning are to belong to the range of the term "reasoning", the notion of reasoning has to receive a new, enlarging explication. We propose such an explication in the paper.
TSeveral authors take up the problem of the possibility of interpreting the Bible, as well as the sacred Books of other religions. The interpretations can be literal, fundamentalist, or non-literal, seeking a metaphorical sense. Attention is called to the tensions between the requirement of being scientific and faith and the moral consciousness of modern man. Various interpretations of the biblical theme of the sacrifice of Abraham are also presented.
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