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Współczesne postaci ontologii. Od Hegla do Quine’a

100%
Paź B.
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
|
vol. 12
|
issue 1(16)
9-38
PL
The article presents some prominent figures of modern ontology from Hegel to nowadays. It takes into account the diverse forms of ontology in three distinct trends of philosophy: Hegelianism, phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Each of these trends has its own subject, aim and method of ontology. The subject of Hegel’s ontology is understood as something originally undefined, being on the border of nonentity. When presented this way, the subject presupposes a dialectic method of ontology, which the German philosopher defines as “the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.” It is based on reflection, which, according to Hegel, is both a tool and medium to knowledge, though in his Phenomenology of spirit he identifies it as being by itself. Thus understood ontology is to be found both in the works of Hegel’s students and his critics (S. Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre). In Husserl’s phenomenology it is not reflection but eidetic intuition (Wesensschau) that is the main method of ontology, and its subject is not just being, but the essence – a correlate to the eidetic intuition. To Husserl’s phenomenological presumptions referred, among others, N. Hartman and R. Ingarden, who understood ontology as eidetic analysis of ideas. Though Heidegger saw the problem differently: the goal of ontology is defining the meaning of Being (Sinn vom Sein), its method is phenomenological. In none of the approaches was the subject of ontology understood in a classic way as Being, but rather as a certain form of its representation, as the content of consciousness (ideas), or as a certain sense for a definite subject. A different approach to ontology is observable within analytic philosophy, which involved lots of different personalities and different traditions, such as the new positivism, scholastics (J.M. Bocheński, E. Nieznański), Leibnizian rationalism (A. Plantinga), empiricism and pragmatism (W.O. Quine, P. Strawson). Remarkable achievements in ontology belong to some Polish logicians, representatives of the Polish school of analytic philosophy, such as S. Leśniewski and T. Kotarbiński. Leśniewski was the founder of formal ontology – logical calculus of names, while Kotarbiński discovered nominalistic and materialistic ontology – reism (from Latin: res ‘thing’) based on Leśniewski’s ontology. The main thesis of reism was the claim that “every object is a body.”
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Ontologia versus metafizyka? Geneza, rozwój i różne postaci nowożytnej teorii bytu

100%
Paź B.
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
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vol. 11
|
issue 4(15)
817-847
EN
The paper presents the process of modern metaphysics transforming into the ontology. The major points of this process became: 1) scholastic sources of Catholic metaphysics represented by Fonseca, Suarez, Śmiglecki on the one side and Protestant metaphysics, represented by Goclenius and Clauberg, on the other; 2) Descartes’ epistemology of representation and 3) Leibniz’s rational and pluralistic metaphysics (monadology). The climax of the transformation process appears to be “Philosophia prima sive ontologia” (1729), a masterpiece being written by Wolff, where the first system of the ontology (science about being as possibility) was presented as a discipline independent from the traditional metaphysics. However starting with the Kant’s works ontology no longer was the discipline of knowledge about the real world but has being turned into a field of aprioristic categories of thinking about an existence and the physical world.
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Cóż po racjonalności w czasie postmodernizmu?

100%
Paź B.
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
|
vol. 12
|
issue 3(18)
273-292
EN
The aim of the article is to present analytical criticism of rationalism in a postmodern interpretation by I. Trzcińska in her book Logos, mit i ratio. Wybrane koncepcje racjonalności od XV do XVII wieku. The author of the article proves that the postmodern rationalistic interpretation is either irrational, since it abolishes the guiding principles of thinking and being (such as the law of contradiction and the principle of reason), or deficient in methodology. In the paper analyzed, the absence of quite essential arrangements for rationality as such is pointed out, just as the absence of a typology of possible rationality forms. The author claims that in the case of I. Trzcińska’s book we deal with both problems mentioned, which makes the book irrelevant to traditionally understood science.
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