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SELF-DECEPTION. THE BRAIN AND THE BELIEF HOLDER (Oszukiwanie samego siebie)

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Pilat R.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2009
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vol. 37
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issue 3
31-54
EN
In this article the author reflects on the ongoing debate between the intentional and non-intentional accounts of self-deception. On the intentional interpretation self-deception is brought about by an intentional act of the belief holder. Since the self-deceiver sets out to replace one belief with another, he must hold contradictory beliefs at the same time, which makes him irrational. On the non-intentional account the person is subjected to psychical motives and urges that do not create a contradiction but rather a tension or a psychological conflict. Non-intentional interpretations lead conveniently to a neurological account of the phenomenon in question. On this account self-deception is generated by uncontrolled, unconscious, and non-conceptual mechanisms which have evolved to deceive the animal or human subjects for their own sake or for the sake of the species. In this paper the author makes a point in favor of the intentional interpretation, but he tries to avoid the conclusion that the self-deceiver is utterly irrational. The problem is philosophically important because we need to judge someone's actions (and react to them) on the basis of the beliefs the persons actually hold, even if they do not admit they do. Besides, seeing the nature of self-deceptive acts helps us to get a better notion of responsibility. In the last part on his paper he distinguishes between causal responsibility and rational responsibility. The former is always there, but the latter is a cognitive and moral achievement. I argue that the intentional, non-naturalistic approach to self-deception provides a better basis for accepting and refining our rational responsibility. His argument against the naturalistic account goes as follows: 1) on this account a person is said to be unintentionally (unconsciously) suppressing certain beliefs. 2) But the suppression cannot disable logic. The person will still be capable of inferring the suppressed belief from pieces of evidence and thus retrieving it. 3) This seems to make the person irrational. 4) But if the person were thinking of herself as irrational, the whole effort of self-deceiving would be futile. The person must at least think of herself as rational being in order to deceive herself. 5) And not only think - a self-deceiving person must ascribe to herself sufficient grounds to think of herself as rational, otherwise the very thought would be irrational. The author calls this ascription a rationalization and he claims that it is the means of self-deception. 6) In order to see how the rationalization works he resorts to the logical account of belief revision (as he takes self-deception to be a kind of belief revision). His claim is that in order to deceive oneself by incorporating a new belief contradicting the one a person already holds and still to avoid the contradiction, a person has to change the intensional part of meanings in her idiolect.
2

RECONCILIATION AND FUTURE GOODS (Pojednanie i dobra przyszle)

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Pilat R.
Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki
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2010
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vol. 9
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issue 3(28)
409-423
EN
In this article the author is continuing reflections presented in his previous paper on the subject 'Ontologia pojednania' (Ontology of Reconciliation), 'Przeglad Filozoficzno-Literacki' 2007, nr 2(17), p. 245-256. He hopes to have considerably improved his argument now as a result of justified criticism leveled by Karolina Wigura. She objects to the author's considering forgiveness as a necessary condition of reconciliation. This view, she rightly claims, does not account for situations in which the wrong is unforgivable and the communities search for a new beginning nevertheless. Following Hannah Arend's remarks to this effect, Karolina Wigura puts emphasis on reconciliatory political gestures that have the power of bringing about a new beginning despite unsatisfactory moral basis. In the author's revised interpretation, he is trying to link reconciliation more to the future than to the past. He continues to claim that in its very core, reconciliation is based on a certain kind of promise, but this promise is based on perception of future goods and not on relieving the burden of the past. His departure point this time are empirical data (obtained from different surveys in Poland) which show that people are more future oriented if they perceive their own past as containing a considerable amount of freedom and choice. He argues that for reconciliation to succeed the perception of open future must in a sense permeate one's past. Only on this condition one's future is capable of absorbing promises and brings the reconciliation. We have to see our past as a field of possibilities that are still (at least in part) valid as possibilities. This is a prerequisite of reconciliation in both individual and political realm.
3
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THE MIND'S ANCHORAGE IN ABSTRACT OBJECTS (Zakorzenienie umyslu w obiektach abstrakcyjnych)

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Pilat R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2010
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issue 11
211-233
EN
Some features of human linguistic competence make one to reconsider the Fregean notion of modes of presentation, which were supposed to correspond to senses of words. Especially two linguistic phenomena invite such a reflection: (1) generalized reports about people's beliefs, like 'Everybody thinks that p'; (2) semantic relations (like synonymy) between empty names (proper or general). In the analysis of belief reports I am referring to studies by Edward Zalta; in the analysis of empty names I am drawing on Jerrold Katz and Georges Rey's accounts. The three entirely independent inquiries seem to support the claim, that Fregean senses (understood as the modes of presentation) presuppose the existence of abstract individuals and properties, which are intuitively apprehended by the speakers. It leads to certain conclusion about the nature of the human mind. In this article I am arguing that to the extent determined by the analyzed phenomena, human mind is in part an abstract entity - it incorporates - as its parts - the abstract entities though which it is referring to itself. This reference to oneself takes place in virtue of possessing ones own thoughts. Possessing thoughts is quite different from having experiences or more generally, psychological states. It requires that a subject is related to certain abstract objects. Although I do not believe that this claim amounts to some sort of spiritualism, I do believe that it imposes rather serious constraint on naturalistic accounts of the mind. This view is committed to rather strong form of emergentism or even to some kind of interactive dualism about the mind.
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