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Sókratova „neskladebná“ filosofie : K Fischerovu výkladu Sókrata

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Jíra P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2012
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vol. 60
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issue 2, Special No: Hledání ztraceného času
135-148
EN
The author notes a lack of response to the work of J. L. Fischer and, using Fischer’s interpretation of Socrates, shows that Fischer deserves critical attention. He first analyses Fischer’s interpretation in terms of content. Fischer’s approach stems from the Scottish school and his analyses can still be productive. However, his idea of a “psychological analysis”, of Socrates proves rather problematic. The author goes on to analyse what Socrates means for Fischer philosophically, noting that fundamental premises of Socrates’ philosophy are exact opposite of the “composable philosophy” Fischer advocates. For Fischer, this means philosophy which can be composed – built up – of discrete observations after the manner of a scientific theory, at least as positivist thinkers conceived of it. Socrates offers a rationalist defence of autocratic rule. T e measure of all things is not the citizen but the expert. On such presuppositions, a general assembly would make no sense. Tus though his study poses as purely historical, Fischer manages to work his way to his central motif, the crisis contemporary democracy challenged by dogma “scientifi c ma¬terialism” which can be neither analysed nor refuted. Socrates is pre¬sented as democracy’s enemy, in wholly contemporary terms. Fischer’s presentation of Socrates, rather like Popper’s reading of Plato, thus re¬flects the experience of the twentieth century.
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Patočkovo rozlišení mezi Sókratem a Platónem

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Jíra P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2010
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vol. 58
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issue 4
485-501
EN
The subject of the article is Patočka’s distinction between Socrates and Plato. In two texts written in the 1930’s (Platonism and Politics and Plato and Popularisation), Patočka declares his allegiance to Platonism as the true philosophy, although he does not yet distinguish betwen Plato and Socrates. These texts of Patočka’s are concerned with an attempt to discover a „philosophy of praxis“, which would free itself from modern intellectualism as well as from the understanding of man as homo faber. In the second half of the forties Patočka develops a distinction between Socrates and Plato in which, initially, in the voluminous study Eternity and Historicity and in the lecture Socrates, he clearly takes Socrates’ side. Socrates, for Patočka, now presents the quintessential philosophical life and thus provides the basis for a „philosophy of praxis“ (humanism), which Patočka had been seeking in Platonism in his articles of the thirties. Plato for Patočka now poses a threat not unlike modern intellectualism: this is because Good for him exists in itself, regardless of man and his moral endeavour. Patočka’s philosophical programme consists in attempts to repeat the basic philosophical questions. Socrates poses the question of human „good“. In order that we may repeat it, in its whole intensity, we must purge it of Plato’s account. Socrates was, in Patočka’s view, capable of raising the question of „true human being“. Insistence on this question is „care for the soul“ and the soul is the single authority on which this question is based. Plato, in Patočka’s view, poses the question of „the true basis of everything“. Socrates’ anthropological concepts gain, in Plato’s work, cosmological significance. A relation to the whole of the world is, however, for Patočka an integral part of the spiritual life, and from this perspective Socrates’ philosophy is shown to be inadequate. Socrates is not capable, in reality, of addressing the question of the whole world. Socrates’ relation to the world is not led by a conscious question, but by a „divine voice“ (daimonion). For Patočka, however, reliance on divine help was an abdication of a philosophical position. As a result, Patočka in Negative Platonism returns to Platonism, so that he might extract its philosophical will and develop it further in a purified form.
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