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Odnowienie estetyki?

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PL
Głos w debacie: Estetyka a metafizyka
EN
A voice in the debate: Aesthethics and metaphysics
EN
In this text the author describes briefly Kierkegaard's conception of existence, which has been juxtaposed by him with the reinterpreted conception of essence and of the existing. Kierkegaard defined existence referring to different orders of representation, first of all to the spoken and written language. He considered existence - always individual and particular - as an object of personal existential choice. This choice concerns, at the same time, the way of individual existence (the stadium of life) and the individual identity. That is why in Kierkegaard's reflection is so important the reference to individual identity and to its grasp in narration - in the mythical parable and in the story concerning everyday life. The problems of existence, identity and their grasp in representation are connected with the Kierkegaardian question of repetition, which is also discussed in this study.
EN
The text presents the main aesthetic theses of Karol Irzykowski, concerning the work of art. Karol Irzykowski (1873-1944) - the Polish writer, critic and theorist of literature, art and culture - considered the work of art as the specific object of culture, as the source of human aesthetic experience and, at the same time, of cognition. He admitted the art, first of all, as the result of intellectual action. That is why, the primary thesis of his aesthetics underlines the connection between the aesthetic and epistemological qualities in the work of art. The text characterises this connection and refers to the philosophical tradition, important for the ideas of Karol Irzykowski.
EN
The goal of the text is to reconstruct the concept of cultural normativity found in the phenomenological philosophy of law. The starting point of the text is the distinction between cultural normativity and normativity in culture. This distinction is based on reference to an extra-cultural, but not non-human instance – transcendent to the creations of humanity and its world, but in relations with the human equipment, with the characteristics of a specific human being and its existence. The specific relations between cultural and legal normativity can be found in phenomenological concepts of law, which draw on the Husserlian transcendentalism and essentialism. The phenomenology of law attempts to answer the question of the sources, and the ontological and epistemological status of normativity as such. Normativity as a written and unwritten set of norms is characterized by phenomenologists with reference to value and axiology. The values are assumed by them as certain fixed reference points (“horizon of values” given to be recognized), because norms make it possible to establish rules for various individual and collective practices within a particular community and culture on the basis of values.
EN
The main question of the text concerns the status of value in Georg Simmel’s thinking. According toSimmel, values are submitted to “idealization,” which can be considered a kind of “constructed essentialism.”Together with the concept of construction, “constructed essentialism” first appeared implicitly in Kant’s theseson the human rational equipment containing necessary inborn dispositions and, particularly, in his theses ontranscendental schematism. However, it was Fichte and Schelling who applied the term “construction” to thedescription of cognitive processes. In his theses concerning the idealization of values as conventionally accepted,socially and economically constructed relations, Simmel refers to the anthropological, cognitive equipment: tothe human propensity to seek patterns, ideals, and even ideas. Such a formulation of the process of idealizationspreads Simmel’s concept of value dialectically between constructivism and anthropological essentialism. Material and Methods Results Conclusions
EN
In the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl defines that which is normative as the objectively regular with its rules of regularity, which can be recognised rationally – normativity concerns the being itself and the rational cognition of the being (logic as a normative discipline establishing the rules of scientific knowledge, as the science of science). Instead, Adolf Reinach in The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law defines the notion of norm as polysemantic and distinguishes the legal provisions (the prescriptive sentences), formulated within a given community, from the basic norms which are grounded in the objective (including moral) justness of the states of affairs. The obligation of the being and the obligation of acting exist in themselves, independently from cognition. In turn, “enactments and the propositions which express enactments” as a kind of normative sentences have the character of normalisation, but they require a person to pronounce them. The prescriptions realise and refer to what is objectively being and to the objectivity of what is being and obligatory. In my text, I present Reinach’s position on the relations between norms and provisions (as prescriptive propositions “which express enactments”) referring his theories to the Husserlian concept of normativity.
Logos i Ethos
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2022
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vol. 60
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issue 2
89-112
EN
The Argentinian legal philosopher Carlos Cossio developed his concepts from the 1930s, being an academic lecturer and actively participating in social life. In assumptions, theses and postulates, his theory of law examines the social role of law, primarily the role of judges and judicial institutions. In his phenomenology of law, Cossio refers above all to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenologist theses, but also to Immanuel Kant’s ethics and to the philosophy of existence – to the construals of Miguel de Unamuno and Martin Heidegger. Cossio systematically emphasises the first-person, i.e., egological and individualistic, perspective of knowledge, decisions and actions. Such a perspective allows us to recognise law as acting towards and for human individuals, taking into account their specific biographical situation and their conduct – law is defined and gaining importance in a concrete social world. At the same time, the position of the subject in the world is determined by the intersubjective context of culture, which is identical to the specifically human “world of life”. Cossio directs our attention towards anthropological theses (the anthropological need for rules and normativity) and towards the language and other sign systems presumed to be specific human products and giving meanings to “cultural objects” (Wilhelm Dilthey), i.e., towards intersubjectivity (Lebenswelt) broadly understood as a symbolic, semiotic and semantic sphere. 
PL
Carlos Cossio, argentyński filozof prawa rozwijał swoje koncepcje od lat trzydziestych XX wieku, będąc wykładowcą akademickim i aktywnie uczestnicząc w życiu społecznym. W założeniach, tezach i postulatach jego prawnicza teoria zajmuje się społeczną rolą prawa, przede wszystkim rolą sędziów i instytucji sądowych. W swojej fenomenologii prawa Cossio odwołuje się przede wszystkim do tez fenomenologicznych Edmunda Husserla, jak również do etyki Immanuela Kanta oraz do filozofii egzystencji – do koncepcji Miguela de Unamuno i Martina Heideggera. Cossio systematycznie podkreśla pierwszoosobową, czyli egologiczną i indywidualistyczną perspektywę wiedzy, decyzji i działań. Taka perspektywa pozwala nam rozpoznawać prawo jako działające wobec i dla ludzkich jednostek, z uwzględnieniem ich specyficznej sytuacji biograficznej i ich zachowania – prawo jest określane i nabiera ważności w konkretnym społecznym świecie. Równocześnie pozycja podmiotu w świecie jest określana przez intersubiektywny kontekst kultury, tożsamy ze specyficznie ludzkim „światem życia”. Cossio kieruje naszą uwagę ku tezom antropologicznym (antropologiczna potrzeba reguł i normatywności) oraz ku językowi i innym systemom znakowym, uznawanym za specyficznie ludzkie wytwory i nadające znaczenie „przedmiotom kultury” (Wilhelm Dilthey), czyli ku intersubiektywności (Lebenswelt) szeroko pojmowanej jako symboliczna, semiotyczna i semantyczna sfera.  
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