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PL
W artykule zaprezentowanych jest pięć argumentów na rzecz witalistyczno-egzystencjalistycznej interpretacji pierwszej filozofii Wittgensteina. Wskazuje się na inter-tekstualne powiązania Traktatu z witalistyczną tradycją transcendentalną rozwijaną w XIX wieku przez Diltheya, a także przez Royce’a. Zwraca się również uwagę na rozmaite typy interpretacji pierwszej filozofii Wittgensteina. Interpretacja witalistyczno-egzystencjalistyczna nie ignoruje zawartości logicznej Traktatu.
EN
The article presents five arguments in favor of a vitalist-existentialist interpretation of Wittgenstein's first philosophy. It points out the inter-textual links between the Treatise and the vitalist transcendental tradition developed in the nineteenth century by Dilthey and Royce. Attention is also drawn to the various types of interpretations of Wittgenstein's first philosophy. The vitalist-existentialist interpretation does not ignore the logical content of the Treatise.
Filozofia Nauki
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1997
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vol. 5
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issue 1
39-58
PL
This is an attempt of formalizing the language of the idealism-realism debate in terms of possible worlds. Different versions of idealism and realism are presented within the proposed framework. Finally, the proposed formal construction is applied to the interpretation of some philosophical positions that can be found in the history of philosophy.
Filozofia Nauki
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2010
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vol. 18
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issue 4
23-47
PL
The paper presents a new model of the structure of basic arithmetical representations encoded in minds which enable them to solve simple story-tasks. According to the dominating paradigm the process of acquiring basic counting abilities culminates in encoding the exact number line in mind. This linear number representation enables the mind to solve simple story-tasks which do not require any mathematical mastery knowledge comprising laws, definitions and theorems. Some researchers try to show that the process of encoding the exact number line stems from transformations of the approximate number line (the mental number line) whereas others model this process as being dependent on the linguistic and logical resources of mind. In the paper the dominating approach is rejected in favor of a new paradigm of comprehending the structure of the basic mature arithmetic representation. The new paradigm assumes that the first, pre-school stage of developing arithmetical capacities is completed when a child acquires a cluster of exact number lines. Hence, the basic arithmetical structure enabling children to solve simple mathematical storytasks cannot be a semantic model of Peano’s arithmetic. If it was the case, then seven-years-old children engaged in solving simple story-tasks would have to use unconsciously very sophisticated set-theoretic tools. It is rather impossible because children provide solutions to these tasks in the very short time (sometimes in seconds) whereas the use of the set theoretic representations in processing input data given in the contents of the tasks would result in prolongation of the time needful for computing the outputs. The formal model of the cluster of number lines requires constructing a formal arithmetical theory which is called the arithmetic of indexed natural numbers. The theory is a generalization of the standard arithmetic of natural numbers. In light of the proposed model, the verbal number line does not function as a tool for counting cardinalities of sets. Its main role is enabling the mind to construct categorial number lines belonging to the cluster-structures processed in the course of solving storytasks. Unlike the classical model, the presented model explains children’s abilities in solving tasks without reference to the tacit set theoretic knowledge encoded in children’s minds.
Filozofia Nauki
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2005
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vol. 13
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issue 1
59-89
PL
The aim of the article is applying some version of phenomenological speech acts theory into the domain of philosophical (existential) discourse. There are identified various language-mechanisms of existential philosophising. Especially, locutionary (noematic) and illocutionary (noetic) aspects of acts existentialising are considered. The main thesis of the paper may be formulated in the following words: In acts of existential discourse, mechanisms of reference determine that an existentialising subject is directed to the mental entities such as illocutionary representations of fears, cares, wastes and other. The predication in such acts of philosophising is internal and also personal, temporal and sometime virtual. In the paper, there is also presented the illocutionary analysis of a fragment of Heidegger's text coming from Sein und Zeit.
Filozofia Nauki
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1996
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vol. 4
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issue 1
17-40
PL
The paper is intended to discuss main semantic presuppositions of language, being of service to express the philosophical problem of idealism/realism in its various versions. At the beginning, the author shows that the terms „idealism” and „realism” are polysemic. The fact of this polysemy makes impossible to construct precise definitions of both the opposed notions. Then there are characterized four types of reasonings, constituting the ground for formulating the question of idealism/realism. It appears that in order to discuss the problem idealism/realism, we must have at our disposal a specific metalanguage. The author reconstructs main semantic presuppositions of this metalanguage: these presuppositions constitute the so-called „possible-world” semantic schema. The general thesis of the papers goes like this: a language for expressing philosophical discours, concerning the question of idealism/realism, is a bearer of semantic presuppositions, stating the existence of possible worlds, mutually connected with the aid of various relations.
Filozofia Nauki
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2011
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vol. 19
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issue 4
83-101
PL
The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model (world) constructed on the grounds of second order arithmetical theories founded upon set theory. Slingshot arguments directed against facts, situations and other propositional entities are usually blocked by rejecting one of the main inference rules used in various versions of this argument. Authors distinguish two types of main inference rules used in these variants: (i) for non-propositional expressions: iota-conversion rules (ι-conv), iota-substitution rules (ι-subs), lambda-conversion principle (λ-conv); and (ii) for propositional expressions: the principle of substitutivity for logical equivalents (PSLE). Even if strategies for defending facts by the rejection of one of the mentioned rules are accepted, it may be shown that the acceptance of the requirement that mathematical facts (situations or truth-makers) differing with regard to their constituents are different facts, leads to the contradiction in meta-theories of set theoretic models for first order arithmetical theories. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which may be called hyper-slingshot. The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact that the former are formulated in the semantic meta-language of mathematical theories without the use of the iota-operator or the name-forming lambda-operator, whereas the latter require for their expression at least one of these non-standard term-operators. Furthermore, in hyper-slingshots PSLE is not used, whereas in conventional slingshots, PSLE plays a crucial inferential role. Hyper-slingshots implement simpler language tools in comparison with those used in conventional slingshots.
Filozofia Nauki
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2007
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vol. 15
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issue 3
77-105
PL
The main aim of the paper is paraphrasing Heidegger's category of being in the theoretic framework of Fregean phenomenological semantics. The choice of Fregean phenomenological semantics as the tool of the paraphrase is justified by the fact that philosophy articulated in Sein und Zeit may be interpreted as the modification of Husserl's project of phenomenology which is treated, in turn, as generalisation of Frege's theory of sense and nominatum. So in the paper it is defended that Heidegger's category of being stems from Frege's considerations devoted to basic semantic questions. In the first chapter there are specified in existentialistic language ten principles clarifying the notion of being. In the second part the principles are paraphrased in the phenomenological theory of noema (this category is understood in spirit of the so called Californian interpretation). This move allows us to show how the conception of being is the modification of Frege's and Husserl's semantics. In the last chapters there is reconstructed Heidegger's model of acts of reference. The formal tool of the reconstruction is Leśniewski's formal language (enriched by Ajdukiewicz) with indexes designating ways of existence and referential backgrounds.
Filozofia Nauki
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2012
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vol. 20
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issue 1
59-91
PL
In the paper there are presented main assumptions underlying the construction of theoretic models of mental processes of numeral reference in mathematical practice which comprises such abilities as counting, solving story-tasks, estimating cardinalities and comparing magnitudes. Numerals are understood as any expressions which enable mind to refer to numbers, cardinalities and magnitudes. The main research question formulated in the article sounds: What cognitive processes do there occur in the mind during execution of various numeral acts of reference? In the first section there is presented the Jumblese quasi-paradox of the surface syntactic structures of numerals. The solution of this quasi-paradox is based on the assumption that numerals possess hidden deep structures alongside their surface structures. The second section comprises syntactic analyses of deep structures of numerals. They are understood as grammatical structures of mental representations of numerals, encoded in mind. The main conclusion of this section is a contention according to which deep structures of numerals are encoded in mind with the help of special functors reflecting the property called positionality of digital record. The third chapter is an analysis of numerals and their deep structures on the ground of categorial grammar. This section results in the construction of the categorial model of deep structures of numerals with help of Ajdukiewicz’s indices of syntactic categories. In the last part there are specified basic mental mechanisms of processing representations of numerals with respect to their deep structures. Results of the paper are intended as an intuitive basis for formal theory of numerals’ syntax. They will be presented in the next paper.
Filozofia Nauki
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2007
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vol. 15
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issue 4
51-70
PL
In the paper there is presented the argument for the situational paradigm of theory of language. In comparison to the nominativistic semantics it is argued in the paper that the propositional semantics is a better tool of explaining various speech acts in which the principle of compositionality is collapsed. In the paper there are also described referential mechanisms of metaphorical speech acts. In accordance with these mechanisms the metaphorical status of speech acts is determined by the collapse of Fregean referential compositionality of speech acts. In the paper there are constructed two notions of compositionality. First of them may be called classical Fregean concept of compositionality which establishes a semantic correlate of a complex speech act on a functional basis of semantic correlates of constituents of a complex speech act. According to the second notion of compositionality, correlates of constituents of a complex speech act are recursively deter-mined by a correlate of a complex speech act. Mataphorical speech acts possess such a property that correlates of their constituent expressions are determined in processes of de-coding by recursive compositionality functions. Maximal metaphors are speech acts in which recursive as well as Fregean compositionality collapse. In the paper it is argued that the traditional nominativistic semantics is not able to explain communicational functioning of metaphorical speech acts. That is why the conclusion of the paper resolves itself to the thesis that the situational semantic paradigm which should base on recursive notion of compositionality, is better than the nominativistic paradigm.
Filozofia Nauki
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2015
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vol. 23
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issue 3
21-55
PL
The article is devoted to the problem of mathematical empiricism: what could the phrase “to be a mathematical empiricist” mean? There are many interpretations of this position in philosophy of mathematics. The essay discusses relevant views of Quine and Putnam. Some detailed questions concerning e.g. the applicability of mathematics, the status of mathematical proof, the status of mathematical axioms are examined from the point of view of these philosophies.
11
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The Logics of Derivational Trees

100%
Filozofia Nauki
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2007
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vol. 15
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issue 2
33-73
PL
The paper presents the construction of a new class of logics, which are called logics of derivational trees. The presentation comprises three sections: (i) intuitive psychological motivations for these logics stemming from some results of developmental psycho-linguistics (Piaget, Chomsky), (ii) the construction of formal calculus with help of algorithmic tools, and (iii) the construction of set-theoretic semantic model for our logic. They determine criteria of valid deriving and transforming structures which are usually described in the literature as derivational trees. These structures are used in linguistics or in computational sciences as tools of modelling deep sentential structures or information-bases. Furthermore cognitive anthropologists notice that most of our ordinary taxonomies arranging the experienced world in our Lebenswelt possess various tree-structures. It seems that our abilities of applying tree-structures (without explicit knowledge concerned with algebraic mechanisms of construing tree-structures) in various segments of our life are mental and behavioral manifestation of some special logical disposal belonging to the machinery of logical competence in general. It is interesting to put the hypothesis according to which the competence of construing and applying tree-structures is even more primitive than the competence of applying logical rules of natural deduction. The presented calculus possesses some peculiar feature, namely its formal language is composed of expressions of three syntactic levels. In standard, formal languages all expressions may be divided as belonging to two levels: the level of formulas and the level of constituents of formulas. In the language of derivational trees there are distinguished the following levels: (i) the level of lexical expressions, (ii) the level of derivation-expressions, (iii) and finally the level of transformation-expressions. These last category fulfils the role of formulas. Proofs are appropriate sequences of derivation-expressions. However what is proved is not a derivation-expression but it is a transformation-expression. The peculiarity of our logic consists in that an expression which is proved, does not belong to the category of constituents of proofs.
13
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Truth and States of Affairs

88%
Filozofia Nauki
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2000
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vol. 8
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issue 1
122-133
PL
Review of: Andrzej Biłat: Prawda i stany rzeczy,  Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 1995.
PL
The aim of the article is to propose a formal model of a representational system underlying the core numerical knowledge which is usually manifested in psychological experiments as the SNARC effect, size and distance effects, and the effect of numerical scale. Starting with the assumption that all the effects can be explained by a metaphor of a mental number line, we based our model on a hierarchical structure composed of three numerical axes characterized by different levels of representational efficiency: (i) a summation-accumulator axis, (ii) a point-place axis, and (iii) an exact point-based axis. The model predicts that a mature exact number line, in a form as it is observed in most of experiments with adults, arises as an effect of certain transformation processes occurring within first two primary, pre-existing axes. The paradigm underlying the theoretic construction may be interpreted philosophically as a neo-Kantian approach to modelling mind's representational structures.
15
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On States of Affairs Once Again

50%
Filozofia Nauki
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2001
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vol. 9
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issue 4
101-112
PL
   
16
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Mathematics and Intensionality

50%
Filozofia Nauki
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2002
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vol. 10
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issue 3-4
123-148
PL
  
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