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Melancholie osmašedesátého roku

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Profant M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2018

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vol. 66

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issue 4

523-542

EN

The author interprets several texts arising in the period of the epilogue to the Prague Spring (late autumn 1968 – August 1969) – polemical discussions on Český úděl (The Czech Deal) and a collection of Kosík’s meditations on the themes of Naše současná krize (Our Conterporary Crisis) and Střední Evropa (Central Europe). The author concentrates his interpretation on the concept of the Czech/Czechoslovak opportunity, as culturally-historical conditions, formed in the national culture (in a non-nationalistic conception of nation), which open up a specific opportunity for the development of a socialist emancipatory project, and for the reformation of the bureaucratic dictatorship into democratic socialism. He takes from Střítecký the definition of the generation of “the ageing youth of communism” which he understands (in opposition to Střítecký’s ideological critique) as a hegemon in the formation of the public will and imagination in the period of the Prague Spring. The hegemon in question, however, has not completely agreed with the political dimension of his role: in the situation of strict Soviet dominance, the chances of success for political conduct arising from the Czechoslovak opportunity were very limited. However, if the members of the aforementioned generation voluntarily surrendered these chances, it would mean not only resignation of the Socialist ideal, but also a devastating conflict with their own self-image and life story, and the collapse of their own integrity. It is this conflict between the awareness of this limitation and the impossibility of surrendering all chances (begun by the crisis of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January 1968) of politically exploiting the Czechoslovak opportunity, amounts to the first layer of the melancholy of Prague Spring. Kosík reassigns the Czechoslovak opportunity to the vision of a harmonious unification of politics and culture, in which the utopian energy of the Socialist Republic was redirected away from its connection with the political realisation of an emancipatory aim, and from the justification of the emancipatory ideal distinguished by the possibilities of revolutionary praxis, towards the life of the individual and his formation and recognition in sociability with other people. This reassignment is treated, by the author of the article, as a retreat from the emancipatory project in favour of a resistance by which a person stubbornly preserves their faith in the idea of liberation. Utopia now takes on the form of the binding melancholy.

DE

Der Autor interpretiert mehrere Texte aus der Zeit des Epilogs des Prager Frühlings (d. h. vom Herbst 1968 bis August 1969): Die Polemik zum Český úděl (Tschechischen Schicksal) und die Sammlung von Kosíks Überlegungen aus dem Kreis Naše současná krize (Unsere heutige Krise) und Střední Evropa (Mitteleuropa). Seine Interpretation konzentriert sich dabei auf den Begriff der tschechischen/tschechoslowakischen Möglichkeit als kulturhistorischer Bedingungen, die in der nationalen Kultur (in nicht-nationalistischer Auffassung der Nation) zu Grunde gelegt sind, und die spezifische Chancen zur Entwicklung eines sozialistischen Emanzipationsprojekts und zur Umwandlung der bürokratischen Diktatur in einen demokratischen Sozialismus eröffnen. Der Autor übernimmt dabei von Střítecký den Begriff der Generation der „alternden Jugend des Kommunismus“, den er (im Gegensatz zu Stříteckýs ideologischer Kritik) als Hegemon der Bildung des öffentlichen Willens und der Imagination in der Zeit des Prager Frühlings begreift. Freilich handelt es sich dabei um einen Hegemonen, der mit der politischen Dimension seiner Rolle nicht ganz einverstanden ist: Angesichts der strengen sowjetischen Dominanz waren die Chancen auf einen Erfolg politischer Verhandlungen vor dem Hintergrund der tschechoslowakischen Möglichkeiten sehr begrenzt – wenn jedoch die Angehörigen der o. g. Generation freiwillig auf diese Chancen verzichtet hätten, wäre dies nicht nur einer Resignation bezüglich des sozialistischen Ideals gleichgekommen, sondern hätte auch einen vernichtenden Konflikt mit der eigenen Biographie und der Selbststilisierung für die Angehörigen eben jener Generation und den Zerfall ihrer eigenen Integrität bedeutet. Es ist genau die Konfrontation des Bewusstseins dieser Beschränkung mit der Unmöglichkeit, die Chance aufzugeben (die durch die KPC-Krise im Januar 1968 eröffnet wurde), die politische tschechoslowakische Option zu realisieren, die erste Ebene der Melancholie des Prager Frühlings schafft. Kosíks Umschreibung der tschechoslowakischen Möglichkeit in eine Vision der harmonischen Vereinigung von Politik und Kultur – in der er die utopische Energie des Sozialismus der Republik von ihrer Verbindung mit der politischen Realisierung des Ziels der Emanzipation umlenkte, von der Rechtfertigung des emanzipatorischen Ideals durch die erkannten Möglichkeiten der revolutionären Praxis – in das Dasein des Einzelnen und seine Formung und Anerkennung in der Gemeinschaft mit Anderen, interpretiert der Autor des Artikels als Rückzug vom Projekt der Emanzipation zu Gunsten des Widerstands, mit dem der Mensch hartnäckig dem Ideal der Befreiung die Treue hält. Die Utopie gewinnt hier die Form einer bindenden Melancholie.

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K bezprostřední reakci československé diplomacie na sovětskou okupaci v srpnu 1968 (Několik poznámek a nepublikovaných dokumentů)

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Dejmek J.

Moderní dějiny: sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století (Modern History: Studies into 19th and 20th century history)

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2015

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vol. 23

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issue 2

283-306

EN

Communist Czechoslovakia’s diplomacy found itself in a completely unfamiliar situation after the invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies on the night of 20/21 August 1968, having to defend the state’s sovereignty against its allies, which the leadership of the governing party and a large section of the public had until then perceived as a guarantee of national independence. The failure of Moscow’s official justification for the invasion was in particular due to appearances by Czechoslovak representatives at the UN, first of all interim CSSR ambassador at the UN Security Council, J Mužík, and then J Hájek himself. Although Prague very early on called upon the ministers not to oppose the invasion at the UN, Hájek repeatedly protested against the occupation. This ‘internationalisation’ of the Czechoslovak question along with other factors, including the opposition of a large number of Western communist parties to the invasion, could have helped ensure a compromise outcome to the crisis. Signature of the Czechoslovak-Soviet ‘Moscow Protocol’ of 26 August which anticipated the withdrawal of the Czechoslovak issue from the UN and the strengthening of mutual diplomatic collaboration between Moscow and Prague amongst other items, however, represented the end of active Czechoslovak diplomacy resistance to the occupation.

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Zpráva Jiřího S. Hájka o jeho diplomatické aktivitě po 21. srpnu 1968

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Dejmek J.

Moderní dějiny: sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století (Modern History: Studies into 19th and 20th century history)

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2016

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vol. 24

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issue 2

265-284

EN

This materials provides a commented printing of a previously unpublished secret report by ČSSR Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Prague Spring period of 1968, Jiří S Hájek, who prepared it for the needs of the ministry heads (and also party circles) following his return to Prague from his dramatic trip to New York and Geneva after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Warsaw Pact. When the invasion occurred on 21 August, Hájek was in Yugoslavia on a holiday, as were three other members of O Černík’s government. Following the occupation, and also thanks to the anti-occupation stance of the Central Committee and most of the Prague government, he travelled via Vienna to New York where the UN Security Council had been convened. Here, as early as 21 August, the ČSSR’s provisional delegate to the UN, J Mužík, had spoken out against the occupation. Upon his arrival in New York on 24 August, Minister Hájek supported this stance, thus significantly helping to dismantle the Soviet lies that it was the Czechoslovak government which had invited the armies of the Warsaw Pact to its country. At the same time, however, he stressed that the ČSSR would remain an ally of the USSR. In subsequent days, Hájek no longer pursued further discussions of the Czechoslovak cause in the Council; on the contrary, in the spirit of the instructions of President L Svoboda (who was at the time holding negotiations with Brezhnev on dealing with the crisis further) he left New York and travelled to Geneva for UN negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. From there, he returned to Prague at the beginning of September.

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2 Moderní dějiny: sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století (Modern History: Studies into 19th and 20th century history)

1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2 Dejmek J.

1 Profant M.

1 2018

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Melancholie osmašedesátého roku

K bezprostřední reakci československé diplomacie na sovětskou okupaci v srpnu 1968 (Několik poznámek a nepublikovaných dokumentů)

Zpráva Jiřího S. Hájka o jeho diplomatické aktivitě po 21. srpnu 1968