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ABSOLUTISM AND PLURALISM

100%
Zieminska R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2005
|
issue 1
159-174
EN
Alethic absolutism is a thesis that propositions can not be more or less true, that they are true or false for ever (if true at all) and that their truth is independent on any circumstances of their assertion. In negative version, easier to defend, alethic absolutism claims the very same proposition can not be both true and false relative to circumstances of its assertion. Simple alethic pluralism is a thesis that we have many concepts of truth. It is a very good way to dissolve the controversy between alethic relativism and absolutism. Many philosophical concepts of truth are the best reason for such pluralism. If concept is meaning of a name, we have many concepts of truth because the name 'truth' was understood in many ways. The variety of meanings however can be superficial. Under it we can find one idea of truth expressed in correspondence truism or schema (T). The content of the truism is too poor to be content of anyone concept of truth, so it usually is connected with some picture of the world (ontology) and we have so many concepts of truth as many pictures of the world. The authoress proposes the hierarchical pluralism with privileged classic (or correspondence in weak sense) concept of truth as absolute property.
2

RELATIVISM AND ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM

100%
Zeman D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2007
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vol. 14
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issue 1
53-71
EN
The essay is an attempt to offer a version of the conceptual relativism that escapes Donald Davidson's (widely thought) decisive criticisms of the notion of 'conceptual scheme'. Two variants of relativism are distinguished, a weaker and a stronger one. The concrete proposal involves accepting a version of 'alethic' pluralism. After discussing 'alethic' pluralism in general, and after exploring both strong and weak versions of it, a suitable version is presented: 'alethic' functionalism. The final part offers an illustration of how embracing 'alethic' functionalism may help the relativist.
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