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MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM BY RICHARD HARE

100%
Saja K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2007
|
issue 5
179-202
EN
Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article The author presents Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation into three levels: semantical, epistemological, and ontological. He also explains his concept of internal motivation and argues that his theory, contrary to what his critics assume, may be called a weak motivational internalism.
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AMORALISM AND PSYCHOPATHY (Amoralizm i psychopatia)

88%
Janikowski W.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 8
35-47
EN
Amoralist in a philosophically technical sense is a person who acknowledges that it would be morally wrong if she did certain act, yet she does not care about it at all, lacking any moral motivations as such. She would be capable of identifying moral reasons, but treating them as not reasons for her. The author points out that amoralists exist - they are persons ranked highly in R.D. Hare's PCL-R test (which, published in 1991, has been widely accepted in practice around the world, and Hare's concept of 'psychopathy' is now firmly grounded in clinical and theoretical community). Then he argues against apparently analytical claim of ethical rationalism. This claim, mostly considered sort of 'moral internalism', is not true, neither conceptually, nor factually. In the course of coming to such conclusion, the author discusses two peculiarities of psychopaths' minds: their difficulties with moral/conventional differentiation and being deprived of Violence Inhibition Mechanism.
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