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Dowód ontologiczny św. Anzelma w ujęciu Nicholasa Reschera

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Spryszak P.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

2014

vol. 42

issue 2

91-102

In this paper I briefly examine the empiricist interpretation of St. Anselm’s ontological proof proposed by Nicholas Rescher. Rescher writes: “I propose to classify the word ‘God’ within the category of words which cannot be given an explicit definition, but whose meaning can only be grasped within experience. On this view, a person whose history is devoid of religious experience simply cannot have an adequate grasp of the meaning of the word ‘God’. And I submit that a person who does have a basis of experience adequate to an understanding of this term, also has, ipso facto, the experiential basis of evidence adequate to underwrite rational, warranted assent to the proposition that God exists.” I find this modern re-reading of the classical text intriguing, but rather untenable, mostly because Rescher’s first premise is an alleged analogy between the term “God” and qualia-terms. However, to strengthen his point in a way, I make some observations concerning, among other things, the problem of qualia. Then I clarify his second premise, that an experience is a basis for a warranted belief by noting that one can hold that an experience of X is only a prima facie argument for the existence of X, which makes experiential evidence even less persuasive than Rescher seems to suppose.

Semantyka anzelmiańskiego Imienia Boga

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Gomułka J.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

2012

vol. 40

issue 3

5 - 22

My paper considers the meaning of St. Anselm's Name of God: quo maius cogitari nequit. The definition is used in the ontological proofs in Proslogion 2 and 3 but, paradoxically, it is claimed to be inconceivable in chapter 15. I believe that Anselm realized the problem during his discussion with Gaunilo, who questioned Anselm's assumption that one can have in mind something than which nothing greater can be conceived. In his reply Anselm defended his assumption and finally changed his earlier theory of what it means to have a concept in mind. The new theory distinguishes vox ipsa (the mere word), res significata (the thing indicated), and intelligere aut cogitare quod dicitur (understanding or conceiving what is said). I call the latter the procedural meaning to distinguish it from the direct meaning which is res significata, because by it Anselm means a procedure for obtaining a thing. The procedure, however, is infinite and will never give us any thing. I thus conclude that quo maius cogitari nequit is a pseudo-definition which gives us pseudo-understanding. It allows us but does not force us, leaving the issue open to further considerations.

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2 Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

1 Gomułka J.

1 Spryszak P.

1 2014

1 2012

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Dowód ontologiczny św. Anzelma w ujęciu Nicholasa Reschera

Semantyka anzelmiańskiego Imienia Boga