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1

Kant's Transcendental Turn

100%

Asmuth C.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 4(52)

77-86

EN

It is usually assumed that what Kant called the Copernican Revolution in philosophy marks his most important achievement and constitites the essence of his transcendental turn. The author shows, however, that not only had Kant several predecessors in his highlighting the role of the cognising subject but also that the new epistemic perspective that endows the subject with the power to gain objectively valid knowledge was already present in Kant's precritical writings, which means that the idea did not belong specifically to his transcendental philosophy. These observations lead the author to believe that the more important achievement than the Copernican Revolution was the proposal of the synthetic unity of apperception. It was more important, as the subject in Kant's philosophy is an entity that produces a uniform picture of the world while remaing itself completely invisible and unaccountable for its contribution. The elusive manner of its operation and the consistent, uniform and interpersonally compatible effect of its work are more characteristic of Kant's transcendental philosophy than the claim that the active role of the subject guarantees epistemic validity of its findings.

2

The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception as the Foundation of Concept and Proposition in Kant's Philosophy

88%

Heinz. M.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 4(52)

227-241

EN

In connection with recent research conducted by several contemporary German scholars, such writers as Baum, Wolff and Reich, the author addresses the following problem: If the subject, conceived generally, is a representation formed by the intellect then a combination of various representations into one object as it appears to the subject must also be a product of the intellect. If so much is granted, the question arises: How is it possible that various representations are unified in the intellect in a way adequate to the representations themselves rather than to the patterns of unification used by the subject? And another question becomes important: What is the meaning of the 'objective unity of apperception', and what is its relation to the 'synthetic unity of apperception' in this context? According to Reich, for instance, objective cognition cannot be effected within one concept due to the properties of the self itself. If the thought presenting the subject, conceived generally, to itself is a necessary thought for the subject which in this way acquires knowledge of its own non-productivity, and if this condition characterises all thoughts different from the self then the limitations of the self are transferred to all its thoughts. From these considerations springs the main idea of the article, namely, that the proposition is, by virtue of its own definition, an instance of the use of concepts when the subject wants to gain cognition of objects. With the mediation of the proposition concepts are constituted as synthetically unified in the subject. According to Wolff the concept of intellectual cognition that underlies transcendental deduction is the point of departure and the guiding beacon for the Kantian program. Eventually, the author joins the position of Reich who claims that the meaning of 'proposition' and 'intellect' must be seen in the light of Kant's contention that the unity of intellect and the unifying functions of intellect can be fully discovered only after a comprehensive understanding of the unifying functions of propositions has been achieved.

3

PERCEPTION AND APPERCEPTION IN TERMS OF LEIBNIZ PHILOSOPHY OR THE NATURE OF CINEMATOGRAPHIC SUBJECTIVISATION (Percepcia a apercepcia z hladiska Leibnizovej filozofie alebo povaha kinematografickej subjektivizacie)

63%

Paluch M.

Slovenské divadlo (Slovak Theatre)

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2009

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vol. 57

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issue 4

306-313

EN

The philosophical concepts by Gottfried Leibniz, Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, and especially parts that contributed to the development of theoretical thinking about film became the inspiration for writing this study. Leibniz writes about perception and apperception as two fundamental moments of cognition of the external (object) and the internal (subject). Identification occurs during the impact of film illusion on perception that is identification of perception of sentient (viewer) and perceived projection (film images). Due to the identification with film, a viewer is able to respond to the film content authentically and realistically. Extent of identification, which is the essence of film experience, is one of the ways how to approach the understanding of film reality. The second way is the realization of this relationship as something unreal and illusive. This knowledge takes place in the act of apperception, when we recollect our original identity. The film is depleted of the basic assumption of experience if it does not offer adequate forms of subjectivisation and it is not seen as the game with identification. Subjectivisation is a basic condition of recognition of film work. It is created around the chronological image-concept (main character). It is essential for the perception of film as it extends into the affects and subordinate consciousness and brings sensational colourfulness into the experience of the film's story.

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2 Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

1 Slovenské divadlo (Slovak Theatre)

1 Asmuth C.

1 Heinz. M.

1 Paluch M.

1 2009

2 2004

Kant's Transcendental Turn

The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception as the Foundation of Concept and Proposition in Kant's Philosophy

PERCEPTION AND APPERCEPTION IN TERMS OF LEIBNIZ PHILOSOPHY OR THE NATURE OF CINEMATOGRAPHIC SUBJECTIVISATION (Percepcia a apercepcia z hladiska Leibnizovej filozofie alebo povaha kinematografickej subjektivizacie)