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Asian and African Studies
|
2017
|
vol. 26
|
issue 1
127 – 147
EN
After the June War of 1967 the issue at stake was the return of territories occupied by Israel. The purposely ambiguous UN Resolution 242 became a controversial issue as each party stressed another part of the resolution. As the Israelis refused the equation “land for peace” and the withdrawal from all territories, the Arab states at Khartoum decided to adopt a unified position. The Arab states agreed to unify efforts to “eliminate the effects of aggression” – not eliminate Israel. Although they pledged not to negotiate with Israel, they looked to the superpowers – the USA and USSR – to resolve the dispute. The USA was all too willing to sit back and wait for the Arab states to come around. After all, the Arab States wanted their land back and all they had to do to get it back was to sign peace treaties with Israel. To re-engage the Americans, Egypt engaged Israel in the so-called War of Attrition artillery duels and aerial dogfights across the Suez Canal (solely within its own occupied territory). The US Department of State made an attempt to break the impasse announcing the Rogers Plan in December 1969. Both sides at first turned down the plan, but the escalation of war during the first half of 1970 and the threat of superpower involvement may have changed the situation. In July 1970 Egypt and Israel accepted the Rogers Plan.
Asian and African Studies
|
2012
|
vol. 21
|
issue 1
86 – 105
EN
The relative calm of the regime of Fu’ad Shihab (Fouad Chehab) began to wither away during the presidential term of his successor Sharil Eulw (Charles Eelou). In many respects the new regime was supposed to be a continuation of the former one. Political, social and economic reforms were carried out as specified under the regime of Fu’ad Shihab. More important, the role of the army and its Deuxieme Bureau in decision-making remained intact and a hard-liner Shihabist, Ilyas Sarkis, wielded great power as the head of the presidential bureau. The new regime provided a convincing argument that not even Shihabist policies were capable of ameliorating Lebanon’s inherent problems. These problems were structural and could not be solved by reforms. Furthermore, these reforms interfered with the confessional arrangements in the political system and were not easy to implement at a time of relative calm in the region. When major disturbances such as the June 1967 war, began to occur in the area, even these innocuous reforms became unacceptable to the traditional and sectarian forces in the country.
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