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1

MOŽNOSTI REKONŠTRUKCIE, ANALÝZY A HODNOTENIA ARGUMENTOV

100%
Bielik L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 2
91 – 108
EN
Arguments formulated in a natural or scientific language usually allow for various different reconstructions. Alternative reconstructions may pertain to different approaches to inference and argumentation (such as classical predicate logic, Bayesian epistemology and many others). However, how are we to select one from among various available reconstructions? The paper provides an analysis of three different reconstructions of a particular argument and discusses their pros and cons with respect to several logical and extra-logical properties. Moreover, the three potential selection principles are considered. It is argued that they work adequately only when subjected to a specific aim of the context of argument-reconstruction.
2

JE SKEPTICIZMUS STÁLE ZAUJÍMAVÝ?

100%
Greif A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 7
531 – 545
EN
The article aims at answering two questions: 1) Is scepticism still a problem worth the attention of philosophers? 2) Is sceptical attitude true? It also sheds light on current local discussion of scepticism and offers some critical commentaries on it. Ad 1): The difference between scepticism and sceptic argument is underlined as well as the necessity to focus on explicitly articulated sceptic arguments. Ad 2): There are several scepticisms that are to be differentiated if we want to judge their truth values. In general, the interesting forms of scepticism are not true (this judgment depends on conceiving interesting sceptical arguments as paradoxes). Finally, some of the short-comings of otherwise valuable writings on sceptical arguments in current discussion are indicated, due to which the solutions they offer cannot be satisfactory.
3

KOMUNIKAČNÉ NÁSTROJE A ICH POUŽITIE V REALITY TV

100%
Gondeková V.
Motus in verbo: časopis mladej vedeckej generácie
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2019
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vol. 8
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issue 1
32 – 39
EN
The study is focused on the theoretical definition of communication tools as components of the communication concept. There are three types of communication tools: persuasive techniques, arguments, and stereotypes. In this paper, we study communication tools in television programmes of the reality TV genre. Reality TV is characterized as unfeigned programmes, with or without script, which depict ordinary people in their real lives and which have entertainment goals. The aim of the study is to characterize and theoretically define communication tools in reality TV programmes.
4

ARGUMENT A JEHO PODOBY VO FILOZOFII VEDY

100%
Bielik L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 7
473 – 490
EN
This paper compares several definitions of argument in the field of logic and argumentation theory in order to identify those defining features that are reflected in the notion of argument in the field of philosophy of science. An argument in philosophy of science has a standard structure that includes a non-empty set of premises and a conclusion, between which there is a relation of deductive or non-deductive (typically probabilistic)support, whereby disregarding the user of the argument does not affect the methodological function of the argument. The core of the study shows that argument in philosophy of science can be used to model explanation, prediction, and also as a tool for problem identification, a means of both justifying and criticizing a particular thesis, a model for testing and evaluating hypotheses, and as a tool for distinguishing between different methodological approaches.
5
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Russellowska krytyka argumentów na rzecz istnienia Boga

88%
Marcinowska N.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 4(19)
193-212
EN
The paper presents Bertrand Russell’s critique of arguments for the existence of God. I divided the theistic arguments which Russell criticizes into three groups. The first group involves arguments concerning the relation between Universe and God: the First Cause argument, the Natural law argument and the argument from Design. The second group is related to the concept of God as a moral Lawmaker and it contains the argument from morality and the argument from remedy for injustice. The last group of arguments pertains to the relation between God and human beings. Here, I consider Russell’s reflections on the validity of the argument from religious experience and his approach to the issue of the foundation of religion. The aim of this article is to consider whether Russellian argumentation against evidence for God’s existence is justified.
6
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Argument vs. vysvětlení: případ souvětí příčinného typu

88%
Klein O.
Slovo a slovesnost: časopis pro otázky teorie a kultury jazyka (Slovo a slovesnost: A journal for the theory of language and language cultivation)
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2009
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vol. 70
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issue 2
100-113
EN
The author analyses five complex sentences of causal-semantic type in order to distinguish between an argument and an explanation in such structurally similar complex sentences. In accord with American philosopher G. R. Mayes (2000), he recognizes differences between them. The presence of epistemic modality in the main clause of a complex sentence can be seen as one of the basic distinctive linguistic signals that differentiates an argument from an explanation. From the pragmatic point of view, an explanation describes causal relations in the real world (speech sphere included), as opposed to an argument, which makes acceptable 'causal relations' in the world of speech. The hierarchy of the argument and the explanation is also the object of scrutiny. Here an argument is understood as a superstructural, additional function that a sentential segment (e.g. an explanation as well) can receive in discourse for various strategic reasons. Finally, the author analyses an eventual correlation of the distinction between an argument and an explanation and inductive and deductive reasoning.
7

HOW TO RECONSTRUCT A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

75%
Picha M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2011
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vol. 18
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issue 2
154-188
EN
The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemic-logical status of the thought experiments. The author deals with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, he criticizes an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, he introduces the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, the author presents objections to the theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabo Gendler based on the reconstruction of Galileo's famous Pisa experiment. He shows that her reconstruction is simplistic and that a more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assessment of the epistemic power of general argument. He proposes such a reconstruction and demonstrates that the general version of the Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the particular one. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, Galileo's thought experiment is reducible to a straightforward argument without particular premises.
8

V ZÁVOJI „LOGIKY“

75%
Káčer M.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
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2012
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vol. 95
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issue 3
197 – 208
EN
Present paper analyses the use of the word „logic“ in utterances of lawyers. A lawyer does not use this word just to designate the rational nature of his reasoning process but also to persuade his addressees that his reasoning is not set up arbitrarily. Although motivation of the first kind of the usage is triggered by correct semantic insight it happens frequently that the lawyer’s „logic“ designates something else than the process of his reasoning. It designates just the outcome of the reasoning but not the way how it was created. Thus the meaning of „logic“ shifts from formal relations between concepts to their material (substantial) relations which are conveyed through observation of ordinary course of factual events. However if we wanted to restore the original meaning of „logic“ in these cases, we could do it in the following way: to the concept/conclusion designated as „logical“ we add all necessary conditions of its logical validity. Example given in this paper indicates this restoration method may secure new refutation strategies against such concept/conclusion. The paper also tries to identify why lawyers use „logic“ as a kind of persuasive word. It seems to be plausible they do so because they intuitively suppose that logical operations inevitably lead to true conclusions.
9

TOULMIN'S MODEL OF ARGUMENT AND THE 'LOGIC' OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

75%
Zarebski T.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2009
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issue 16(29)
267-283
EN
The paper discusses Toulmin's substantial (jurisprudential) model of argument, as set out in The Uses of Argument (1958), in juxtaposition with his considerations concerning scientific discovery and scientific arguments, as presented in The Philosophy of Science (1953). The author finds Toulmin's search for understanding the nature of science to be a forerunner of his later concep- tion of argument. In addition, he claims that the latter displays much more accurately the 'logic' of both scientific discovery and the arguments in science than the patterns of formal (both inductive and deductive) logic. For actually, in Toulmin's view, no logic in the traditional, formal sense can be ascribed to discovery and scientific arguments - despite all the mathematical techniques they employ. Thus neither the neo-positivistic account nor even the Popperian one can do justice to their specific character. Although the Toulminian model of argument cannot be treated, in a strict sense, as a methodological instruction, it plays an explicatory role, throwing some light on our understanding of scientific enterprises and their rationality. In fact, the author finds Toulmin's concept of argument to be the core of his overall conception of rationality, and the considerations about science to be one aspect of this conception.
10

INTERPRETÁCIA V PRÁVE II

75%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 10
789 – 799
EN
The article is a continuation of the author’s contribution Interpretation in Law I (Filozofia 2015/8) with the special attention paid to methods of interpretation in law: textualist, intentionalist, and teleological ones. It explains the cooperation of the law’s purpose and the method of idealizing generalization in defining the propositions relevant for teleological arguments. Particular, so called “logical methods” of interpreting law are included: the method a contrario, the method per analogiam, as well as two kinds of the a fortiori argument (argument with even stronger reason): a minori ad maius and a maiori ad minus.
11

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE INFORMAL LOGIC INITIATIVE

63%
Johnson R. H.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2009
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issue 16(29)
17-46
EN
In this paper, I undertake to present clearly just what informal logic ('logika nieformalna') is and how it relates to formal logic, and to logic as such. To do that, I start by explaining how the Informal Logic Initiative (ILI) began in North America in the 70s. That will lead to a discussion of what is meant by 'informal logic' and how it stands related to cognates such as formal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation. In Section 3, I discuss what I take to be basic theses about argumentation that have emerged from the informal logic perspective. In Section 4, I discuss some achievements of informal logic, and in Section 5, I discuss several interesting recent developments and in Section 6, I discuss the possible future developments. I conclude with some remarks on the importance of the Informal Logic Initiative in Section 7.
12

ARGUMENTATION THEORY AND THE CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

63%
Bermejo-Luque L.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2009
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issue 16(29)
285-303
EN
I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin's work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin's model of argument.
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