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Psychological Studies
|
2004
|
vol. 42
|
issue 1
7-10
EN
Higher-order functions of cognitive control are not dealt with properly by contemporary psychologists. All to often, the mysterious 'little man', or homunculus, is implicitly referred to when speaking about the mechanisms of cognitive control. For instance, control is switched on or off, but by whom? The thesis of this short note is to suggest that attention is the mechanism that plays a role implicitly ascribed to the homunculus. So, the studies of attention, with their many theories and sophisticated experimental paradigms, may be insightful for our understanding of the controlling functions of mind.
EN
The author analyses implications of the results of research on negative priming for the theory that attributes this phenomenon to inhibitory mechanisms in selective attention. According to an early inhibitory account of negative priming, the representation of the stimulus ignored or selected against in the prime (preceding) display is actively suppressed, which entails a short-term decrease in the representation's activation level below baseline. As a result, when a response to this stimulus is required in the probe (subsequent) display, accessing the stimulus representation may be more difficult. Contrary to this account, it was found that negative priming may persist for quite a long time and that it depends on the conditions in, and on the broader context of, the probe display in which an earlier distractor appears as the target. These results are congenial with noninhibitory accounts of negative priming, which attribute the effect to a conflict or difficulty arising when on the probe trial an episodic representation of the probe target is retrieved that was established when this stimulus served as a distractor. Following the integrative proposal put forward by Tipper (2001), the author considers modifications the inhibitory account seems to require to accommodate the data indicating that both inhibition and memory processes play a role in negative priming. A basic change is a revision of the assumptions concerning the way the effects of inhibition are carried over from the prime trial to the probe trial. A modified inhibitory account assumes that this transfer involves memory coding (on the prime trial) and retrieval (on the test trial) of inhibitory processes or their effects. It is shown that this modification necessitates a revision of other assumptions of the original inhibitory account, especially those concerning the nature of the representations involved in negative priming and the very concept of inhibition. Taking into account the role learning and memory processes play in selective attention puts the mechanisms of the latter in a new theoretical perspective. The transition is from analysing attentional selection in a narrow focus of the question that concerns how the organism solves a current problem of distinguishing task-relevant stimuli from distractors, to analysing it in a broader context of the issue of how the organism in its interactions with a given environment learns to categorise stimuli as relevant or irrelevant, to represent them in the context of an activity as those that should be attended to and those that should be ignored.
EN
Fluid intelligence is a critical factor in learning and instruction. It also influences performance at school and in the workplace. There have been many attempts to directly and indirectly improve general fluid intelligence by training its underlying cognitive functions, such as working memory, cognitive control, or attention. The aim of the present study was to determine the extent to which school-age children’s scores on intelligence tests could be improved by attention training. After training sessions, which consisted of four computerized cognitive tasks that practiced various aspects of attention, the children’s scores on an attention test improved, with fewer false alarms and increased performance speed. This improvement partially persisted over an extended period of time. However, this effect was not associated with higher intelligence test scores. These results suggest that attention is possible to develop through short-term interventions but general intelligence is not. We interpret our findings in terms of the three-stratum theory of human intelligence.
EN
Change blindness represents extreme difficulty in detecting changes in the visual field induced by brief blank screen interjected in between two alternating images. In the process of searching for a change, visual saliency certainly plays an important role in attracting attention (i.e., pop-out effect). In our study, we were interested in whether there are high-level scene factors that might attract attention as well. As hypothesized, probable, central, relevant and within the figure changes were detected more easily than changes that were improbable, marginal, irrelevant and occurring within the background. Interestingly, detecting changes occurring within close proximity of the figure was most difficult. This indicates that when searching for changes in scenes, parts of the scenes close to the most powerful attractors are being shadowed, and therefore seem to be ignored by selective attention. This could be ascribed to the role of expectations in change detection task. Therefore, we believe that specifically in explicit change detection task, an individual might use certain heuristics that helps her/him scan the scene. The data are discussed in the context of the debate about the nature of scene representations.
EN
Clear understanding of the demonstrative use of expressions, the author argues, is a complicated philosophical task. We have to decide whether relevant contextual factors that determine semantic values of demonstratively used expressions are: (i) speaker's intentions; (ii) speaker's pointings; (ii) teller-hearer attention. Arguments supporting (ii) are given - e.g. the author thinks that there are mistakes in arguments favouring intentions over pointings and that the careful analysis of the notion of intending shows that typical causes of pointings are treated as having property of influencing semantic values of expressions. However, since this last feature can be properly predicated of pointings themselves, proponent of (i) confuses intentions with effects of expressing them.
EN
While smartphones enhance communication and productivity, they may negatively affect mental health and cognitive performance. They can be distractive where the risk can have substantial consequences (e.g., in traffic, while working). Even when not in use, smartphones can be distracting and reduce cognitive capacity. This mere presence of smartphones has been described as having an adverse impact on social interaction and cognitive performance. Since creativity is also an increasingly important skill for finding new and useful ideas, the impact of mere presence on creative thinking should be investigated, as considerable evidence is missing. The first goal of this study is to replicate the reduction effect of the mere presence of one's smartphone on cognitive capacity and test the effect of the dependency relationship on this hypothesized reduction. The second goal is to investigate this effect on divergent thinking.
EN
In order to explain the influence of affect on judgments a functional approach is proposed in the article. The author demonstrates that an emotional stimulus influences judgment: a) in the direction in which it prompts (assimilation effect), b) in the opposite direction (contrast effect) or c) not at all; and that the influence is not determined by awareness/lack of awareness of the stimulus itself, but by the strength of motivation. Many experiments applying the affective priming paradigm supported the notion that the attenuation of self-control through deactivation of goals or cognitive overloading leads to an assimilation effect. In these cases assimilation was observed even in response to long-lasting exposition of affective stimuli (1000 msec, which is sufficient for conscious perception). However, intensifying self-control, i.e. error checking (monitoring), favored contrast effects, also in the case of preconscious attention engagement (when the exposure time was too short for conscious perception – e.g. 20 msec). Such a phenomenon can be explained by attention-automatic rebound hypothesis, derived from Wegner’s theory of ironic processes of mental control. A compilation of research and a preliminary experiment support this hypothesis.
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