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Uwagi o Alvina Plantingi rozumieniu konieczności

100%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2010
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issue 47
109-133
PL
Alvin Plantinga’s understanding of necessity is discussed. The kinds of necessity, as seen by Plantinga, are indicated, and concepts are described which are sometimes identified with the concept of necessity. The distinction between de dicto necessity and de re necessity is the principal matter for Plantinga. After their short characteristic, the attempts of the de re necessity rejection, undertaken by some authors, are presented. In the final part of the paper Plantinga’s argumentation aiming at defense of the de re necessity is discussed. Critical remarks, concerning the presented material, are a part of the paper.
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Sensus Divinitatis jako koncepcja genezy przekonań teistycznych

80%
Ruczaj S.
Diametros
|
2019
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vol. 16
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issue 59
48-60
EN
Alvin Plantinga's notion of sensus divinitatis ("sense of divinity") refers to a human cognitive faculty designed to produce theistic beliefs that have warrant (positive epistemic status). While most of Plantinga's commentators focus on whether introducing this notion really helps to defend the rationality of theistic beliefs, the genetic aspect of the operation of the sensus divinitatis is often overlooked. This paper is devoted to fill this gap. On the basis of Plantinga's opus magnum titled Warranted Christian Belief, I distinguish three different interpretations of how sensus divinitatis creates theistic beliefs. I also analyse the ways in which human sin impairs the proper functioning of this sense of divinity in each of these interpretations.
PL
W koncepcji Alvina Plantingi, sensus divinitatis („zmysł boskości”) jest ludzką władzą poznawczą, nakierowaną na tworzenie posiadających gwarancję (pozytywny status epistemiczny) przekonań o Bogu. Większość komentatorów myśli Plantingi koncentruje się na pytaniu, czy wprowadzenie tej koncepcji faktycznie pozwala obronić racjonalność przekonań teistycznych, pomijając przy tym zazwyczaj genetyczny aspekt funkcjonowania zmysłu boskości. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu wypełnienie tej luki. Na podstawie Warranted Christian Belief Plantingi wyróżniam trzy możliwe interpretacje tego, jak sensus divinitatis tworzy przekonania teistyczne. Wskazuję także, w jaki sposób ludzki grzech wpływa na poprawne funkcjonowanie zmysłu w ramach każdej z tych interpretacji.
3
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Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism

80%
Fábiková A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2021
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vol. 69
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issue Special_issue_3
62-74
EN
The paper analyses the arguments put forward by Plantinga to justify his refutation of evolutionary reliabilism, i.e. the claim that the probability that the cognitive faculties, developed in the process of unguided evolution, are reliable is low. I argue that all the thought experiments offered by Plantinga to justify this thesis suffer from a common defect – they disregard the condition of evolution or fail to take it into account properly. In addition, I argue that pointing out the difficulties that naturalistic approaches have in explaining mental causation does not lead to Plantinga’s conclusion that in a naturalistic world there would be no mental causation whatsoever.
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Is Being a Good Empiricist the Same as Being a Good Naturalist? The Case of the Relationship Between Science and Christian Theism

61%
Bylica P.
Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy
|
2023
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vol. 20
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issue 1
EN
Using Feyerabend's argumentation, and rephrasing of the problem in terms of the Model of Levels of Analysis, I show that a good empiricist need not be a (metaphysical or methodological) naturalist. I characterize the ideas of Alvin Plantinga and Jitse M. van der Meer as being representative of two different varieties of theistic response to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and contemporary science. Against van der Meer, I argue for Plantinga's conclusion about the value of theism-based science. Against both approaches, I point to situations where theistic assumptions do indeed influence the contents of observation.
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