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Anaximandrovy nekonečné světy

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Some ancient authors attribute to Anaximander of Miletus the doctrine of infinite worlds. By this could be meant worlds which exist simultaneously, follow consecutively, or merely transformations in one world. Co-existing worlds, however, were attributed to Anaximander most probably as a result of his unique cosmology of circles of heavenly bodies proceeding under the Earth. Aristotle’s reference to the account of the alternating inception and demise of the world would then correspond to the remarks about the temporal cycles in Anaximander. In comparison with the continuous changes of the world, however, the emergence of a new world originally means the demise of the preceding one. On the basis of the incompatibility of the “unmoving” infinite and the biological background of cosmogony, it may be supposed that just as everything living emerges, so the emerged world is subject to demise. After its emergence, however, there comes the time for a further world, in a similar way to how everything living maintains a continuity in the succession of generations. Progressively, thus, the particular worlds follow on from one another.
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The usual interpretation has it that Anaximander made ‘the Boundless’ (τὸ ἄπειρον) the source and principle of everything. However, in the works of Aristotle, the nearest witness, no direct connection can be found between Anaximander and ‘the Boundless’. On the contrary, Aristotle says that all the physicists made something else the subject of which ἄπειρος is a predicate (Phys. 203 a 4). When we take this remark seriously, it must include Anaximander as well. This means that Anaximander did not make τὸ ἄπειρον the source or principle of everything, but rather called something else ἄπειρος. The question is, then, what was the subject that he adorned with this predicate. The hypothesis defended in this article is that it must have been ϕύσις, not in its Aristotelian technical sense, but in the pregnant sense of natura creatrix: the power that brings everything into existence and makes it grow and move. This ‘nature’ is boundless. It rules everything and in this sense it can be called ‘divine’. Being boundless, the mechanisms of nature, in which the opposites play an important role, are multifarious. The things created by boundless nature are not boundless, but finite, as they are destined to the destruction they impose onto each other, as Anaximander’s fragment says.
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Setrvávání Země v Anaximandrově univerzu

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Anaximander, according to Aristotle, was said to explain the persistence of the Earth in its place in the universe on the basis of symmetry. Simplicius however asserted that the Earth was also meant to be supported by air. Although the universe exhibits marked signs of symmetry, it may be assumed that the air under the Earth – in view of its significant cosmological role – really was extended. Anaximander’s conception of a universe of concentrated circles of heavenly bodies, situated around the Earth at their centre, postulated movement of bodies under the Earth as well, in opposition to cosmologies of the time. The orbit of the heavenly bodies under the level of the Earth was, then, conditioned both by their compact structure and by an inclination and demarcation of size and distance. One may, therefore, suppose that Aristotle in reality drew on information referring to Anaximander’s symmetrical universe of circles of heavenly bodies orbiting under the surface of the Earth, which, so it seemed, did not sit on air.
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Anaximandrova geometrie

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According to tradition Thales brought geometry to Greece from Miletus. Although discussion of the nature of Thales’ geometry has not arrived at a consensus, it seems that the theorems formulated were retrospectively applied in his concrete measurements. So far, however, we have no information about the geometry of Thales’ pupil and successor, Anaximander of Miletus. An exception is presented in the lexicon Suda which claims that Anaximander “in general showed the basics of geometry”. This lexicon at the same time states the points at which the employment of the geometry can be discerned. Most importantly, we have the question of the gnomon, with the help of which an order of measurement is realisable. Clear signs of the application of geometry are likewise shown by Anaximander’s whole conception of cosmology: the shape of the earth and its position at the centre of the universe, and the very description of the heavenly bodies. In addition one can discern geometry involved in the map of the world and the sphere. Thus, although Anaximander is not explicitly connected with geometry, extant texts demonstrate that he significantly exploited geometrical knowledge when he connected concrete observation with the geometrical organisation of the universe as a whole.
CS
Podle tradice přenesl geometrii do Řecka Thalés z Mílétu. Ačkoli v diskusích o povaze Thalétovy geometrie nepanuje konsensus, zdá se, že zformulované teorémy byly až dodatečně uplatněny na jeho konkrétní měření. Již o Thalétově „žákovi a nástupci“, Anaximandrovi z Mílétu, však nemáme žádné zprávy, které by se týkaly geometrie. Výjimku představuje lexikon Súda, který uvádí, že Anaximandros „vůbec ukázal základy geometrie“. Lexikon zároveň vyjmenovává momenty, v nichž může být užití geometrie spatřeno. V prvé řadě se jedná o gnómón, s jehož pomocí mohla být realizována řada měření. Zřejmé znaky uplatnění geometrie vykazuje též celá Anaximandrova koncepce kosmologie: tvar Země a její umístění ve středu univerza, i samotný popis nebeských těles. Podobně lze uplatnění geometrie spatřovat za mapou světa a sférou. Ačkoli tedy Anaximandros není explicitně s geometrií spojován, dochované texty ukazují, že její poznatky významně využil, když propojil konkrétní pozorování s geometrickým uspořádáním celého univerza.
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The present paper argues that the teachings of Anaximander are much better knowable than they actually appear, since a number of his teachings have the privilege of being almost transparent in their predicative content as well as in their logic. As a matter of fact, one can quite easily come to understand the train of thought which lies behind Anaximander’s most momentous conjectures. Thus, a largely unexpected Anaximander comes to light despite the availability of the majority of the relevant sources since 1903. Two main areas appear to be particularly prominent: on the one hand, the complex body of various conjectures and doctrines that helps to understand the system of spatial relationships from Miletus to the stars and, on the other hand, the equally complex body of conjectures and doctrines whose primarily concern is the macro-story of the Earth from its most remote past to its predictable future. The merits of Anaximander as an earth-researcher are much greater than one could actually imagine. It is suggested here that what philosophy owes to him in particular lies in his quest for knowledge, his method, his cognitive hybris, and his intellectual discipline, rather than individual doctrines. A comparison with Thales follows in the last paragraph.
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Interpretations of the Earth in Ionic archaic cosmologies usually revolve around the idea of it being a flat disc lying on water or air. In them, the Earth is also conceived as a concrete body situated in the space of the universe. However, due to the meteorological nature of Ionic archaic cosmologies, we can presume that in these cosmologies space was not generally assumed to exist under the Earth. The Earth, then, constituted the lower dimension of the universe as a whole and was not therefore considered a cosmic body. A fundamental change did not occur until the cosmology of the Italian branch of philosophy, which conceived of both the Earth and the universe as being in the shape of a sphere – meaning that the Earth became a separate body. If however still earlier reports of Anaximander’s Ionic cosmology described a cylindrical Earth located in the middle of the rings of celestial bodies, we might conclude that it was Anaximander who was the first to consider Earth to be a cosmic body.
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Interpretace Země v iónských archaických kosmologiích obvykle pracují s představou ploché desky ležící na vodě nebo vzduchu. Země je v nich zároveň pojímána jako konkrétní těleso umístěné v prostoru univerza. Vzhledem k meteorologické povaze iónských archaických kosmologií se však lze domnívat, že tyto kosmologie obecně nepředpokládaly prostor pod Zemí. Země tak tvořila spodní dimenzi celého univerza, přičemž nebyla považována za kosmické těleso. K zásadní změně došlo až v kosmologii italské větve filosofie, která pojala Zemi i univerzum ve tvaru sféry – tím se Země stala samostatným tělesem. Pokud však ještě předtím zprávy o Anaximandrově iónské kosmologii popisují válcovitou Zemi umístěnou uprostřed kruhů nebeských těles, lze soudit, že to byl právě Anaximandros, kdo jako první pokládal Zemi za kosmické těleso.
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Aristotelova první filosofie a první filosofové

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The author addresses the issue of the origin of the discipline that we call metaphysics. First he briefly describes the difficulties associated with Aristotle’s extant metaphysical concept: problems with the character of his treatise Metaphysics, problems with the arrangement of the individual books, and even problems with the title – all related to the problematic lack of clarity in the discipline itself. He then presents an overview of the common solutions to these difficulties in the conclusion to the first part of the article. In the second part, the author provides a detailed analysis of one of the possible interpretative hypotheses: that Aristotle’s metaphysics is a continuation of the pre-Socratic tradition and, in fact, only explicitly articulates a general, foundational theme of philosophy. This interpretation is closely related to Jan Patočka’s universal concept of metaphysics. By analyzing the textual evidence of the doctrines of the archetypal pre-Socratic candidates for a first metaphysics, the author concludes that, in agreement with recent research, these thinkers do not share Aristotle’s metaphysical approach. Differently from Patočka, the author thereby concludes that we can meaningfully talk about a pre-metaphysical philosophy.
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Autor se zabývá problémem původu disciplíny zvané metafyzika. Nejprve nastiňuje obtíže spojené s rekonstrukcí Aristotelovy metafyzické koncepce: problémy s charakterem spisu Metafyzika, problémy s řazením jednotlivých knih, ba dokonce problémy s názvem – to vše souvisí s problematickou nevyjasněností disciplíny samé. V závěru první části prezentuje přehled obvyklých řešení těchto obtíží.
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Artykuł poświęcony jest przybliżeniu problematyki powstania europejskiej nauki i filozofii, które zostały ufundowane przez antycznych Greków. W okresie nazywanym Pierwszym Oświeceniem doszło, z jednej strony do stopniowego odejścia od mitologicznych wyjaśnień rzeczywistości, z drugiej – do zbudowania nowego sposobu patrzenia na świat, zwanego badaniem przyrody. Dociekania antycznych Greków miały wymiar ontologiczny – polegały na poszukiwaniu arche świata – poszukiwali oni bowiem ostatecznej struktury rzeczywistości, a co ważne, człowiek usytuowany był w tych badaniach jako integralna ale nie najważniejsza część kosmosu, poddana jego prawom. Presokratycy nie stawiali człowieka ponad naturą, nie odróżniali bowiem ściśle praw przyrody od praw wspólnoty. Był to jeden z powodów, dla których nie powstała wówczas nauka prawa. Poza tym, Grecy nigdy nie redukowali swojego prawa do systemu, ponieważ zbyt często bogowie lub demos „wtrącali się” do praw polis. Było ono typowym przykładem „prawa bez prawoznawstwa”, ponieważ było elastyczne a także posiadało niejasno sformułowane reguły i instytucje. Istotny był tutaj również brak wyszkolonej grupy zawodowych prawników. Okres ten zakończył się wraz z pojawieniem się filozofii Sokratesa. Do jego czasów filozofia badała liczby i ruchy, a także zajmowała się zagadnieniem, skąd wszystkie rzeczy biorą swój początek i dokąd znikają; obserwowała też gwiazdy, odległości między nimi, ich obiegi oraz badała zjawiska pojawiające się na niebie. Pierwsi mędrcy uważali, że zdobywają wiedzę przez prowadzenie badań dotyczących samych zjawisk naturalnych. Sokrates odrzucił ontologię i badanie natury zapoczątkowane przez Milezyjczyków i myślicieli z obszaru Wielkiej Grecji, na rzecz poszukiwania znaczenia słów i pojęć występujących w języku ateńskiego polis. Sądził bowiem, że znalezienie znaczenia słów oznacza odsłonięcie rzeczywistości, do której inaczej dotrzeć nie można.
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The paper is devoted to the issues of the emergence of European science and philosophy, founded by the ancient Greeks. In the period known as the First Enlightenment, there was, on the one hand, a gradual departure from the mythological explanations of the reality, and, on the other, the construction of a new way of looking at the world, known as the study of nature. The inquiries of the ancient Greeks had an ontological dimension; they consisted in searching for the arche of the world and they were looking for the ultimate structure of reality, and, what is important, the human being was situated in these studies as an integral, but not the most important part of the Cosmos, subject to its laws. Presocratics did not put the human being above nature, because they did not strictly distinguish between the laws of nature and the laws of community. This was one of the reasons why the science of law did not arise at that time. Besides, the Greeks never reduced their right to the system, because too often gods or demos ‘interfered’ with the laws of the polis. It was a typical example of “law without jurisprudence”, because it was flexible and had vaguely formulated rules and institutions. Another significant factor here was the lack of the trained group of professional lawyers. This period ended with the advent of Socrates’ philosophy. Up to his time, philosophy had studied numbers and movements, and had dealt with the question of where all things have their origin and where they disappear; it also had observed the stars, the distances between them, their circuits, as well as had studied phenomena which appear in the sky. The early sages believed that they could gain knowledge by conducting research into natural phenomena themselves. Socrates rejected the ontology and study of nature initiated by the Milesians and other early Greek thinkers in favour of searching for the meaning of words and concepts found in the Athenian polis language. He believed that finding the meaning of words translated into revealing the reality which could not be reached otherwise.
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