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EN
Myth in literature is an enunciative matter that lends itself to two interrelated studies. On the one hand, one should analyse the way a text rewrites and reinterprets mythical themes and motives. This is the object of thematology. On the other hand, one is also supposed to bring to light the workings of the imagination in its anthropological dimension and see how it is embodied in a significant writing process based on a palimpsestuous reading in which myth functions both as intertext (quotation, allusion, plagiarism) and hypertext (imitation, transformation). This is the object of mythopoetics. The interpretation of “myth as intertext” thus requires analytical approaches that combine and reconcile the tools of mythocriticism with Genette’s theories of transtextuality. This inter-/transdisciplinary approach is particularly appropriate in the study of B.-M. Koltès’ plays. Not only does the French playwright’s production echo and re-actuate biblical and ancient myths, but the haunting recurrence of a whole array of mythemes and mythologemes also generates “Figures” – in Deleuze’s definition of the term – that are truly mythical in the sense that they appear as universal singulars, as symptoms of the forces that pervade our universe.
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Główne typy metafizyki analitycznej

59%
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
|
vol. 11
|
issue 4(15)
849-864
EN
In a widespread general view about analytic philosophy it is often emphasized the supposed animosity or mistrust of that movement towards metaphysics. That opinion is in many respects one-sided and incorrect. First, one cannot find that animosity towards metaphysics in the works of G.E. Moore and B. Russell, the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Of course, they criticized the speculative, Hegelian metaphysics of their idealistic predecessors, but they did it in order to defend metaphysics of a different kind, more careful, empirical, and realist one. Moreover, even if it is to some extent true that over a few decades analytic philosophy was dominated by the attitude of mistrust towards more theoretical and comprehensive metaphysical investigations, it should be stressed that that attitude has almost completely disappeared in the last fifty years. Metaphysics has again regained the status of central and vigorously pursued philosophical discipline. One of the main originators of that metaphysical turn in contemporary analytic philosophy was Sir P.F. Strawson, the Oxford philosopher, who in 1959 forcefully articulated the idea of descriptive metaphysics. A somewhat similar way of doing metaphysics was later developed in the writings of D. Davidson, M. Dummett, and – in certain respects – H. Putnam. One may say that all those thinkers have attempted to identify the basic structure of reality by describing and elucidating the basic structural features of our thought and talk. Since in such a method of doing metaphysics one can discern some characteristic marks of Kantian transcendental arguments, there is a point to call it analytic-transcendental metaphysics. In a completely different way metaphysics has been pursued by those analytic thinkers who are under heavy influence of the conception of philosophy put forward by W.V. Quine. For Quine philosophy, including metaphysics, is continuous with science, and, to be more precise, constitutes the theoretical end of science. Among many followers of that kind of metaphysics, that may be called analytic-naturalistic one, there are D.M. Armstrong and D. Lewis. The paper presents those two varieties of analytic metaphysics, and succinctly discusses their main difficulties. Subsequently, it mentions those examples of contemporary analytic metaphysics that, for one reason or another, do not belong to either of those two varieties. The paper ends with a brief appendix discussing the most recent revival of metaphysics within the analytic movement and a critical response toit from the deflationary point of view.
3
51%
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
|
vol. 11
|
issue 4(15)
919-938
EN
There are three chief aims of the paper. First, it presents in short the beginning of the analytic philosophy of religion, its development, issues, and methods. Second, it puts forward a hypothesis that in the last five decades analytic philosophy of religion has been dominated by the epistemological paradigm, i.e. in most cases, any problem in question has been studied as part of the general problem of rationality of religious belief. That situation is changing slowly towards achieving more balance between the issues of epistemology of religion and those concerned with philosophical theology. Third, the paper provides criteria for the classification of the different ways to understand the rationality of religious belief: the rationalistic and evidentialist approach, the natural theology approach, the Wittgensteinian fideism and Reformed epistemology approaches. A brief description of each of those four positions in epistemology of religion is included.
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