The paper looks at the important subject of the sister city frameworks as part of China’s public diplomacy at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic (post-2020). The first part presents the concept of public diplomacy, with special focus on the role of provincial and municipal governments in China. Relations between the local Chinese governments and other local governments are seen as “having less political color” and, according to Chinese scholars, are more effective in transmitting the national image and discursive power in the P.R.C. The second part elaborates on the situation during the COVID-19 pandemic and argues that local governments in China have been using the Health Silk Road and Digital Silk Road as a vehicle of China’s public diplomacy. This section also includes a detailed analysis of the Chinese government’s plans and actions taken by the central authorities. After a general analysis, the authors present Sichuan and Guangdong provinces’ actions as a case study. The first case study examines Sichuan and Chengdu’s efforts to promote the Health Silk Road through the “mask of diplomacy,” in the second, the authors discuss actions undertaken by Guangdong province and the city of Guangzhou as part of the Digital Silk Road.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an international project involving many countries around the world. The economic development and the implementation of new infrastructural and investment projects have been giving rise to a growing number of cross-border disputes. To meet these challenges China has created specialized entities, competent to solve disputes arising from the BRI. The aim of this article is therefore to identify? the latest trends in this area and to assess whether the Chinese solutions and proposed dispute resolution methods will permanently change the global landscape.
Польша является ключевым элементом инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» (BRI). Она также является активным участником контейнерных перевозок в регионе Балтийского моря (BSR). Цель статьи - определить, представляет ли дальнейшее развитие BRI угрозу для контейнерных перевозок в Польше по региону Балтийского моря, и наоборот. Основные инструменты, используемые для достижения упомянутых выше целей, включают анализ литературы, логические рассуждения и статистические исследования. Результаты исследования важности выбранных факторов для дальнейшего развития BRI в Польше, а также SWOT-анализ этих факторов также являются частью предлагаемого исследования. Проведенное исследование показывает, что такие факторы, как расширение глубоководной инфраструктуры, увеличение перевалочного потенциала морского порта или конкурентоспособность региона Балтийского моря являются одними из самых больших угроз для будущего BRI в Польше. В то же время, похоже, что в ближайшее время дальнейшее развитие BRI не окажет существенного влияния на контейнерные перевозки в регионе Балтийского моря.
EN
Poland is a key element of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is also an active container shipping participant in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). The aim of the article is to determine whether further development of the BRI is a threat for the Polish BSR container shipping, and vice versa. The main tools used to achieve the objectives mentioned above include a literature review, logical reasoning and statistical analysis. The results of a survey on the importance of chosen factors for the further development of the BRI in Poland, as well as the SWOT analysis of these factors are also part of the proposed study. The performed research shows that such factors as expansion of deep water infrastructure, the increase of seaport transhipment potential or competitiveness of the BSR are among biggest threats to the future of the BRI in Poland. At the same time, it seems that in the near future, the further development of the BRI will not significantly affect the container shipping in the BSR.
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wniosków wynikających z analizy programów wyborczych opracowanych przez relewantne partie niemieckie na potrzeby kampanii wyborczej do Bundestagu w 2021 r. W pracy przyjęto następujące pytania badawcze: 1. Czy w 2021 r. w programach wyborczych do Bundestag relewantne niemieckie partie polityczne zawarły informacje o ChRL?, 2. Jeśli tak, to jakich określeń w stosunku do ChRL użyto?, 3. Czy w omawianych programach wyborczych pojawiła się kwestia dotycząca Inicjatywy Pasa i Szlaku (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI)? 4. Czy w omawianych programach wyborczych pojawiły się newralgiczne kwestie dotyczące ChRL takie łamanie praw człowieka? Realizację badania umożliwiła zastosowana metoda polegająca na systematycznym przeglądzie literatury i analizie zastanych dokumentów czyli programów wyborczych omawianych partii w 2021 r. Z analizy wynika, że każda z niemieckich partii politycznych mających obecnie (2022 r.) swoją reprezentację w Bundestagu zawarła w programie wyborczym w 2021 r. informacje odnoszące się do ChRL. Nie ma więc rozbieżności, Chiny stanowią ważki temat dla każdej strony sceny politycznej. Odmienne jest jednak postrzeganie działań tego państwa, co wykazano w przeprowadzonej analizie.
EN
The article aims to present conclusions resulting from the analysis of the election programs developed by the relevant German parties in the election campaign to the Bundestag in 2021. In the study, the following research questions were adopted: 1. Did the relevant German political parties include the information about the PRC in the Bundestag election programs in 2021? 2. If so, what terms concerning the PRC were used? 3. Does the discussed election programs refer to the Belt and Road Initiative? 4. Do sensitive issues concerning the PRC such as human rights violations appear in the election programs discussed? The research was made possible by the method used, consisting of a systematic review of the literature and analysis of existing documents, i.e. election programs of the parties in question in 2021. The analysis shows that each of the German political parties currently (2022) represented in the Bundestag included information related to the PRC. So there is no discrepancy, China is an important topic for every side of the political scene. However, the perception of the actions of this country is different, which was in the conducted analysis shown.
Przedmiotem poniższego artykułu jest chińska ekspansja edukacyjna na świecie. Artykuł przedstawia wpływ chińskiego planu gospodarczego OBOR („One belt, one road” – tłum. „jeden pas, jedna droga”, w skrócie OBOR lub Belt and Road Initiative – w skrócie BRI) na kształt edukacji w państwach, które znajdują się na trasie Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku lub w jakikolwiek sposób związane są inicjatywą OBOR. W artykule przywołane zostały przykłady praktycznych rozwiązań edukacyjnych z państw, w których Chiny rozpoczęły ekspansję w obszarze edukacji wyższej oraz na poziomie technicznego kształcenia zawodowego, tzw. Luban Workshops.
EN
The aim of the following article is the Chinese educational expansion in the world. The article attempts to present the impact of the Chinese economic plan OBOR (One Belt, One Road, known also as Belt and Road Initiative – BRI) to the shape of higher education in countries that are on the route of the new Silk Road or are related to the OBOR initiative. At the article some examples of Chinese educational expansion in higher education (like Xiamen University Malaysia XMUM) and examples of technical vocational training (Luban Workshops in Africa and India) are described.
The aim of the study is to evaluate the potential role of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for promoting EU – China trade, and especially Poland – China trade. We test two hypotheses: 1) Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), particularly related to railway transport, are significant for Poland – China trade, and 2) Poland – China trade fits railway transport well. Therefore, we start with a study of the significance of tariff and non-tariff barriers in mutual trade relations, including transport-related barriers. NTBs are mainly derived from the EU Market Access database, and as for transport-related barriers – the logistics performance index (LPI) is used. As the next step, we study the composition of bilateral trade in static and dynamic terms using the OECD TiVA database. In the light of the significant increase in NTBs on EU manufacturing products exported to China and the railway transport infrastructure performance in Poland, the BRI could become an effective tool for improving the business environment for EU exporters. By contrast, the BRI project is more suitable for China and the EU as a whole than for Poland in terms of commodity structure of bilateral trade.
By assuming a proactive role in international environmental regimes and extending the ‘green’ dimensions of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been seeking to promote itself as a leader and responsible stakeholder in global environmental governance. This article examines this development concerning the notion of China’s ‘soft power’ and, more specifically, the notion of ‘green soft power’ – which aims to bridge the traditional concept of soft power with a state’s behavior on environmental and climate issues. China presents an interesting case since it has accrued a considerable amount of green soft power through its multilateral environmental diplomacy practiced at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs), the high-profile annual United Nations Climate Change Conferences, but its patchy deployment of environmental standards in the bilateral engagements under the BRI highlights the contradictions in referring to China as a green soft power. With these ideas in mind, this article holds that in the search to understand the evolving nature of China’s responsible stakeholder role, attention should be given to exploring the notion of green soft power.
This article gives an insight into the main aspects of Mongolian’s economy related to its Asian Trading Partners namely China, India, South Korea, and Japan in the period of 2011–2021. To give more clarity about the main trading partners of Mongolia there are two countries: China and Russia, but the author focuses only on the Asian trading partners to try to evaluate if the policy of “the third neighbour” works. The main goal is to popularise the still not well-known economy of Mongolia and to see how it was developed in the analysed period of 2011–2022. As the methodology of the research, the author used empirical analysis based mainly on Macrobond data which also has access to Mongolian Statistics Office data and also to available world reports such as OECD, and UNCTAD. Besides that, the article was consulted with the Mongolian Ambassador in Poland and it was enriched this way with his best knowledge regarding the economy and Mongolia’s international trade and investment policy. The interesting aspect which was raised by the author in this article was the future state of the economy of Mongolia after the pandemic SARS-CoV-2 and the impact of the restrictions imposed on Russia due to the war on Ukraine.
What are the primary drivers of the relationship between Xi’s China and Lukashenko’s Belarus? The present research paper uses the historical process-tracing method to provide an answer to this question. Furthermore, it uses quantitative data analysis regarding the economic intercourse between Belarus and China. It examines whether China’s opposition regarding the unipolar American-led world order and Belarus’s security concerns are the primary drivers of the relationship between Minsk and Beijing. The present article concludes that the congruence of beliefs and Minsk’s desire to ensure survival are drawing the two countries closer together. China’s new strategy encompasses Beijing’s increasing participation in world affairs. China opposes the world order led by a single hegemon, the United States of America. In the interim, Belarus, a relatively weak state insignificant in the global balance of power, shares Beijing’s beliefs about the desired nature of the contemporary world order. However, the Belarusian economy’s condition, which relies heavily on external funding, does not allow the economic cooperation between Minsk and Beijing to thrive. China gradually increases its engagement with Belarus, yet it obscures its ambitions, for Minsk lies in Moscow’s sphere of influence.
The article focuses on the Belt and Road Initiative, which was introduced by the leadership of the People’s Republic of China in 2013, and its political as well as economic implications for Iran China relations. The ongoing implementation of the Chinese initiative raises a few research questions. Would both sides benefit from the cooperation in the BRI framework or would one of them maybe have the upper hand? What are the main opportunities and challenges in the case of China-Iran relations and BRI implementation? The analysis is conducted in the framework of the grand strategy theory. This study is based on primary sources such as official governmental documents, speeches of influential politicians, and official statistical data. Besides these sources, information from secondary sources like monographs and academic articles was taken into consideration.
Although discussion about connecting Chinese railways to Nepal borders first surfaced in the year 1973, it could not make any headway until the political change of 2006 in Nepal, when the idea of linking Tibet with Kathmandu resurfaced again. However, political instability in Nepal further thwarted it, at least until Nepal faced the Indian blockade in 2015 and had to look for ways to diversify its trade and transit. Thus, for Nepal, China’s railways offer an escape from its dependence on India for trade and transit. But, for Beijing, it offers a strategic gateway to enter South Asia, which is India’s conventional sphere of influence. Although Nepal and its northern neighbor China have agreed to connect Nepal’s capital Kathmandu with the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China through railways, the materialization of such a game-changer is not free from challenges. Against the same backdrop, the objective of this study is to discover various challenges faced by the trans-Himalayan railways including political, bureaucratic, economic, and environmental challenges, and to concurrently identify how the geopolitical challenge tops the list, halting Nepal’s ambition to ‘bridge’ India and China and instead aggravating the possibility of becoming a burden to both the Asian giants. While the available literature on China and South Asia is mostly concentrated on Belt and Road (BRI) projects, ‘debt trap’ narratives, and geopolitical rivalry between India and China, this study would be a new attempt to understand how China’s aim to get connected with South Asia via land is not free of impediments. Using the qualitative method, this study reviews the geopolitical challenges confronted by the trans-Himalayan railway in the context of territorial disputes between India and China in the Himalayan region and the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership to contain the rise of China and its ambitious connectivity projects.
Celem artykułu jest ukazanie dylematów i postaw polskiego rządu związanych z uczestnictwem w chińskiej inicjatywie Belt and Road. Tezą pracy jest twierdzenie, że inicjatywa Belt and Road podzieliła główny nurt dyskursu publicznego na dwa główne wątki: opcję o optymistycznym nastawieniu – dostrzegającą szanse partycypacji w tej inicjatywie oraz dyskurs pesymistyczny – ukazujący zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa państwa polskiego. Autorzy odpowiedzą na następujące pytania badawcze: jak BRI jest przedstawiana w polskim dyskursie publicznym? Jakie są główne szanse i wyzwania wynikające z przystąpienia Polski do inicjatywy? Dokonana zostanie także analiza danych zastanych wszelkiego rodzaju płaszczyzn relacji polsko-chińskich.
EN
The aim of the article is to show the dilemmas related to the Poland’s participation in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. The theory behind the paper is that the Belt and Road Initiative has divided the mainstream of public discourse into two main threads: an optimistic option – one that sees opportunities in the participation in the initiative – and a pessimistic one, highlighting the threats to the security of the Polish state. The authors will answer the following research questions: how is the BRI presented in the Polish public discourse? What are the main opportunities and challenges resulting from Poland’s accession to the initiative? A desk research analysis of all types of Polish-Chinese relations will also be conducted.
COVID-19 przynosi doniosły spadek globalnego rozwoju gospodarczego, a jego konsekwencje dla chińskiej inicjatywy Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) pozostają także nieuchronne. Pomimo wstrząsów gospodarczych pandemii, BRI pozostaje głównym priorytetem dla Chin, co pozwala Pekinowi poprawić łączność regionalną i rozszerzyć zasięg gospodarczy na Europę i amerykańskie wybrzeża. Z drugiej strony, pandemia mocno dotknęła gospodarki Azji Środkowej, w związku z ograniczeniem handlu regionalnego, spadkiem cen ropy naftowej i jej towarów, głębokim spadkiem przepływów pieniężnych oraz słabnącą zdolnością produkcyjną. Ożywienie BRI i jego natychmiastowy sukces jest pożądany. Dzieje się tak, ponieważ BRI połączył region w zakresie rozwoju infrastruktury, gdzie Chiny, pod nazwą BRI, inicjują duże projekty rozwojowe, inwestując inwestycje w sektor energetyczny, oferując zadłużenie i poprawiając dwustronny handel z regionalnymi gospodarkami. Z tego powodu kraje Azji Środkowej pragną natychmiastowego ożywienia oraz bliskiej współpracy gospodarczej, która mogłaby powiązać losy gospodarcze krajów regionalnych z Pekinem i wysunąć BRI na pierwszy plan w priorytetach regionalnych. Artykuł podkreśla wpływ COVID-19 na gospodarki Azji Środkowej, znaczenie BRI dla regionu; jego geopolityczne znaczenie dla Chin; oraz rosnące wpływy chińskie w post-pandemicznej Azji Centralnej za pomocą teorii siły symbolicznej Bourdieu. Wreszcie, korzystając z jakościowej analizy treści, artykuł argumentuje, że wpływ gospodarczy COVID-19 jest krótkoterminowy oraz ograniczony, i tylko zwiększy perspektywy dla BRI w post-pandemicznej Azji Środkowej, z istotnymi strategicznymi narzędziami dla profilu geopolitycznego Chin w regionie.
EN
COVID-19 brings a momentous decline for global economic activities but its consequences for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains imminent. Despite the economic shocks of the Pandemic, BRI remains a top priority for China which allows Beijing to improve regional connectivity and expand its economic outreach far off to Europe and the American shores. On the other hand, the Central Asian economies are hard hit by the pandemic with a reduced regional trade, decline in oil prices and its commodities, deep slump in remittances, and the slackening manufacturing ability. The revival of BRI and its immediate success is desirable to the COVID-19 hit Central Asian economies. This is because BRI has bound the region together in terms of infrastructural development where China, under the rubric of BRI, is spearheading major developmental projects, pouring investment in energy sector, offering debt, and improving bilateral trade with regional economies. For this reason, the Central Asian countries desire immediate revival of close economic cooperation which could links the economic fortunes of regional countries to Beijing and brings the BRI to the fore in regional priorities. The paper highlight the impact of COVID-19 over Central Asian economies, the significance BRI for the region; its geopolitical importance for China; and the growing Chinese influence in the post-Pandemic Central Asia using Bourdieu’s Theory of Symbolic Power. Finally, using qualitative content analysis, the paper argues that the economic impact of COVID-19 are short-term and of limited nature and it will only increase prospects for BRI in the post-Pandemic Central Asia with vital strategic utilities for China’s geopolitical profile in the region.
The European Union is facing the challenge of developing a coherent reaction to the increased economic activity of China in Europe. Beijing’s policy of foreign economic expansion and its leap to digital economy are affecting Europe, despite the geographical distance. China is strengthening its position as one of the main actors on the global scene as elements of the New Silk Road will be built in European cities, Chinese companies are buying European technological manufacturers and the trade exchange as well as Chinese investment level in Europe are increasing dramatically. The purpose of this article is to answer the question about the way the EU should react to such Chinese policy. In order to do so the research problem related to the process of shaping this reaction up to now has been analysed. The following research questions have been formulated: what are the sore points and weaknesses which the European side needs to limit? On which fields should the EU develop its partnership with China in the first place? What are the assets on the side of the EU, of which it should make a better use in relations with Beijing? Within the process of resolving these questions the following hypotheses have been formulated: even if not deliberately, Chinese policy contributes to a fragmentation of the European unity; intensity of EU countries’ relations with China is inversely proportional to their engagement in a common European action on contentious topics in the EU-Chinese agenda; coherent European strategy towards China is necessary in order to limit disintegration tendencies as well as to mitigate unfavourable effects of Chinese activity on the internal European market. Three guidelines can be defined as a conclusion drawn from the analysis conducted: introducing a level playing field into reciprocal relations, protection of the European unity and building a strong negotiating position by the EU. An assumption could be made that shaping EU strategy based on these elements will let Europe thoroughly benefit from opportunities provided by the new Chinese economic opening and at the same time limit the possible dangers it carries.
Ewaluacja działań publicznych zwykle koncentruje się na wkładzie i wynikach danej interwencji (stosuje zatem podejście „czarnej skrzynki”); tymczasem doświadczenie interwencji publicznej wpływa także na głębsze zmiany przedsiębiorców będących jej beneficjentami. Stąd, do teorii i praktyki ewaluacyjnej wprowadzono trzeci wymiar dodatkowości interwencji publicznych – dodatkowość behawioralną (behavioural additionality). Uwzględnia ona zmiany w zachowaniu grupy docelowej zachodzące pod wpływem działania interwencji publicznej. Chociaż sama idea odkrywania mechanizmu zmiany, tj. jak instrumenty polityki publicznej wpływają na zachowania podmiotów systemu innowacji, wydaje się bardzo interesującym obszarem dociekań dla naukowców i praktyków, stanowi ona spore wyzwanie. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu wskazanie, jak dodatkowość behawioralna jest definiowana w odniesieniu do instrumentów polityki publicznej na rzecz badań, rozwoju i innowacji (BRI), gdzie ten termin został ukuty, jak można ją mierzyć i co mówią wyniki badań empirycznych w tej dziedzinie. Wykorzystano do tego metodę ilościowego systematycznego przeglądu literatury. Analizie poddano trzydzieści osiem opracowań naukowych, które wyraźnie deklarują badanie dodatkowości behawioralnej instrumentów polityki publicznej na rzecz BRI i stanowią oryginalne prace badawcze, w których dodatkowość behawioralna jest badana empirycznie. W ten sposób ustalono stan wiedzy w tej dziedzinie i kierunki dalszych badań, m.in. zidentyfikowano siedem różnych ujęć dodatkowości behawioralnej, które oddają wielowymiarowość badanego konceptu.
EN
Traditional evaluations of public policy actions focus on the input and output side of the intervention (i.e. assume the so-called ‘black box’ approach), whereas the experience of public intervention also affects deeper changes of the recipient companies. Thus, a third dimension of additionality has been introduced to the evaluation theory and practice – the ‘behavioural additionality’. It takes account of the difference in behaviour of a target population owing to a public intervention. Although the idea to evaluate how public policy interventions affect behaviour of the actors of the innovation system appears to be a very compelling line of inquiry for scholars and practitioners alike, it gives rise to many practical difficulties. This paper investigates how behavioural additionality is defined and measured as well as what are the empirical findings on behavioural additionality in the literature on evaluation of public policy instruments in the field of research, development and innovation (RDI), where this term has been coined. To this end, a quantitative systematic literature review has been conducted. Thirty-eight scientific papers which explicitly acknowledge assessing behavioural additionality in reference to RDI policy instruments, and represent original research papers in which behavioural additionality is approached empirically, have been analysed revealing the current state in the field and directions for further research. Seven different conceptualisations of the term have been identified which reflect a multidimensional nature of the concept.
Artykuł analizuje działania, cele i problemy SOW od momentu powstania, aby zrozumieć, co jest główną przyczyną jej stworzenia i istnienia. Jakie są jej osiągnięcia i jakie korzyści mają poszczególne państwa członkowskie? Czy jest to korzystne dla wszystkich członków? Postawiono hipotezę, że SOW służy tylko jego dużym członkom i ma być narzędziem Chin do wejścia do Azji Środkowej bez drażnienia Rosji. W artykule przeanalizowano działania SOW w ramach istniejących teorii SM, aby odpowiedzieć na powyższe pytania. Głównym celem powstania SOW była próba przejęcia kontroli przez mocarstwa regionu Azji Centralnej. SOW zmaga się z problemem braku zaufania między jej członkami. SOW jest bardzo ważnym instrumentem gwarantującym chińsko-rosyjskie partnerstwo. Gwarantuje również, że Chiny nigdy nie zdominują Azji Centralnej, ze względu na wiele porozumień podpisanych w ramach organizacji. Po ponad dwudziestu latach historii i istnienia SOW może stać się prawdziwą siłą na arenie międzynarodowej. Zamiarem SOW jest stać się światową siłą i stworzyć bardziej sprawiedliwy porządek międzynarodowy. SOW ma potencjał gospodarczy i wolę polityczną żeby to uczynić.
EN
The main goal of this paper is an analysis of activities, purposes, problems of the (SCO) since its inception in order to understand what is the main reason behind its creation and existence? What are its achievements and what benefits have got each member state? Is it beneficial to all members? The hypothesis is that SCO serves only its big members, it was intended to be a China’s tool to enter Central Asia without vexing Russia. The article analyzes the activities of the SCO with the existing theories in IR in order to answer these questions. The main objective of the SCO was an attempt by the powers of the Central Asia to control the region. The SCO faces problems of distrust between its members. It is a very important instrument of guaranteeing Sino-Central Asian partnership. It is also a guarantee that China will never dominate Central Asia due to many signed agreements within the organization. With more than twenty years of history and existence, the SCO may become a real force on the international arena. The SCO’s intention is to become a world power and to construct a fairer international order. The SCO has the economic potential and political will to do it.
Głównym celem artykułu jest analiza motywów dotyczących decyzji o zaangażowaniu kapitałowym chińskich spółek w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej (EŚW). W artykule poddano analizie użyteczność istniejących koncepcji teoretycznych do wyjaśnienia uwarunkowań chińskich zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich (ZIB). Decyzje chińskich podmiotów okazały się zgodne z teorią rozwoju inwestycji Dunninga (IDP), ale badania dowiodły także, że motywy ZIB są inne dla krajów regionu Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej niż w pozostałych regionach. Badanie wykazało, że jednym z głównych celów inwestycji w tym regionie jest uzyskanie dostępu do wspólnego rynku UE. Dodatkowo analiza danych ujawniła, że kraje EŚW, które nie są częścią UE, przyciągają proporcjonalnie więcej chińskich ZIB niż te, które mają łatwiejszy dostęp do funduszy UE.
EN
The main aim of the article was to analyze the motives behind the FDI decisions of Chinese companies’ capital engagement in Central and Eastern Europe. The article examines the applicability of existing theoretical concepts towards Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Chinese OFDI patterns have been found to be consistent with Dunning’s investment development path (IDP) theory, but research shows that OFDI to CEE countries is additionally driven by specific motives different than in other regions. The study has proved that one of the major purposes is to get access to the EU common market. Additionally, data analysis has revealed that CEE countries that are not part of the EU attract proportionally more Chinese FDI than those that have easier access to EU funds.
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