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1

DISTINCTIVE RATIONALITY OF INTENTIONS

100%
Botting D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 4
507 – 526
EN
In this paper the author intend to defend Broome’s cognitivist view that reduces practical normativity to theoretical normativity, but argue that this leaves unaccounted for distinctively practical norms that the author seeks to capture as a system of local obligations to have particular intentions. The krasia requirement dictates what obligations we have relative to the normative beliefs that we have but does not tell us what intentions it is rational to have all-things-considered.
2

BOOTSTRAPPING OBJECTION

100%
Piller C.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 4
612 – 631
EN
If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
3

RATIONAL AKRASIA

100%
Brunero J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
|
issue 4
546 – 566
EN
It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an akratic agent acts as he has most reason to act, and cases in which an akratic agent achieves a kind of global coherence he wouldn’t have achieved had he instead formed intentions in line with his best judgment, do not establish the possibility of rational akrasia. However, I do think that rational akrasia is possible, and I present two arguments for this thesis. The first argument involves a case in which one is incapable of revising one’s belief about what one ought to do, where one also acknowledges this belief to be insufficiently supported by the evidence. The second argument involves a case in which one rationally believes that one ought to have an akratic combination of attitudes.
4

UNDERSTANDING ENKRATIC REASONING

88%
Gjelsvik O.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 4
464 – 483
EN
Beginning from John Broome’s approach to Enkrasia, the paper quickly moves to giving a condensed presentation of an approach to practical reasoning motivated by a Fregean approach to inference (in theoretical reasoning). The suggested account of practical reasoning avoids using rationality requirements to do explanatory work when accounting for correct reasoning, and thus avoids lots of problems. It is strictly conservative in its approach, and no new inference rules are required for moving from the theoretical to the practical case. It is suggested that we can stick to deductive reasoning when accounting for practical proper; the crucial premise from theoretical reasoning about practical matters cannot normally be established this way. The paper moves on to tackle counterarguments to the effect that there will simply be too little correct practical reasoning on the present (deductive) approach. The simple account of correct reasoning has too high a cost, it is argued. The paper meets this objection when it argues that much reasoning is enthymematic or incomplete reasoning. By making specific claims about how there may be practical premises to which we do not attend even when there are, in some sense, before the mind, the approach is defended.
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