Search results

1

The Competitiveness of Small Baltic Container Terminals. The PROMETHEE II Multi-criteria Analysis

100%

Bartosiewicz A., Szterlik P.

Logistics and Transport

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2019

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vol. 44

5-14

EN

The article examines the competitiveness of small Baltic container terminals. In order to conduct the research, thirty terminals, whose annual maximum throughput capacity does not exceed 150,000 TEU, have been examined taking into consideration a number of criteria which are: length of the quay (C1), number of RTG (C2) and STS (C3) cranes, number of shortsea shipping connections (C4), maximum (technical) depth at the quay (C5), distance from motorways and expressways/national roads (C6), distance from the national railway station (C7). Selected k=7 criteria were used to perform PROMETHEE II (Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluations II) multi-criteria ranking that enabled specifying those Baltic Sea container nodes which are in the area of strategic benefits for the analysed market sector.

2

Polish Armed Forces and hybrid war: current and required capabilities

100%

Piekarski M., Kopcewicz G., Olszanecka N., Urbański D., Piechowiak-Lamparska J., Bryc A., Bojarczyk B., Jorgensen F. A. E., Niedziołka D., Pacześniak A., Potorski R., Wincławska M., Włodkowska-Bagan A., Jeran A., Mol A., Solsbery A., Dąbrowska I., Głodkowski M., Kopcewicz G., Olszanecka N., Piechowiak-Lamparska J.

The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies

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2019

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issue 1

EN

The article describes the problems of Polish military forces in the context of a relatively new type of threat, commonly described as “hybrid warfare”. The first step of the analysis is a description of such threat, based on data gathered by Polish and foreign analytical centers. The next step is a presentation of the current state of Polish military forces – in terms of doctrine, organization, training and materiel (e.g. equipment). This kind of data analysis offers relevant information about defense capabilities that the Polish Armed Forces have and those which they lack. These capabilities are then compared to the challenges posed by hybrid warfare, thus providing insights on potential new capabilities which should be acquired as well as those which are unnecessary in the context of hybrid war.

3

Bałtycka „zimna wojna”. Możliwe reakcje NATO i UE na rosyjską aktywność militarną na akwenie bałtyckim.

100%

Mickiewicz P.

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2015

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issue 2

57-70

EN

Baltic Sea, as an area of strategic importance for Russia’s policy toward Europe, has become a place of showcase of Russia’s military might. Its primary purpose is to show the international community the level of determination Russian authorities express to make national interests of the Federation included in the global politics. The number of incidents which cannot be a ground for military action on a larger scale – even according to Russian conventions – requires a politico-military response by regional supranational organizations. The response should take the form of smart-power strategies and the formula of military involvement must go beyond purely defensive action in response to enemy action. Hence, it is necessary to determine the scope of comprehensive EU and NATO operations (due to the need to protect the territorial sovereignty of Sweden and Finland) to offset the forms of Russian incidental activities in a way that does not elevate political tension in the region. Such a reaction is possible through effective impact on forms of activities on the waters of the Baltic Sea, which are important for Russia, notably shipping. The European Union, and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in particular, has appropriate instruments to create an effective impact. On the other hand, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty should be to prepare and conduct systematic and comprehensive operations which limit the possibility of encroaching on the treaty territory and protect the member states against Russia applying instruments of hybrid war.

4

Baltic macroalgae as a potential source for commercial applications – review

88%

Śliwińska-Wilczewska S., Budzałek G., Kowalska Z., Klin M., Latała A.

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis Studia Naturae

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2020

220-237

PL

Morze Bałtyckie jest wyjątkowym ekosystemem wodnym, charakteryzującym się wyraźnymi zmianami w środowisku, szczególnie w odniesieniu do zasolenia i klimatu. Jest to także miejsce występowania morskich i słodkowodnych organizmów roślinnych, które od stuleci fascynują naukowców. Niewiele jest jednak prac prezentujących bałtyckie glony makroskopowe, jako potencjalne źródło dla zastosowań komercyjnych. Celem niniejszego opracowania było przedstawienie bałtyckich makroglonów, jako źródła zasobów przemysłowych. W przeglądzie uwzględniono, m.in. potencjał wykorzystania tych organizmów w przemyśle kosmetycznym i medycznym, w tym najważniejsze składniki, które czynią je cennym produktem spożywczym. Zwrócono także uwagę na ich rosnącą popularność i potencjalne wykorzystanie w przyszłości, np. jako biopaliwa, nawozy naturalne lub składniki oczyszczalni ścieków. Przedstawiono także możliwość wykorzystania makroglonów jako biologicznego czynnika, ograniczającego występowanie masowych zakwitów sinic w Morzu Bałtyckim.

5

Military Security in the Baltic Sea during Cold War: Analysis Based on the Materials of the Naval Reconnaissance Unit of the Polish People’s Republic

88%

Będźmirowski J., Gac M.

Historia i Polityka

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2023

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issue 46 (53)

85-104

EN

The purpose of the article was to present, in the proverbial nutshell, the issues related to the military situation in the 1950s and 1960s during the so-called Cold War in the Baltic Sea, based on the materials of the Naval Reconnaissance Unit of the Polish People’s Republic. These materials were very important for analytical teams preparing concepts for operations in the Northern European Theater of Operations, as well as ensuring the security of the maritime borders of the Warsaw Pact countries. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a wide range of reconnaissance activities as a consequence of the changing reality in the Baltic Sea. The naval potential of both NATO countries, especially Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was expanded, thus the other side began to create the People’s Navy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), as well as to strengthen the combat potential of the naval forces of the People’s Republic of Poland. At the same time, the cooperation of allied fleets of the Warsaw Pact countries was improved, and for this purpose, staff exercises were conducted on maps and in the Baltic Sea. In retrospect, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact appreciated the military importance of the Danish Straits and the Baltic Sea. In the following years, efforts were made to improve the concepts of naval forces in these waters.

6

The concept of mobile, maritime system for location, assessment of technical condition, recovery and destruction of dumped chemical munitions

88%

Fabisiak J., Paczek B.

Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces

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2018

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vol. 50

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issue 2(188)

19-30

EN

After the World War II, acting under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement, the anti-Nazi coalition commenced destroying chemical and conventional munitions by dumping it in the seas (including in the Baltic Sea). As a result of these activities, tens of thousands of tons of ammunition were brought to the Baltic. The international project CHEMSEA has shown that dumped chemical munitions pose a threat to the environmental safety of the Baltic Sea, and that the need to collect and destroy munitions should be taken into account. The article describes the assumptions of a pilot system to identify chemical munitions in the Baltic Sea (including selected areas of the Polish Maritime Areas), assess its technical condition and the potential for its recovery. In addition, existing technical solutions (allowing for the use of the best available techniques – BAT) provide the opportunity to collect and neutralize sunken chemical munitions.

7

Współpraca regionalna pomiędzy Polską a Szwecją

75%

Frączek A.

Studia Gdańskie. Wizje i rzeczywistość

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2014

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vol. 11

117-127

EN

Poland and Sweden have common interests in frames of the Baltic region. Co-operation in the subregion framework of the Cooperation of the Baltic Sea contri-buted to get the observer status at the Committee of the Regions of the European Union. Both Poland and Sweden, seeing as the great importance for the regional co-operation they have initiatives about local character, activity aimed at increasing financing these projects from national budgets took. For the development of the that kind of cooperation they remained the obstacle differences in the autonomy and the degree of the self-reliance of individual regions of the countries. Only an introduction of the so-called new neighbourhood policy, contributed for more effective leading the regional policy.

8

Storm surges versus shore erosion: 21 years (2000–2020) of observations on the Świna Gate Sandbar (southern Baltic coast)

75%

Łabuz T. A.

Quaestiones Geographicae

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2022

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vol. 41

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issue 3

5-31

EN

Based on observations spanning 21 years (2000–2020), the article studies the effects of storm surges on the shore of the Świna Gate Sandbar in the southern part of the Pomeranian Bay (southern Baltic Sea). Impacts of selected maximum storm surges in each year were assessed with respect to morphological data collected on the beach and the foredune. The data included parameters of beach-dune erosion as measured along a beach transect before and after each surge. Differences and trends in the shore erosion were related to the sea level (SL), duration of a storm surge [highest storm sea level (HSL) > 1 m], wind-wave sector and wave run-up. The relationships were explored using a sim- ple correlation analysis. The most serious erosion was observed during the heaviest surges [HSL > 1.3 m above the mean sea level (AMSL)], with a wave run-up higher than 3.2 m AMSL. Such surges occurred at about 2-year intervals. The average SL during a surge was 1.2 m AMSL, with a run-up of 2.6 m AMSL. The beach and the lower part of the shore, below that level, were eroded each year. The heaviest surges resulted in an average 5.2 m and 7.0 m dune retreat on the high-beach-accumulative shore and on the low-beach-erosive shore, respectively. The dune was not eroded when the beach height exceeded the wave run-up. The heaviest surges eroded away 12–14 m3 of the beach sand volume. The shore erosion was found to be related to the storm surge duration, the maximum SL, the run-up and the beach height prior to the surge.

9

Toxic Ticking Time-Bomb in the Baltic Sea and Threats to Poland’s Security

75%

Willa R., Szpak A.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2023

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issue 1(52)

187-204

EN

The authors examine the threats from hazardous toxic materials from World War II wrecks sunk in the Baltic Sea and their cargo of chemical ammunition, indicate Poland’s reaction to this situation, and map out Polish obligations in this regard. This problem gives rise to multiple uncertainties about the exact nature of threats to environmental/ecological security, marine security, human security (including health security), economic security and food safety. The authors also elaborate on legal regulations relevant in this context. The research methods include formal-institutional analysis of relevant legal documents and discourse analysis. The main conclusions are: 1. toxic materials in the Baltic Sea threaten ecological, economic, human and security; 2. food safety in all Baltic states might be endangered; Poland should accede to the Nairobi Wreck Removal Convention; and Poland should cooperate regionally to resolve the problem of the Baltic chemical waste.

10

Role of Private Entities and Non-Governmental Organisations in Ocean Governance: Remarks on the Baltic Sea Perspective

75%

Zużewicz-Wiewiórowska I., Wiewiórowski W.

Prawo Morskie

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2022

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issue XLII

11

Love of Wide Open Waters. The Polish Maritime Programme according to the Baltic and Western Institutes in the Aftermath of the Second World War (1945–ca. 1950)

75%

Grzechnik M.

Acta Poloniae Historica

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2018

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vol. 117

PL

This article analyses the Polish maritime programme after the Second World War, as expressed in scholarship of two main Polish research institutions: the Baltic Institute and the Western Institute. Given the considerable border changes at the end of the war, which incorporated a long coastline and three major ports on the Baltic Sea (Danzig/Gdańsk, Stettin/Szczecin and Gdynia) into post-war Poland, the maritime programmes gained a new basis for operations in comparison to the interwar period, and thus had to be adapted accordingly. They contained both continuities and modifications: in ideological terms they were based on the prewar premises of Poland’s origins as a Baltic Sea country, and had a strong anti-German dimension. On the other hand, they were more pragmatic and concentrated on the organization of the maritime economy and education. Similarly as in the interwar period, they were also seen as a modernizing project: the maritime economy and education were supposed to connect the Polish nation with the whole world, and thus assure its equal status as part of the Western world.

12

Allelopathic effect of the Baltic picocyanobacterium Synechococcus sp. on selected diatoms

75%

Konarzewska Z., Śliwińska-Wilczewska S., Latała A.

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis Studia Naturae

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2017

EN

It is commonly believed that the structure of phytoplankton and the formation of cyanobacterial and algal blooms may be explained by allelopathic interactions. The main aim of this study was to investigate the allelopathic effect of picocyanobacterium Synechococcus sp. on the following growth and fluorescence parameters: the maximum quantum yield of PSII photochemistry (Fv/Fm), and the effective quantum yield of PSII photochemistry (ΦPSII) of selected diatoms – Nitzschia fonticola, Fistulifera saprophila, Navicula perminuta and Amphora coffeaeformis. In this study, it was demonstrated that picocyanobacterium caused allelopathic effects against Baltic diatoms. The results showed that the addition of cell-free filtrate from Synechococcus sp. increased the number of cells of N. fonticola and F. saprophila. Moreover, it was found that picocyanobacterium was stimulated fluorescence parameters of N. fonticola, F. saprophila, and N. perminuta. On the other hand, it was noted that filtrate obtained from picocyanobacterium caused the inhibition of Fv/Fm parameter of A. coffeaeformis. The results of this experiment may provide further information about allelopathic interactions between Baltic picocyanobacteria and diatoms that are crucial to the understanding of algal blooms in aquatic ecosystems.

13

Scientific exchange in the Baltic Sea region during the Cold War – an ongoing transnational Oral History Project

75%

Söhner F., Halling T., Hansson N.

Wrocławski Rocznik Historii Mówionej

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2023

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vol. 13

26-35

EN

Science communication, especially science diplomacy, is seen as a means to remain in the conversation in times of political crisis, including the Cold War era. In this paper, drawing on experiences from an ongoing oral history project within the ‘Bridging the Baltic’ network, which is interested in knowledge transfer during the Cold War and afterwards in northern Europe, we look at pitfalls of international interview projects in medicine, e.g. the influence of the chosen language in international interview projects.

14

Współpraca i integracja w regionie Morza Bałtyckiego w świetle badań empirycznych

63%

Białobrzeska R., Marks-Bielska R.

Studia Regionalne i Lokalne

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2004

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issue 1(15)

67-86

PL

Zmiany demokratyczne i gospodarcze, które nastąpiły po 1989 r. w krajach Europy środkowo-Wschodniej, ukształtowały nową sytuację polityczną w rejonie Morza Bałtyckiego. Powstały wówczas możliwości swobodnego rozwoju współpracy nie tylko na poziomie międzypaństwowym, ale również na szczeblu społeczności regionalnych i lokalnych. Inicjatywy te wynikają z konieczności aktywizacji społeczno-ekonomicznej, z przekonania o możliwości uzyskania wzajemnych korzyści ekonomicznych, jak też są motywowane transgranicznymi powiązaniami transportowymi, bliskością kulturową i językową społeczności zamieszkujących po obu stronach granicy. Celem pracy jest przedstawienie zakresu i skali współpracy regionalnej w regionie Bałtyku. Szczególna uwaga zostanie zwrócona na dotychczasowe efekty i możliwości tej współpracy na polskich obszarach przygranicznych. W artykule zaprezentowano wyniki badań ankietowych przeprowadzonych wśród przedstawicieli samorządów lokalnych w gminach przygranicznych należących do Euroregionu Bałtyk.

EN

Democratic end economic transformations that occurred after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe Countries have resulted in a new political situation in the Baltic Sea region. They created opportunities for unrestricted development of cooperation not only at international, but also at regional and local communities level. Those initiatives are a consequence of the necessity for social and economic activation, the belief in opportunity of achieving economic benefits for everybody and they are motivated by cross-sborder transport links, cultural and language similarities between communities living at both sides of the border. The paper aims at presenting the scope and scale of regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region with particular focus on the current effects and potential of that cooperation in the border areas of Poland. The paper presents the results of questionnaire based on investigations encompassing representatives of local governments from border municipalities of the Baltic Sea Euroregion.

15

Wspólnota interesów czy rywalizacja? Subregion bałtycki w koncepcjach politycznych Rosji i Chin w drugiej i trzeciej dekadzie XXI wieku

63%

Mickiewicz P.

Przegląd Geopolityczny

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2020

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vol. 31

9-22

PL

Rosyjsko-chińska współpraca na akwenach morskich określa wspólny cel, jakim jest ograniczenie zdolności USA do kontroli morskich szlaków przewozów towarowych. Jej zakres ograniczają rozbieżności interesów zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do polityki europejskiej, co prowadzi do podjęcia przez obydwa państwa form rywalizacji. Prawdopodobnym miejscem jej zaistnienia jest region bałtycki. Celem artykułu jest określenie czynników ograniczających pola rywalizacji w regionie bałtyckim, jak i determinujących jej wystąpienie. Założenie wyjściowe to teza iż chińsko-rosyjska wspólnota interesów to dążenie do przeniesienia ciężaru działalności morskiej USA z akwenów azjatyckich na północny Atlantyk i morza otaczające Europę. Chińczycy z tej grupy wykluczają Morze Bałtyckie, które ma być obszarem stabilności politycznej. Natomiast w założeniach polityki rosyjskiej Bałtyk ma być regionem zastępczym dla prowadzonej z USA rywalizacji arktycznej. Dodatkowo czynnikiem ograniczającym zakres chińsko-rosyjskiej kooperacji jest projekt Arctic Silk Road, który narusza rosyjskie interesy w Arktyce. Przyjąć więc należy, że Rosja prowadzić będzie politykę ograniczania ekonomicznego znaczenia tej trasy, koncentrując swoje działania w regionie bałtyckim i kierując je do państw uczestniczących w tym projekcie. Stworzy to nową sytuację strategiczną, w której to region bałtycki stanie się istotnym obszarem rywalizacji mocarstw.

EN

Russian-Chinese cooperation conducted on maritime watersconducted in the 21st century sets a common goal, which is to limit the US ability to control maritime freight routes, especially energy transport carriers. Its scope is limited by divergence of interests, especially in relation to European policy, which leads to forms of competition between the two countries. The Baltic region is a likely place of its occurrence. The purpose of the article is to determine the factors limiting the areas of competition in the Baltic region, as well as determining its occurrence. The initial research assumption is that the SinoRussian community of interests is striving to shift the burden of US maritime activities from Asian waters to the North Atlantic and the seas surrounding Europe. The Chinese from this group exclude the Baltic Sea, which is to be an area of political stability. On the other hand, in the assumptions of Russian policy, the Baltic is to be a replacement region for the Arctic competition conducted with the USA. An additional factor limiting the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation is the Arctic Silk Road project, which violates Russian interests in the Arctic. Therefore, it should be assumed that Russia will conduct a policy of limiting the economic significance of this route, focusing its activities in the Baltic region and directing them to the countries participating in this project. It should be assumed that Russia will conduct a policy of limiting the economic significance of this route, focusing its activities in the Baltic region and directing them to the countries participating in this project. This will create a new strategic situation in which the Baltic region will become an important area of competition between the powers.

16

Rosyjski projekt operacji desantowej w strefie Kanału Cesarza Wilhelma w 1914 roku

63%

Herma M.

Zapiski Historyczne

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2022

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vol. 87

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issue 1

91-106

EN

The paper discusses a scheme for a landing operation in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal area (German Kaiser-Wilhelm-Kanal, from 1948 the Nord-Ostsee-Kanal, the Kiel Canal in international terminology), whose aim was to capture and destroy the Germanbuilt transportation route that connected the Baltic Sea with the North Sea. The canal bore a strategic importance after the outbreak of World War I, as the German navy had to operate both in the North Sea against its main adversary, the British fleet, and to ensure Germany’s strategic control in the Baltic. The scheme, which has received little attention in literature to date, was developed after the outbreak of World War I, in the autumn of 1914, by Captain 2nd Rank (Commander) Alexander Bubnov, an officer in the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich. The article proposes an analysis of the assumptions of Bubnov’s scheme, the question of who it was inspired by, and discusses the reasons why the scheme was not implemented, also in the context of the cooperation between the Allies (Russia and Great Britain) at the beginning of the war.

17

Access to the Sea and the Imperial Ambitions of Peter the Great

63%

Anisimov E. V., Lewandowska A.

Zapiski Historyczne

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2021

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vol. 86

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issue 4

5-27

EN

Access to the Baltic Sea was the main initial goal of Russia’s participation in the Great Northern War (1700–1721). This military involvement was primarily due to the personal motives of Peter the Great, however, numerous different factors also played an important role. The foundation of St Petersburg, making it the capital city, and fortifying it with a defensive system was aimed at securing the Russian control over the mouth of the Neva. The military operations and diplomatic efforts undertaken by Russia in 1702–1709 were aimed exclusively to maintain access to the sea. At this time, Russia was ready to agree to the peace terms which were to grant it only the old Russian provinces of Ingria and Karelia. However, after the victorious Battle of Poltava of 1709, Peter the Great developed imperial ambitions. Under the pretext of ensuring the security of St Petersburg and ensuring Russia’s access to the sea, the Russians captured Swedish lands in the Eastern Baltic and Finland, and then annexed most of these territories. At the same time, Russian diplomacy constantly ensured of its readiness to conclude peace, but these attempts were rejected by the Swedes. Ten years of warfare and destructive raids on the coastal regions of the Kingdom of Sweden forced the Swedes to negotiate. The Treaty of Nystad of 1721 not only ended the war between Russia and Sweden, but it also became the starting point of the extraordinary development of Peter the Great’s imperial ambitions. Russia entered the world of great European and global politics as an empire, as an aggressive state of despotic character.

18

Baltic – Black Sea Area as a Geopolitical Reality: Does It Exist?

63%

Doroshko M., Tsyrfa I.

Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne

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2021

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issue 1

107-136

PL

Ponieważ przemiany społeczne i polityczne, jakie obserwujemy we współczesnym świecie, uaktualniły w ostatnim czasie kwestię powstawania nowych regionów geopolitycznych, obszar mórz Bałtyckiego i Czarnego zasługuje na szczególną uwagę, ponieważ status geopolityczny tego znajdującego się na rozdrożach obszaru jest wciąż dyskusyjny. Geopolityczne granice obszaru mórz Bałtyckiego i Czarnego nieustannie się zmieniają nie tylko funkcjonalnie, ale także strukturalnie: można więc uznać ten obszar za specyficzną formację geopolityczną, która znajduje się na styku dwóch geopolitycznych megaregionów – Europy Zachodniej i Północnej Eurazji. Obszar ten jest głęboko podzielony i nadal przechodzi bardzo bolesne przemiany polityczne, kulturowe i gospodarcze. Rywalizacja o władzę między Rosją, NATO i UE, a także dziedzictwo historyczne tego rejonu uwarunkowały ścieżkę jego rozwoju. W efekcie w obszarze mórz Bałtyckiego i Czarnego nie istnieje żaden system podziału politycznego czy zarządzania gospodarką, ale bliskie związki znajdujących się tam krajów i wiele obszarów wspólnych zainteresowań sprzyjają wszechstronnej współpracy i dialogowi w różnorakich kwestiach. Jeśli ich współpraca przybierze formę wielostronnych relacji opartych na zasadzie suwerennej równości państw, które starają się poszerzyć zakres współpracy i ograniczyć pole konfrontacji, państwa te będą w stanie stworzyć system komplementarnych elementów zapewniających efekt synergii, urzeczywistniając powstanie obszaru mórz Bałtyckiego i Czarnego stanowiących rzeczywisty byt geopolityczny.

EN

As the social and political transformations observed in the modern world have recently made current the issue of formation of new geopolitical regions, the Baltic – Black Sea Area deserves particular attention because the geopolitical status of this junction territory still remains questionable. The geopolitical boundaries of the Baltic – Black Sea Area are constantly changing not only functionally, but also structurally, which is why it can be considered as a specific geopolitical formation located at the junction of the two geopolitical mega-regions of Western Europe and Northern Eurasia. This area is highly fragmented and still undergoing very painful political, cultural, and economic transformations. The power competition between Russia, NATO and the EU, as well as the region’s historical legacy have determined the path of its development. As a result, the Baltic – Black Sea Area does not have any system of political division or economic management, but close connections between the countries located there and many spheres of their common interest promote comprehensive cooperation and dialogue on a variety of issues. If their cooperation leads to multilateral relationships based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states which are trying to expand the scope of their collaboration and limit the scope of confrontation, they could organize a system of complementary elements which provide synergies and ensure the existence of the Baltic – Black Sea Area as a geopolitical reality.

19

Miejsce obwodu kaliningradzkiego i Morza Bałtyckiego w wybranych rosyjskich dokumentach strategicznych

63%

Żęgota K.

Przegląd Geopolityczny

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2020

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vol. 31

23-34

PL

Obwód kaliningradzki Federacji Rosyjskiej i Morze Bałtyckie odgrywają znaczącą rolę w kształtowaniu rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa, zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do relacji z Unią Europejską i NATO. Dokonując przeglądu dokumentów strategicznych Rosji pod kątem miejsca Morza Bałtyckiego w polityce bezpieczeństwa Rosji należy stwierdzić, iż zagadnienie to jest obecne zarówno w kontekście współpracy, jak i rywalizacji z Zachodem. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowanie miejsca i znaczenia w rosyjskiej polityce zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa obwodu kaliningradzkiego i basenu Morza Bałtyckiego w świetle zapisów wybranych rosyjskich dokumentów strategicznych. Uwaga autora została skoncentrowana na wybranych strategiach i dokumentach sektorowych, nie zaś na zapisach poszczególnych strategii bezpieczeństwa. Przeprowadzona analiza wykazała, iż problematyka związana z obwodem kaliningradzkim i rolą regionu w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa europejskiego pojawiała się w strategiach sektorowych częściej niż w ogólnych strategiach bezpieczeństwa czy koncepcjach polityki zagranicznej. Należy to interpretować w ten sposób, iż strategie bezpieczeństwa i koncepcje polityki zagranicznej zawierają ogólne cele Federacji Rosyjskiej w polityce zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa, zaś miejsce i rola regionów przygranicznych, w tym obwodu kaliningradzkiego, była pochodną uwarunkowań globalnych i regionalnych bezpieczeństwa, zawartych w tych dokumentach.

EN

The Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation and the Baltic Sea Basin play a significant role in process of shaping Russia’s foreign and security policy, especially with regard to relations with the European Union and NATO. Reviewing Russia’s strategic documents in context of the position of the Baltic Sea in Russia’s security policy, it should be stated that this issue is present both in the context of cooperation and rivalry with the Western Europe. The purpose of this article is to analyse the place and importance of the Kaliningrad region and the Baltic Sea basin in Russian foreign and security policy in the light of selected Russian strategic documents. The author’s attention has been focused on selected strategies and sectorial documents, not on the provisions of individual security strategies of Russia. The analysis proved that the issues related to the Kaliningrad region and the role of the region in shaping European security appeared in Russia’s sectorial strategies more often than in general security strategies or foreign policy concepts. This should be interpreted in such a way that general security strategies and foreign policy concepts contain the general objectives of the Russian Federation in foreign and security policy, while the place and role of border regions, including the Kaliningrad region, was a derivative of global and regional security conditions showed in these documents.

20

Morze Bałtyckie – zmiany w środowisku bezpieczeństwa wyzwaniem dla NATO

63%

lebiedzińska t.

Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego

|

2016

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vol. 10

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issue 2

326-339

EN

Recent security changes in the Baltic Sea region indicate that this area has to be considered as the area of potential risk caused by the actions of the Russian Federation, NATOand each country of the region. Those changes in security environment force the adaptation of international security structures and generate a change in their approach to achieve its new tasks and goals. The Baltic Sea must become an area of particular interest to Alliance - as themain security organization in the region - because here is the critical eastern NATO border. This does not mean a return to the previous strategy and organizational structures. This means the necessity to adapt structures to new challenges, particularly in the maritime domain.

PL

Zmiany, jakie zachodzą w regionie Morza Bałtyckiego wskazują, że bezpieczeństwo tego dotychczas spokojnego obszaru może zostać zagrożone. Świadczą o tym niektóre działania Federacji Rosyjskiej, Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego jak i poszczególnych państw regionu. Zmiany te wymuszają adaptację międzynarodowych struktur bezpieczeństwa oraz zmianę podejścia do realizacji stawianych przed nimi nowych zadań. Morze Bałtyckie powinno stać się obszarem szczególnego zainteresowania Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego, jako głównej organizacji bezpieczeństwa regionu, tu bowiem leży wschodnia granica NATO. Nie oznacza to powrotu do strategii i rozwiązań organizacyjnych sprzed transformacji Organizacji Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego. Oznacza konieczność dostosowania struktur do nowych wyzwań, szczególnie w morskiej domenie działań.

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