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EN
The 17th century faced some deep changes within the scope of the philosophy of nature. Having discarded hylemorphism, modern philosophers had to find new ways of gaining knowledge of and explaining natural phenomena. One of the new currents was the experimental philosophy that had a famous proponent – Robert Boyle. Nevertheless the new method also had its opponents, Thomas Hobbes being one of the most prominent of them. The present paper is an attempt to show the most fundamental reasons why the two philosophers took radically opposite positions towards the experimental method. The discussion started with T. Hobbes’s work Dialogus physicus de natura aeris which was a severe critique of Boyle’s New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, touching the Spring of the Air. The paper is not any examination of the detailed discussion of the two, rather it focuses on differences concerning the concepts of knowledge (philosophy) accepted by them and some theoretical problems interwoven with the way of experiment. It seems that Boyle accepted to some extent the probabilistic and temporal concept of knowledge, whereas Hobbes defended the traditional ideal of universal and certain one, and maintained that experiments cannot be any source of it. Hobbes was in favor of the deductive concept of natural philosophy. What is more, Hobbes pointed out that experimentalists’ attempts to secure some degree of certainty fail because they are built on some conventional presumptions. According to Hobbes, any outcome of an experiment must be strongly influenced by those assumed assumptions. Further development of sciences and also the philosophy of sciences proved the deductive concept of natural philosophy ineffective, on the other hand, however, Hobbes was right in pointing out the inevitable theoretical context of any pursuit after ‘matters of fact’.
EN
The seventeenth century witnessed the transition from qualitative to quantitative physics. The very process was not easy and obvious and it consisted of discussions in many fields. One of them was the question about the nature of chemistry which was at the time undergoing some changes towards the form we know now. The main argument concerned the explanatory principles one should invoke to understand properly certain outcomes of chemical experiments. The present paper is a presentation of such an (indirect) argument between R. Boyle, a prominent proponent of corpuscular, quantitative principles and S. Duclos, an al-chymist and a proponent of paracelsian, qualitative ones. What is interesting, Duclos knew The Sceptical Chymist, Boyle’s main work which contained a severe critique of paracelsian chemistry, and a%empted to point out some weaknesses of Boyle’s own position. Duclos scrutinized Boyle’s experiments described in his Certain Physiological Essays and other works and argued for certain shortcomings of Boyle’s laboratory skills, his failure to indicate some literature sources and, first of all, insufficiency of Boyle’s arguments for the corpuscular thesis. According to Duclos, Boyle did not follow in laboratory certain procedures recommended by himself, using unclear notions and applying the corpuscular principles without proper justification. What is more, Duclos argued also in favour of paracelsian chymistry presenting some qualitative explanations in experiments in which Boyle failed to give quantitative ones. Knowing the further development of natural philosophy, it seems interesting to realize how complex it was. The present paper shows also how much irremovable from scientific research is the theoretical component.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2022
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vol. 70
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issue 4
213-235
PL
Odważna i zdecydowana obrona tolerancji stanowi ważny wątek Traktatu teologiczno-politycznego (TTP) Spinozy i jeden z powodów znaczącego historycznego wpływu tego tekstu. Nie jest jednak łatwo sprecyzować argumenty Spinozy na rzecz tolerancji. Zgodnie z tytułem, TTP zawiera dwa główne argumenty na rzecz tolerancji: polityczny i teologiczny. Autor niniejszego artykułu argumentuje, że teologiczny argument Spinozy za tolerancją jest ściśle związany z odrębnym i często pomijanym argumentem z pluralizmu. Artykuł zawiera analizę Spinozjańskiego argumentu z pluralizmu i broni tezy, że argument ten jest bardziej atrakcyjny niż zbliżone do niego argumenty na rzecz tolerancji podane przez Bodina i Bayle’a, ponieważ Spinoza dopuszcza możliwość, że przekonania i doktryny religijne mają racjonalne uzasadnienie, co pozwala z większym optymizmem patrzeć na przyszłość sporów religijnych. Spinozjański argument z pluralizmu jest również bardziej atrakcyjny niż argument Bayle’a, ponieważ Spinoza nie uznaje przekonań religijnych za uzasadnione na mocy ich szczerości, co zwalnia go od konieczności uznania problematycznych praw błądzącego sumienia. Ponadto Spinoza nie jest zmuszony do traktowania jako uzasadnionych szczerych przekonań prześladowców ani przekonań jawnie niemoralnych czy niereligijnych.
EN
Spinoza’s bold, spirited defense of toleration is an animating theme of the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) and an important reason for the significant historical impact of the text. But Spinoza’s arguments for toleration can be challenging to discern. True to its title, the TTP offers two main arguments for toleration, one political, the other theological. This paper argues that Spinoza’s theological argument for toleration is closely connected to a distinct and often overlooked argument from pluralism. This paper examines Spinoza’s argument from pluralism and defends that it is more attractive to similar arguments for toleration offered by Bodin and Bayle. It is more attractive than Bodin’s pluralism argument because Spinoza’s allows that religious beliefs and doctrines of faith have a rational justification, which makes possible a more optimistic picture of the prospects for religious disputation. Spinoza’s pluralism argument is also more attractive than Bayle’s argument because Spinoza’s does not regard religious beliefs as justified by sincerity, which means that he does not need to recognize any problematic rights of erroneous conscience, nor is he forced to accept as justified sincere beliefs in persecution or obviously immoral or irreligious beliefs.
Praktyka Teoretyczna
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2013
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vol. 8
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issue 2
281-308
EN
This text is an attempt to conduct a historical-materialist analysis oftheological, political, and scientific concepts (e.g.,katechon, multitude and vacuum).Such studies carried out in detail on the discussions between Spinoza, Hobbesand Boyle held on the verge of the modern era are to show the crucial theoreticalconclusions fraught with consequences. It presents the shaping of the bourgeoisvision of science, theology, and the birth of the modern concept of private propertyon the one hand, and on the other - the forming of the first universalist classstruggles conducted both at the level of theology, politics, and the methodologyof science. A better understanding of these struggles and disputes, as well asa clarification of the specific stance taken by Spinoza in this conflict, shed newlight on the crisis described and diagnosed within the autonomist theories ofNegri, Hardt and Virno.
PL
Tekst stanowi próbę historyczno-materialistycznej analizy pojęć teologicznych, politycznych i naukowych (na przykład katechon, wielość czy próżnia). Takie badania, szczegółowo przeprowadzone na toczonych u progu nowoczesności dyskusjach między Spinozą, Hobbesem a także Boylem, mają pokazać kluczowe i brzemienne w konsekwencje teoretyczne rozstrzygnięcia. Pokazuje z jednej strony ukształtowanie się mieszczańskiej wizji nauki, teologii czy narodziny nowoczesnego pojęcia własności prywatnej, z drugiej formowanie pierwszych uniwersalistycznych walk klasowych prowadzonych tak na poziomie teologii jak i polityki oraz metodologii nauk. Lepsze zrozumienie tych walk i sporów a także wyjaśnienie specyficznego miejsca jakie zajmuje w nich Spinoza rzuca nowe światło na kryzys opisywany i diagnozowany w ramach autonomistycznych teorii Negriego, Hardta czy Virno.
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