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IMPLAUSIBILITY OF THE CAUSAL CLOSURE OF THE PHYSICAL

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Swinburne R.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2019

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vol. 26

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issue 1

25 - 39

EN

Much recent neuroscientific work, and in particular the programme initiated by Benjamin Libet, seeks to show “the causal closure of the physical”—that mental events never cause physical events, and in particular that our intentions never cause brain events and thereby our intentional bodily actions. But no one is justified in believing any scientific theory unless they are justified in believing that it successfully predicts certain events. Someone is justified in believing that certain events predicted by some theory did occur, if they apparently remember having perceived these events or if some other scientist apparently testifies that they have perceived these events. But we believe our apparent memories of our past perceptions of events because we believe that perceiving those events has caused brain events which have caused our present apparent memories of them; and we believe the apparent testimony of others because we believe that their intentions to testify have caused brain events in them which in turn have caused the words of their testimony to come out of their mouths. So someone could only justifiably believe the theory that mental event never cause physical events if they believe that either their past perceptions or the intentions of other scientists to tell them what they perceived, both of which kinds of mental events are, have caused brain events, which are physical events. So that theory is self-defeating; no one could ever be justified in believing it, or more generally be justified in believing the theory of the causal closure of the physical.

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PRINCIPLE OF THE CAUSAL OPENNESS OF THE PHYSICAL

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Von Wachter D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2019

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vol. 26

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issue 1

40 – 61

EN

The argument from causal closure for physicalism requires the principle that a physical event can only occur through being necessitated by antecedent physical events. This article proposes a view of the causal structure of the world that claims not only that an event need not be necessitated by antecedent events, but that an event cannot be necessitated by antecedent events. All events are open to counteraction. In order to spell out various kinds of counteraction I introduce the idea of ‘directedness.’

3

ACTIVE DOINGS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CAUSAL CLOSURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD

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Beckermann A.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2019

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vol. 26

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issue 1

122 – 140

EN

Some philosophers hold that it would be impossible for us to do something actively if the physical world were causally closed, i.e., if in the physical world all events were caused by other physical events if they are caused at all. The reason for this view is that these philosophers adhere to what I call the traditional picture of action. Recently, Martine Nida-Rümelin tried to defend this picture by phenomenological considerations. According to the traditional picture behaviour can only count as something an agent does actively if it is ultimately caused by the agent in an agent-causal way. In this paper I adduce three arguments against agent causation: (1) We do not really understand what agent causation is. (2) If agent causation were real, we would be confronted with the strange fact that human agents can only cause certain tiny events in the brain. (3) There is no empirical evidence that agent causation is real. In the last part of my paper I present an alternative account of the difference between what agents do actively and what is done to them.

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3 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 Beckermann A.

1 Swinburne R.

1 Von Wachter D.

3 2019

IMPLAUSIBILITY OF THE CAUSAL CLOSURE OF THE PHYSICAL

PRINCIPLE OF THE CAUSAL OPENNESS OF THE PHYSICAL

ACTIVE DOINGS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CAUSAL CLOSURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD