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1

O TEÓRII ADEKVÁTNEJ PRÍČINNEJ SÚVISLOSTI

100%
Dulak A.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
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2017
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vol. 100
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issue 6
558 – 575
EN
The existence of the causal relationship between an unlawful conduct and a damage is the prerequisite for establishing a responsibility for damage. The legal regulation of today does not define what is to be understood as “causing“ damage, and leaves the interpretation of this term to judicial practice. The practice of the courts defined many rules for determining and proving causal relationships, that, among other things, emphasize that the relationships between unlawful conduct and the consequences of such must be direct (immediate), and that the causal relationship must be “safely proved“. Several more recent rulings of the Slovak judicial practice have, however, claimed that a causal relationship exists if the damage arises as an adequate (emphasized by the author) consequence of unlawful conduct. Some rulings even refer to the theory of adequate relationships. Since these rulings fail to mention what exactly in their cases decided about the ‘adequateness’ of causality, and since they do not include references to theoretical sources, their argumentation is, to a considerable extent, shallow and unconvincing. The theory of adequate causal relationships poses a concept that has been worked on generously, and one that is accepted to judge legal causality. Although it hasn’t gained much support in the legal climate of the Slovak Republic, one cannot overlook it traditional utility during the process of defining and deciding about the duty to compensate for caused damage.
2

PUTNAM’S VIEW ON REFERENCE CHANGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF KRIPKE’S

88%
Moreno L. F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 3
367 – 383
EN
A usual objection put forward against the causal theory of reference is that it cannot explain the reference changes that terms may undergo. The main aim of this paper is to examine the position on reference change of one of the classic supporters of the causal theory, Hilary Putnam. It is usually claimed that Putnam’s causal theory of reference of natural kind terms is closely related to Kripke’s theory and can be conceived as a development of the same. The motivation of this paper is to allege that there is at least one important difference between both theories, consisting of their explanation of reference changes or at least in the way in which those theories make reference changes possible. After dealing with the problem of reference change within the framework of Kripke’s theory and reconstructing Kripke’s proposal to account for it, we will allege that there are components of Putnam’s theory which make reference changes possible, although they are different from those present in Kripke’s theory.
3

FODOR ON CAUSES OF MENTALESE SYMBOLS

75%
Aytekin T., Sayan E.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2012
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vol. 19
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issue 1
3 – 15
EN
Jerry Fodor’s causal theory of content is a well-known naturalistic attempt purporting to show that Brentano was wrong in supposing that physical states cannot possess meaning and reference. Fodor’s theory contains two crucial elements: one is a notion of “asymmetric dependence between nomic relations,” and the other is an assumption about the nature of the “causally operative properties” involved in the causation of mental tokens. Having dealt elsewhere with the problems Fodor’s notion of asymmetric dependence poses, we show in this paper a difficulty with the other element of his theory concerning what kinds of properties are the causally operative ones in the tokening of a semantic symbol in the brain of a perceiver. After presenting this difficulty, we examine three possible responses that Fodorian might make to our criticism.
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