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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 10
766 – 779
EN
David Hume (1711 – 1776) is often considered as a sceptic about the existence of causal powers or the necessary connection between cause and effect, and his work is interpreted in various books on the history of philosophy in this way. In the last century, however, new interpreters have emerged who are destroying this traditional image of Hume's philosophy. These philosophers, known as “The New Humeans”, also consider Hume to be a sceptic, but not as to the objective existence of causal forces, but only as to the recognisability of those forces. The presented article deals with the main arguments of the new interpretation and connects them with Hume's work. The conclusion of the article presents our own argument on the issue.
EN
The article deals with some questions that are closely connected with clarifying the meaning of causal claims and understanding their distinctive features. It presents a perspectival view of causation that regards both the asymmetry of causation and its temporal orientation as products of our own perspective that we all share. The authoress argues against one of the basic thesis of causal perspectivalism according to which the notion of causation arises from our experience of success as agents, and she asserts that the distinction between causes and effects can also be relevant to practical or epistemic behaviour of creatures who are mere observers.
EN
The article explains the meaning of the cause and effect relation in Hegel’s thought. It explains what Hegel understands by freedom and what it has to do with causality. Hegel is trying convince us that this issue is insufficient to grasp the absolute with one’s mind, which, in Hegel’s opinion, is the one and only task of philosophy as a whole.
EN
The paper discusses the regularity account of causation but finds it insufficient as a complete account of our notion of causality. The attractiveness of the regularity account is its attempt to understand causation in terms of empirically accessible features of the world. However, this account does not match our intuition that singular causality is prior in normal epistemic situations and that there is more to causation than mere succession. Apart from succession and regularity, the concept of causality also contains a modal feature which allows us to engage in counterfactual discourses about singular causal events and to claim that a particular cause is both sufficient and necessary for its effect in the circumstances. However, we may directly observe singular causes, but the modal element is not something we can possibly observe. Rather, this element is something we add to our perception of succession. Thus, the paper suggests that the modal feature of causality is a mental construction which was originally formed by our knowledge of certain structural features of similar events in other situations. It stems not from what we actually observe but from what we have observed or may observe under different but relevant circumstances. So the concept of causation has partly an empirical content and partly a constructed one.
EN
The subject of this article is the ontological theory of causality presented in Roman Ingarden's 'Controversy over the Existence of the World'. The peculiarity of this theory is discussed, and some differences between it and Hume's and Kant's theories are shown. The article presents Ingarden's definition of cause, the principles of causality, and rarely discussed problems connected with the analysis and division of events. The changes in the method of inquiry which occur in the third part of the 'Controversy over the Existence of the World' and which are related to the problem of causality are also examined.
6
80%
Sociológia (Sociology)
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2017
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vol. 49
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issue 1
55 - 80
EN
This paper addresses process tracing as a tool for studying causality in case studies. The method of process tracing, which is based on explicit specification of a causal mechanism and formalized treatment of empirical evidence, is intensively developed in political science. However, sociology and other social sciences seem to be turning a blind eye to the method. Therefore, the paper strives to familiarize the Czech and Slovak sociological community with this method and to outline the ongoing discussions about its application. The value of process tracing dwells not only in the elaborate frame for standardization of case studies, but also in the related debates reflecting upon a whole range of general methodological issues. This makes process tracing a valuable lesson in contemporary social science methodology and possibilities in non-experimental analysis of causality.
EN
The paper presents the hypothesis of the mathematical rationality of the world put forward by Polish Platonist Michael Heller. There are to obstacles which make it difficult to understand this hypothesis. These are: (1) a conviction that mathematical entities are causally powerless and (2) a suspicion that mathematical objects, understood as ontological beings, are unintelligible.
8
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Kultura a przyczynowość

70%
Filo-Sofija
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2011
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vol. 11
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issue 1(12)
279-289
EN
The essay addresses the problem of how to link culture and causality. The starting point is an appeal to J. Kmita’s socio-regulative conception of culture where culture is given in terms of the propositional attitudes communally defined. Since human actions are physical events, one can ask if they can enter into the causal relationship with other physical events. The problem is that this relationship is given to an agent through the cultural mediation. The mediation in question is possible due to the symbolic relationship embedded in the so-called symbolic sphere presupposed by Kmita’s conception. The causal relationship is therefore derived from the symbolic relationship. It is also the communal language which expresses the attitudes in question that is of a symbolic nature. Kmita’s conception then allows one to understand not only the communal nature of culture. It also shows how the human beings culturally defined live in a world of causality.
Sociológia (Sociology)
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2014
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vol. 46
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issue 2
130 – 145
EN
In the article, the fundamental principles of analytical sociology are briefly introduced. As underlined, the contemporary analytical sociology based on social mechanism concept is closely connected to multi-agent (or agent-based) modelling. Three methodological inspirations which can be found in contemporary analytical sociology are discussed. The first one is dealing with Merton´s interpretation of Middle range theory. According to Hedström and Udehn, there are two basic dimensions of MRT: dimension of generality (explanandum) and dimension of isolation (explanans). In the next part, the model construction of theory is discussed and compared to the strategy of hypothetic-deductive theory construction. Finally, the issue of explanation based upon social mechanism is analysed. There are two fundamental approaches to solve the issue which can be found in the analytical sociology. Bunge´s approach (How does it work?) is compared to Boudon´s one (Why does it work?). The social mechanism underlying the social control process is introduced to demonstrate the idea that the answer to the question “how does it work?” can provide a non-trivial though not final explanation of social phenomena.
EN
The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework - Transparent Intensional Logic - is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions.
11
Content available remote

La causalité, l'argumentation et les connecteurs

70%
Linguistica Pragensia
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2011
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vol. 21
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issue 1
1-13
EN
The paper deals with the relation between argumentation and causality. After having defined causality (referring to D. Hume) and its language representation, we distinguish three types of argumentative discourse articulated by an argument-introducing connective (parce que, puisque, car, en effet etc.), i.e. argument for the utterance content, argument for the illocutionary act and argument for the act of enunciation. Afterwards, we examine the relation between argument and conclusion in these three types of discourse from the point of view of causality. We show that causality operates as a principle which the argumentation is based on only in the case of truth-conditional acts. We try to explain some restrictions concerning the distribution of the causally related entities which are observed.
EN
First, this paper examines the causal relationship between the current account and financial account then the current account and the main components of financial account and finally the financial account, saving, and investment in Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. In this context we employ Toda-Yamamoto approach to Granger causality test by using the quarterly data. We find a causal relation running from the financial (current) account to the current (financial) account in Croatia (Poland) and Slovenia (Romania) while a bi-directional causality exists in the case of Hungary. We conclude that at least one component of financial account balance Granger causes current account in Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia while the causality running from the current account to at least one component of financial account in Poland, Romania and Hungary. It seems that the financial account Granger causes the saving in Hungary and investment in Croatia while the causality running from the saving in Romania and investment in both Croatia and Poland to the financial account.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 4
343-355
EN
One part of the paper is devoted to frequency interpretation, as advocated by early K. Popper. However, the main subject of the paper is Popper's own propensity interpretation of probability. It outlines the fundamental principles of the propensity interpretation, as well as its relation to quantum theory and its various variants. In conclusion it examines the so called Humpreys' paradox as related to the interpretation of causality in the frame of Popper's propensity interpretation.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 4
294 – 308
EN
The paper deals with Thomas Reid’s comments against Joseph Priestley’s materialism. Priestley’s mechanical materialism is based on the philosophy of Isaac Newton, especially Newton’s rules of reasoning. Priestley rejected substantive dualism and arguments in favour of a single material substance on the basis of these rules. The paper first presents the form of Priestley’s materialism and then analyses the individual remarks of Reid. The emphasis is on the notions of truth and causality, which both philosophers interpret differently. The last part of the article analyses whether Reid’s remarks are relevant or not.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 5
400 – 407
EN
The article discusses the enigmatic backtracking counterfactuals. It offers an explanation according to which in the case of the latter the negative time direction is due to their being abductive retrodictions, i.e. explanations of unreal effects by introducing possible causes while the conditions remain tacit or unexpressed. The counterfactual abductive retrodictions´ backtracking time direction is in accordance with the postulating the positive time direction from cause to effect. Thus we demonstrate that in order to explain backtracking counterfactuals there is no need to consider the backtracking impact of the present on the past. Further, there is no need to violate natural laws or to have a special logic. What we need is to take into account the third parameter, i.e. a set of tacit or unexpressed additional propositions, as well as the principle of ceteris paribus as our background. When the power of logic is not overestimated, there is no need to change the direction of causality. And a correct analysis does not require any special logic. Last, but not least, we showed, how to correctly make the abductive retrodiction by the contraposition of the deductive retrodiction.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his 'Science of Logic' and which can be applied to issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author's contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon's philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science.
EN
The analyses Ingarden had carried out of relatively isolated systems are important from the point of view of the ontology of mind as they lead to a precise description of the form and the mode of existence of consciousness within the multilevel structure of human existence and in a broader context of the causal structure of the physical world. Ingarden's position regarding the form and mode of existence of consciousness and the role of relatively isolated system in the structure of human being is compatible with the results of contemporary research within the general systems theory, dynamical systems theory and cognitive neuroscience. Still, in many respects it exceeds their findings. The account of consciousness as a relatively isolated system leads to rejection of the main assumptions of the transcendental (in a Husserlian sense) philosophy of mind and becomes compatible with the interdisciplinary research programme dealing with the analysis of the systemic nature of a human being and his mental dimension.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
890 – 905
EN
The present analysis of the evolution of the concept of freedom in Ernst Tugendhat’s philosophy aims to highlight several interesting facts. First, Tugendhat attempts to describe the meaning of Kant’s statement “I could have acted otherwise” from a non-transcendental perspective. Second, he makes an effort to avoid the classical Kantian dilemma of the relation of free will and determinism by posing the question differently. Third, he situates the issue of the relation of freedom and causality in the framework of the inner structure of freedom – examining it from the perspective of the human’s relation to him- or herself. Fourth, he attempts repeatedly to overcome the impossibility of considering freedom in the objective language of causality. The paper demonstrates why the issue of freedom remains a central problem of continental philosophy.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 1
36 – 50
EN
The paper proposes a solution to the problem of counterfactuals building on both Rescher’s epistemic and Tichy’s semantic approaches. The core of the latter is the thesis that a speaker when expressing a true counterfactual assumes a set of background indicative premises as an implicit parameter. When added tacitly to an unreal antecedent, these premises entail the consequent logically or analytically. We argue against Pollock’s impossibility objection concerning revision of the producer’s beliefs. In accordance with the linguistic solution we distinguish between a relative and an absolute unreality of a course of events described in the consequent. Likewise, we draw a distinction between a potentially unreal and an absolutely unreal condition expressed in the antecedent. Drawing on our previous paper, Deductive and abductive retro dictions and predictions, we take counterfactuals with a positive time vector and an absolute unreal condition to be elided deductive judgements, i.e. deductive retro dictions, without any appeal to a special non-classical logic. Similarly, we consider counterfactuals with a positive time vector and a potentially unreal condition to be elided deductive predictions.
EN
The paper tries to analyze critically what is usually taken for granted - the causal relation between empirical knowledge about external world and the world which is (supposedly) known. The aim is neither to propose a new definition of knowledge nor to restate an old one but rather to take a closer look at the claim that knowledge is a true belief caused in a proper way by facts, events, etc. of the external world. This claim is a core of the epistemological approach usually labelled as a 'causal theory of knowledge', but there are many causal theories distinct from each other. The paper therefore sketches the causal components of D. Davidson's epistemology and the roles they play in the process of cognizing, first. Then it exposes more details of Davidson's approach and pushes some of them further critically.
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