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1

Culture, Tradition and Translation in the Philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre

100%
Filipczuk M., Filipczuk M.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2008
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vol. 17
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issue 3(67)
21-31
EN
A specific form of relativism characteristic for Alasdair MacIntyre's philosophy is discussed in the paper. The authors focus on mutual translatability between languages in the context of conceptual schemes connected with tradition constituted moral enquiry. They locate the source of MacIntyre's relativism in incommensurability of various conceptual schemes and discuss the chances of its overcoming. They address their attention to two claims made by MacIntyre: a weaker one (i) that there does not exist a language that would be neutral with respect to non-linguistic reality, and a stronger one (ii) that non-linguistic reality does not exist at all. Consequently the choice of language predetermines the body of truths that can be expressed in that language. A gradual improvement of descriptive adequacy is however possible. MacIntyre points out that it is always possible to adopt a new language that enables a better description of some moral problems, especially when the traditional language is unable to deal with some aspects of moral dilemmas. To this strategy he adds another. It is also possible to learn a new language as a 'second-first-language'. The ultimate goal of the paper is to assess these proposals.
2

STRAWSON'S DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS - ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS

100%
Stjernberg F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2009
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vol. 16
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issue 4
529-541
EN
This paper examines some aspects of Strawson's conception of descriptive metaphysics, as it is developed in 'Individuals'. Descriptive metaphysics sets out to describe 'the actual structure of our thought about the world'. Three specific problems are discussed for this project. First, isn't the description of our actual thought about the world mainly an empirical task? Second, how determinate and consistent is the stuff we find, how determinate and consistent is our conceptual scheme? Third, who are 'we' here? Answers to these sets of questions are mainly negative in spirit. But all this probably doesn't mean that there will be no place for metaphysics, descriptive or revisionary, as a subject. The whole enterprise is perhaps more fraught with difficulties than Strawson thought, however.
3

JE POJMOVÝ RELATIVIZMUS PREDPOKLADOM FILOZOFIE AKO POJMOVÉHO INŽINIERSTVA?

88%
Labuda P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 1
3 – 17
EN
The aim of the paper is to examine whether conceptual relativism is a prerequisite for conceptual engineering (and if so, then to what extent). In the first part of the paper, I explore and classify varieties of relativism to prepare a distinctive definition of conceptual relativism. In the second part I analyse conceptual relativism and I consequently propose two different readings of conceptual scheme: (i) conceptual scheme as a monolithic, timeless, and determinate systems of meanings, and (ii) conceptual scheme as a system of relatively stable meanings, that is based on agreement and is open to change over time. In the third part of the paper, I show that of those two readings only the second reading of conceptual scheme fits into the practice of conceptual engineering.
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