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2012
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vol. 57
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issue 2(343)
117-131
EN
The article gives overview of the impacts of the ECJ rulings in Laval case, the Viking case, the Rüffert case, the Commission vs. Luxembourg case on the practice of collective bargaining and the effectiveness of industrial actions in the European Union. Particularly the consequences of those important judgments on the social dimension of the EU internal market are discussed. Author presents ECJ analysis of relation between economic freedoms and fundamental rights (as a background the Schmidberger case is used). The doubts of European Parliament and concerns of European Economic and Social Committee related to ECJ judgments are presented as well. Author emphasized differences between European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Right attitudes towards perception of right to collective bargaining.
EN
Contemporary philosophers generally conceive of consequence as necessary truth-preservation. They generally construe this necessity as logical, and operationalize it in substitutional, formal or model-theoretic terms as the absence of a counter-example. A minority tradition allows for grounding truth-preservation also on non-logical necessities, especially on the semantics of extra-logical constants. The present article reviews and updates the author's previous proposals to modify the received conception of consequence so as to require truth-preservation to be non-trivial (i.e. not a mere consequence of a necessarily true implicatum or a necessarily untrue implicans) and to allow variants of the substitutional, formal and model-theoretic realizations of the received conception where the condition underwriting truth-preservation is not purely formal. Indeed, the condition may be contingent rather than necessary. Allowing contingent non-trivial truth-preservation as a consequence relation fits our inferential practices, but turns out to be subject to counter-examples. We are left with an unhappy choice between an overly strict requirement that non-trivial truth-preservation be underwritten by a necessary truth and an overly loose recognition of non-trivial truth-preservation wherever some truth underwrites it. We need to look for a principled intermediate position between these alternatives.
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