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THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SEJM OVERSIGHT: SELECTED ISSUES

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Gromek Z.

Przegląd Sejmowy

2008

issue 3(86)

This article discusses selected issues concerning the exercise by the Sejm of its powers to hold persons performing top State positions (from the point of view of Sejm oversight) accountable before the Tribunal of State. The authors of analysis of the Sejm authority to deal with preliminary motions to hold persons constitutionally accountable pointed out that in such power the oversight function of the Sejm is realized. However, they also noted that such power has at the same time some specific features as compared with other instruments of oversight exercised by Sejm. Then, the proceedings before the Constitutional Accountability Committee of the Sejm were described. In this respect, the standpoint which considers such proceedings as completely consistent with pre-trial proceedings in the penal procedure should be criticized. They also opted for reduction of the scope of the proceedings in the Committee in relation to evidence. Similar criticism was caused by the lack of application by the Committee of instruments regulated in Article 9(2) of the Act on the Tribunal of State. Addressing a controversial issue whether the proceedings to hold persons constitutionally accountable is based on the principle of procedural legality, it was ascertained that in such proceedings the principle of opportunism exists. Therefore, the Sejm is not under legal obligation to initiate, in any case, proceedings in relation to constitutional accountability. Another issue, raised in the article, is admissibility of holding members of collegial bodies constitutionally accountable for actions taken by such body in gremio. As concerns this question, it was stated that individual accountability of members of such bodies for such actions is exceptionally admissible. Finally, the issue of effectiveness of performance by the Sejm of its power to initiate proceedings before the Tribunal of State was discussed. The reasons for low effectiveness in this sphere were indicated.

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESSIVE PROVISIONS (Odpowiedzialnosc konstytucyjna w swietle zasady okreslonosci przepisów represyjnych)

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Gromek Z.

Przegląd Sejmowy

2010

issue 2(97)

9-28

The article examines the provisions concerning constitutional accountability (Article 198 para. 1, Article 145 para. 1 and Article 156 para. 1 of the Constitution) in the context of the principle of specific nature of a prohibited act. From the constitutional principle of 'nullum crimen sine lege' (Article 42 para. 1 of the Constitution) stems, inter alia, the requirement for precise and explicit statutory definition of material elements of a prohibited act, which prevents repressive provisions of a blanket nature from being enacted The requirement for sufficient specificity of the features of a prohibited act covers all forms of repressive responsibility, including constitutional accountability. The fact that the constitutional legislator has given the regulations establishing constitutional accountability the form of blanket provisions may raise doubts whether the specificity requirement has been thereby met. The article provides arguments that seem to support the use a blanket provision in this case. The author points out that, in view of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, the principle of specificity is not absolute. At the same time, in the context of disciplinary responsibility which is similar to constitutional accountability, the constitutional court permits the application of blanket regulations. A similar structure is applicable to criminal liability for abuse of powers of authority (Article 231 §1 of the Penal Code). The author believes that only such approach to liability may guarantee full protection of the principle of legalism in the functioning of the supreme organs of the state. He also draws attention to the fact that regimes of liability stricter than those applied to regular citizens are allowed in relation to persons holding public functions.

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2 Przegląd Sejmowy

2 Gromek Z.

1 2010

1 2008

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SEJM OVERSIGHT: SELECTED ISSUES

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESSIVE PROVISIONS (Odpowiedzialnosc konstytucyjna w swietle zasady okreslonosci przepisów represyjnych)