This article is an attempt to answer the question whether, in the Polish law theory and practice, the limits of the freedom of expression of the press are precisely defined and what is the predictability of the mechanisms to execute responsibility for transgression of these limits. Freedom of expression is subjected to the limits of admissible interference in the sphere of rights and freedoms in accordance with the requirements contained in Article 31(3) of the Constitution and Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Any limitations upon the exercise of freedom of the press may to be 'imposed only by statute' and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of freedoms referred to in the above-mentioned acts. These considerations seem to suggest that the limits of freedom of the press should be established in a defined and unquestionable way. Nevertheless, no such conclusion can be drawn from the decisions of Polish courts on two cases of collision between values protected by the Constitution and by the Convention, i.e. protection of freedom of the press and protection of honour and privacy. Some doubts in this area result from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal. Particularly controversial is the transgression of the limits of expression and violation of virtue and other personal rights by stating the untruth. The article addresses some questions - absent in the above-mentioned judgments - which makes the issue of veracity of public expression even more ambiguous. The systemic interpretation and analysis of the practice of Polish courts enables us to conclude that making the illegality of an expression dependent on its veracity is both unfounded and infeasible.
Military courts are a special category of bodies in the administration of justice, distinguished from ordinary courts by subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. They stand in the tradition of many European states, and also exist in Poland. This article deals with requirements put on such bodies by the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the context of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Although the Convention does not directly address the issue of military justice, the general requirements concerning any law-administration body existing in the state apply also to the Tribunal, as it stressed itself. However , the unique nature of these bodies and, particularly, the status of judges of military courts, along with their jurisdiction including, sometimes, not only members of the armed forces, but also civilian personnel or even persons unrelated to the armed forces, raises a question of their independence and impartiality. First, the article examines the position of the armed forces in the system of government and the status of military courts. Next, it considers the issue of jurisdiction of military courts over both members of the armed forces and civilian. Moreover, the status of judges of military courts is widely discussed. Finally, the article deals with most important problems of appellate justice. The cited judgments of the European Court of Human Rights allow us to formulate general guidance that are applicable to military courts in the states parties to the Convention. They include, in particular: the limitation of their jurisdiction, generally, to members of armed forces and civilian employees of the armed forces, guarantees of independence and impartiality of the judges and establishing an effective appellate mechanism in criminal cases.
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