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1

THE LAW AND THE LANGUAGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES AND H. L. A. HART

100%
Doliwa K.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2009
|
issue 15(28)
199-209
EN
The aim of the study is to compare T. Hobbes' and H. L. A. Hart's remarks concerning theories of language and the emphasis of the role of linguistic questions in the ideological systems of the two philosophers, demonstrating that their views on the language are considerably related to considerations concerning the law.
2

NESKORÝ WITTGENSTEIN O LOGICKÝCH PRAVIDLÁCH

88%
Čana T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
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vol. 66
|
issue 2
109-121
EN
In his remarks from the late period, Ludwig Wittgenstein is frequently concerned with so-called external roots of our logical operations. He asks questions like: 'How is possible anything like logical necessity?'‚ How is possible anything like following a logical rule under normal circumstances?'‚ Where is the compelling force of a logical proof coming from?'; etc. In the philosophical community, it is generally accepted that the late Wittgenstein's remarks deal with these questions, but the philosophical motivation behind these remarks is still not clear. Instead, there is a growing disagreement among various interpretations over these remarks. The present consideration is built upon the belief that Wittgenstein's remarks try to communicate a new sense to us. The author argues that, contrary to the generally accepted view, there is a new and positive sense in these remarks. His aim in this paper is to clarify the philosophical motivation behind them.
3

Konwencjonalne ujęcie strategii w rozstrzyganiu problemów koordynacyjnych

88%
Adamus M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2012
|
vol. 40
|
issue 1
143 - 166
EN
This article show how communication through language can be expressed in terms of game theory. The general idea and the main line of argumentation is based on David Lewis’ book Convention (Lewis 1969) and more recent works on game theory that develop the concepts of cooperation and equilibrium. The term agreement, in the sense given to it by game theory, is used to show how to justify the thesis of the conventional nature of language. In the first part of the article some general notions of game theory are presented. Game theory is supposed to examine strategies chosen by rational agents in order to obtain preferred outcomes and is thus a good tool for describing and predicting human behaviour. It applies to situations when subjects operate reasonably, taking into account the behaviour of other rational subjects, and thus can also be used in situations of language communication. Sustaining conventionalism with game theory is possible primarily because it satisfies two basic conditions: it is both a description and a justification. Only within a complex system is it possible to explain the normative character of language, which, like utility, is only a simplified scheme. Through the analysis of coordination problems and the use of the principles of rationality and utility, it is possible to anticipate the behaviour of agents. In this context normativeness should be regarded as striving for balance, and even if another way of understanding is a deviation of the system, it still can be explored and explained within it.
4

STRUCTURAL REALISM WITHOUT METAPHYSICS: NOTES ON CARNAP’S MEASURED PRAGMATIC STRUCTURAL REALISM

63%
Beni M. D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
|
vol. 22
|
issue 3
302 – 324
EN
Carnap’s re-invention of the Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theories has been at the centre of a new debate in recent years. Following Grover Maxwell, Psillos (2000a) argued that Carnap’s re-invention of the Ramsey-sentence had failed to lead to the desired neutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate, and ended, instead, to a form of structural realism which happened to be liable to Newman’s objection to Russell’s version of structural realism. The objection held that without putting suitable restrictions on the range of the variables of the Ramsey-sentence, a Ramsey-sentence approach to theories renders trivial and a priori true all ontological commitments to unobservable entities issued by scientific theories. By arguing that Carnap achieved the neutral stance, Friedman (2011) counter Psillos claim. He denied that any form of realism could be attributed to Carnap. In this paper, the author provides a middle ground, where an unorthodox form of structural realism could be attributed to Carnap. He highlights parts of Carnap’s work which deal with the problem of designation of abstract terms and the relation of the language to the facts of the matter (in Carnap 1934; 1950; 1966), to argue that it was Carnap’s view about the practical methodological considerations, being at work in the construction (or choice) of the linguistic systems, which led him to the unorthodox form of structural realism. The author claims also that the same practical considerations constitute the nub of a viable Carnapian answer to Newman’s objection.
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