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EN
The right to good administration aims at the protection of a set of rights that a citizen is entitled to in the course administrative proceedings. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the right to good administration became an integral part of the EU legal system. Furthermore, the concept of the right to good administration is also included in the soft law acts issued by the institutions of the European Union and the Council of Europe. Polish administrative courts perceive those regulations as an important directive for the interpretation of the domestic rules of administrative procedure.
EN
The significance of the ne bis in idem principle is determined by its essence. In view of enhanced international cooperation this principle acquires a new meaning and the scope of its validity becomes redefined. EU Court of Justice referred to the ne bis principle – inter alia – on Zoran Spasic case. The author of this paper presents the most unconventional aspects of that important judgment. The Court found that reasons of safety and widely understood efficiency of functioning of cross-border prosecutions is more vital than understanding of the res judicata principle established in the literature.
EN
This text presents the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by Polish courts since the entry into force of the Charter in December 2009. As the Charter is an element of the ‘external’ constitution for the Republic of Poland, similar to the European Convention on Human Rights, the practice of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is of particular importance in this analysis. Hence the referral to the Charter by common and administrative courts is rather briefl y described and the main focus of the text is on the broader analysis of the way of and reasons for using the Charter by the Constitutional Tribunal. While the Charter is not treated as a model for the hierarchical analysis of norms in cases of constitutional complaints, it can however be offered as such a model in cases of abstract control and legal questions fi led by the courts. The use of the Charter might be further clarifi ed by an answer of the Court of Justice of the European Union to the fi rst request for preliminary ruling made by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in case C-390/15 RPO.
EN
In EU law a lot of attention has recently been paid to personal data protection standards. In parallel to the development of the general EU rules on data protection, the Members States also develop cooperation between law enforcement agencies and create new information exchange possibilities, including the processing of personal data of participants in criminal proceedings. The aim of this article is to analyse whether the personal data of victims of crime are safeguarded according to the standards of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. For this purpose, the author analyses two directives: 2012/29/EU, which regulates minimum standards of victims of crime; and 2016/680/EU (also known as the Law Enforcement Directive), which regulates personal data processing for the purpose of combating crime. Based on the example of the Polish legislation implementing both directives, the author comes to the conclusion that the EU legislation is not fully coherent and leaves too much margin of appreciation to the national legislator. This results in a failure to achieve the basic goals of both directives. The author expects the necessary reflection not only from the national legislator, but also from the European Commission, which should check the correctness of the implementation of the directives, as well as from national courts, which should use all possible measures to ensure that the national law is interpreted in the light of the objectives of the directives.
EN
The article examines the legal consequences of Protocol (No 30) on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. The author notes that the Charter does not merely confirm the fundamental rights previously recognized in EU law, but also introduces new ones. In the light of this statement it is proposed, that – according to article 1(1) of the Protocol – the Charter does not extend the ability of given courts to examine the compliance of laws and practices of Poland and the UK with the Charter, as far as it introduces these new rights. Article 1(2) of the Protocol excludes the possibility of litigation based on provisions of title IV of the Charter. Article 2 of the Protocol aims at preventing the EU from imposing changes of national laws and practices in certain areas. In the light of provisions of the Charter (particularly article 52(6)) it is however doubtful, whether article 2 constitutes any genuine modification of legal obligations. Finally, the author notes, that according to the predominant view it would be theoretically possible for the Court of Justice of the EU to diminish or even deprive the Protocol of actual practical consequences by making use of general principles of EU law. This however might be regarded as a circumvention of primary EU law and as such deserves negative opinion.
Studia Ełckie
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2019
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vol. 21
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issue 4
567-581
EN
The path to changing the concept of marriage led through a change in the understanding of the family. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was intended to cover cases in which national legislation recognizes other possibilities of family formation than marriage. Thus, the entry in the Charter has been shaped in such a way as to avoid a clear response to the new issue of same-sex relationships; that is, it neither permits nor prohibits because of trends based on social movements. This does not affect the institution of marriage itself, but allows the recognition of other forms of family found in the internal regulations of the states as corresponding to marriage.
EN
The present contribution looks at the protection of fundamental rights under EU law, paying special attention to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) which, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, enjoys “the same legal value as the Treaties”. First, by looking at the recent case law of the European Court of Justice, it explores the scope of application of the Charter. Second, it examines the conditions that the limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must fulfil in order to be valid. Third, it looks at the interaction between, on the one hand, the Charter and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and between, on the other hand, the Charter and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Finally, a brief conclusion contains some remarks as to the requirements private applicants must fulfil in order to build strategic human rights cases successfully.
EN
This article presents the normative status of the principle of human dignity in the law of the European Union. The issue is portrayed with reference to primary and secondary legislation of the EU. The first field of analysis was the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as primary sources of EU law. The examination of secondary law in the form of regulations, directives as well as soft law used to implement the policies regarding the area of freedom, security and justice was the subsequent stage. Having explored this, it was possible to formulate the thesis of this paper. It is believed that human dignity – as a principle of EU law – is a legally binding rule not only for the Member States but also for the third countries applying for EU membership. Human dignity is also one of the indivisible and universal values on which the European Union is founded.
EN
The article deals with the signifi cance and legal character of the provision of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This article provides for the freedom to conduct a business. Therefore, the article presents a standpoint regarding the qualifi cations of the right to conduct business within the framework of the division of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into principles and fundamental rights (rights or freedoms). In the article’s considerations, the right to conduct business activity under art. 16 of the Charter is recognized as a fundamental right. The article also draws attention to the signifi cant deficiencies in the protection of economic freedom in EU law, in particular when it concerns the introduction of restrictions on this freedom in EU derivative law. Finally, comments are also made regarding the basic aspects of the subjective and objective scope of the right to conduct business.
EN
The elimination of religious references in the CFR’s preamble can be interpreted as a disregard for the tradition of appeals to God and Christianity, typical for the most EU member states, which should be reflected in the EU symbols in the name of respecting the principle of unity in diversity. The rejection of invocatio Dei is a sign of reluctance to the functioning of the religious factor in the public space, based on the anti-clericalism rooted in the French Enlightenment, despite the declaration expressed in the Charter that its axiological layer primarily reflects the common constitutional traditions of the member states.
PL
The Protocol No. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, so called “British-Polish Protocol”, annexed in 2007 to the Treaties by means of the Lisbon Treaty, led to many interpretational disputes about its legal status and consequences for application of the Charter in Poland and United Kingdom. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), continuing the protection of human and fundamental rights contained in the Charter, dispels some doubts concerning the Protocol significance through its case law. Judgment of the CJEU of December 21, 2011 in joined cases N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department et M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as well as Advocate General’s Verica Trstenjak opinion delivered on September 22, 2011, confirms the normative content of art. 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, so that the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland is unchallengeable. Significance of the Advocate General’s Juliane Kokott’s opinion, delivered on December 15, 2011, in case General Prosecutor v Łukasz Marcin Bonda (C-489/10) should not go unnoticed. It states that Protocol No. 30 cannot be seen as an opt-out clause, but shall be regarded as having only clarifying character and as construction guidelines. Broad scope interpretation of the Charter was what CJEU called in the case Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10). It allowed to develop common standards for the interpretation and application of European Union fundamental rights.
EN
This article seeks to explore whether the EU system of fundamental rights protection allows room for constitutional pluralism. By looking at recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court of Justice), it is submitted that the Court has answered that question in the affirmative, thereby respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as their national identities. The application of the Charter does not rule out a cumulative application of fundamental rights. That being said, pluralism is not absolute, but must be weighed against the indivisible and universal values on which the European Union is founded. Logically, the question that arises is how we order pluralism. In this regard, I shall argue that it is not for the Court of Justice to decide when an EU uniform standard of fundamental rights protection is to replace (or coexist with) national standards. That decision is for the EU political institutions to adopt, since they enjoy the necessary democratic legitimacy to determine the circumstances under which the exercise of a fundamental right is to be limited for reasons of public interest. However, this deference to the EU political branches does not mean that EU legislative decisions are immune from judicial review. On the contrary, cases such as Schwarz and Digital Rights demonstrate that the Court of Justice is firmly committed to examining whether those legislative choices comply with primary EU law, and notably with the Charter. In this regard, when interpreting the provisions of the Charter, the Court of Justice – in dialogue with national courts and, in particular, constitutional courts – operates as the guarantor of the rule of law within the EU, of which fundamental rights are part and parcel. It is thus for those courts to make sure that each and every EU citizen enjoys a sphere of individual liberty which must, as defined by the Charter, remain free from public interferences.
PL
The Protocol No. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, so called “British-Polish Protocol”, annexed in 2007 to the Treaties by means of the Lisbon Treaty, led to many interpretational disputes about its legal status and consequences for application of the Charter in Poland and United Kingdom. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), continuing the protection of human and fundamental rights contained in the Charter, dispels some doubts concerning the Protocol significance through its case law. Judgment of the CJEU of December 21, 2011 in joined cases N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department et M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as well as Advocate General’s Verica Trstenjak opinion delivered on September 22, 2011, confirms the normative content of art. 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, so that the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland is unchallengeable. Significance of the Advocate General’s Juliane Kokott’s opinion, delivered on December 15, 2011, in case General Prosecutor v Łukasz Marcin Bonda (C-489/10) should not go unnoticed. It states that Protocol No. 30 cannot be seen as an opt-out clause, but shall be regarded as having only clarifying character and as construction guidelines. Broad scope interpretation of the Charter was what CJEU called in the case Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10). It allowed to develop common standards for the interpretation and application of European Union fundamental rights.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł stanowi analizę ewolucji podejścia Unii Europejskiej do kwestii ochrony praw podstawowych. Opracowanie skupia się na aktach prawa pierwotnego stojących najwyżej w hierarchii unijnych źródeł prawa. W tym zakresie przeanalizowano pod tym kątem traktaty założycielskie jak i traktaty rewizyjne a także Kartę Praw Podstawowych. Z uwagi na złożoność zagadnienia i ograniczenia objętościowe niniejszej publikacji skonkretyzowano się na kwestiach dotyczących modyfikacji treści Traktatów. Na podstawie dokonanych rozważań zakreślono proces kształtowania się wielopoziomowego systemu ochrony praw człowieka w Unii Europejskiej a także aktualny stan prawny, który stanowi niewątpliwie istotny wkład w uregulowaniu tego aspektu.
EN
This paper analyzes how the approach of the European Union to the protection of fundamental rights evolved. It focuses on primary legislation, which ranks highest in the hierarchy of EU sources of law. For this purpose, the author examines the Founding Treaties, the Reform Treaties, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The paper focuses on modifying the Treaties due to the complexity of the subject matter. The considerations discussed in this paper set the ground for the outline of the formation of a multi-level system of human rights protection in the European Union, as well as for the presentation of the current state of the law, which undoubtedly constitutes an important contribution to the regulation of the issue discussed.
Nurt SVD
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2020
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issue 1
217-232
EN
Both the discussion around the axiological roots of human rights adopted in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as concerns about the uncontrolled increase of EU competences in the area of human rights protection have resulted in the establishment of restrictions on the Charter’s impact on national legal systems, among others in the form of declarations and protocols incorporated into primary law at the request of certain member states, including Poland. Despite legal doubts concerning their effectiveness in protecting national traditions against harmonization in the spirit of left-wing liberalism, they express a consensus arising from the desire to respect the principle of unity in diversity.
PL
Zarówno dyskusja wokół aksjologicznych źródeł praw człowieka przyjętych w Karcie Praw Podstawowych UE, jak i obawy dotyczące niekontrolowanego wzrostu unijnych kompetencji w dziedzinie ochrony praw człowieka skutkowały ograniczeniem wpływu Karty na krajowe systemy prawne, m.in. poprzez deklaracje i protokoły przyjęte na wniosek niektórych państw członkowskich, w tym Polski. Pomimo wątpliwości prawnych dotyczących ich skuteczności w ochronie tradycji narodowych przed harmonizacją w duchu lewicowego liberalizmu, są one wyrazem konsensusu wynikającego z chęci poszanowania unijnej zasady jedności w różnorodności.
EN
One of the biggest challenges of European law is balancing the relations between the Member States and the European Union. An especially interesting aspect of this issue is the horizontal impact of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. The authors of the article will reconstruct the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which precisely settles problems related to this issue. Various examples will be examined, ranging from the renowned judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court in Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson to the most recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court in Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v. Martin Broßonn. The authors will also evaluate the settled case law using a holistic perspective on the whole system of European law and its principles.
PL
Jednym z największych wyzwań prawa europejskiego jest uzyskanie balansu między systemami prawnymi poszczególnych państw członkowskich a systemem Unii Europejskiej. Zagadnieniem, które jawi się jako niezwykle interesujące w tym kontekście, jest horyzontalny skutek oddziaływania Karty Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej. Autorzy artykułu dokonali rekonstrukcji linii orzeczniczej Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE, które w sposób konsekwentny rozwija wykładnię tej problematyki — od legendarnego już wyroku wielkiej izby Trybunału w sprawie C-617/10 Åklagaren przeciwko Hansowi Åkerbergowi Franssonowi po najnowszy w badanym zakresie wyrok wielkiej izby Trybunału w sprawach połączonych C‑569/16 i C‑570/16 Stadt Wuppertal przeciwko Marii Elisabeth Bauer oraz Volker Willmeroth przeciwko Martinie Broßonn. Autorzy podjęli się także ewaluacji dotychczasowej linii orzeczniczej w sposób holistyczny, biorąc pod uwagę czynniki wynikające z całego systemu prawnego UE oraz jej zasad i wartości.
|
2017
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vol. 6
|
issue 8
125-128
PL
W dniu 26 września 2017 r. Sąd Najwyższy wystąpił do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE (dalej: TS UE) z pytaniem prejudycjalnym, zwracając się o dokonane wykładni zasady ne bis in idem (ponowne sądzenie lub karanie w tej samej sprawie) oraz ustalenie czy w wypadku równoległego stosowania unijnego i krajowego prawa konkurencji ochronie podlega ten sam interes prawny. Pytanie to ma znaczenie dla ustalenia zakresu ne bis in idem, w tym rozumienia pojęcia tej samej sprawy (idem). Upraszczając, spór dotyczy tego czy idem należy odnosić wyłącznie do tożsamości stanu faktycznego (te same fakty; rozumienie wąskie), czy tożsamości czynu zabronionego (te same fakty i ich taka sama kwalifikacja prawna; rozumienie szerokie) oraz tego, czy dla zastosowania zasady ne bis in idem ma znaczenie – obok tożsamości stanu faktycznego – tożsamość chronionego interesu prawnego. Pytanie prejudycjalne jest istotne, ponieważ odnosi się do sytuacji, kiedy sąd krajowy staje przed dylematem – czy stosować się do wiążącego go standardu wynikającego z Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka (ww. rozumienie wąskie), czy też standardu wynikającego z orzecznictwa TSUE w sprawach konkurencji, intepretującego na potrzeby tych spraw zasadę ne bis in idem określoną w art. 50 Karty Praw Podstawowych (ww. rozumienie szerokie). Pytanie to ma także znaczenie dla zdecentralizowanego stosowania w UE art. 101–102 TFUE. W kontekście zasady ne bis in idem Sąd Najwyższy (dalej: SN) stawia bowiem pytanie, czy krajowe prawo konkurencji i unijne prawo konkurencji – gdy stosowanie przez organ krajowy równolegle – chroni ten sam interes prawny.
EN
The Polish Supreme Court made a reference for preliminary ruling in a case involving double fine for the same anticompetitive conduct (first fine for violation of Polish competition law and second fine for violation of Article 102 TFEU). The Court asks whether the identity of interest protected can be considered as a separate condition in the context of ne bis in idem analysis. In addition, it also asks for clarification whether the national competition law where applied in parallel with Article 101-102 TFEU can be said to protect different legal interest. The reference is of importance for a uniform understanding of ne bis in idem principle in EU and ECHR case-law as well as the adequate functioning of decentralized enforcement of Arts 101-102 TFEU. It also addresses the problem what standard national courts should apply when differences between ECtHR and CJEU fundamental rights case-law exist.
PL
Unia Europejska jako gospodarczo-polityczny związek państw, historycznie nie skupiała się ani na problematyce zdrowia, ani praw człowieka. Od czasu przyjęcia Karty Praw Podstawowych zauważalny jest związek między prawami podstawowymi a zdrowiem człowieka. Uznanie praw podstawowych i poszanowanie dla godności ludzkiej i autonomicznych decyzji jednostki, odegrały ważną rolę w ewolucji rozumienia prawa do zdrowia jako prawa człowieka w systemie prawnym UE. Celem artykułu jest analiza rozwoju praw zdrowotnych w prawie UE oraz odpowiedź na pytanie: czy ujęcie prawa do zdrowia jako prawa człowieka skutkuje określonym roszczeniem prawnym? W artykule wykorzystano wykładnię celowościowo-funkcjonalną, oraz aksjologiczną. Pomocniczo stosowano metodę historyczną (genetyczno-krytyczną).
EN
As an economic and political union of states, the European Union has historically focused neither on health nor on human rights. Since the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the link between fundamental rights and human health has been noticeable. Respect for human dignity and individual decisions played an important role in the evolution of the understanding of the right to health as a human right in the EU legal system. The aim of the article is to analyze the development of health rights in EU law and answer the question: does recognizing the right to health as a human right result in a specific legal claim? The article uses a purposeful-functional and axiological interpretation, and the historical method.
EN
Anti-suit injunctions are rather unknown in the civil law legal system of the Czech Repbulic. The policy reasons for the rejection of anti-suit injunctions in the Czech Republic are rooted in the constitutional right of every person to assert, through the legally prescribed procedure, their rights before an independent and impartial court or, in specified cases, before another body. In other words, every person may commence proceedings before a competent court, or respectively before any court or another body (e.g. like an arbitral tribunal, etc.), which is then exclusively empowered to rule on its jurisdiction. Therefore, there is also no distinction between anti-suit injunctions in domestic and international litigation. Czech law does not have any alternative procedural or substantive devices that may have similar functions as anti-suit injunctions related to arbitration. It means that it is not possible to obtain a court order against a respondent prohibiting the respondent from commencing or continuing court proceedings in another forum in violation of an arbitration agreement.
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