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EN
Throughout the existence of the Polish People’s Republic (PPR), its scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) supported Polish mining, energy, metallurgy, and machine industries. Cooperation with companies and research and development centers intensified in the first half of the 1970s, as a natural consequence of the experience accumulated by the intelligence service in the previous fifteen years. The most crucial issues related to the improvement of secret methods of acquiring technologies for the Polish economy were defining the scope of the tasks, i.e. the types of technologies which can be acquired by intelligence or purchased in the black market, selecting objects, (i.e. institutions and organizations with the required knowledge), and recruiting personal sources of information in western facilities. Apart from acquiring specific solutions S&TI also developed analyses related to specific countries, as well as to specific technologies in the global aspect or to international corporations that possessed the technologies. Furthermore, S&TI was engaged by the Polish government to provide information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade during trade negotiations with foreign contractors. Author draws the history of Polish S&TI during the 70s and 80s, showcasing its operations, explaining its modus operandi and discussing the question about the efficiency of illicit transfer of know-how from OECD for the purposes technical progress in communist Poland. Article bases on recently declassified documents of Polish intelligence service from the pre-1990 period. There are moreover other archival records as well as secondary sources explored.
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PL
Zasadniczym celem artykułu było przedstawienie długiego i skomplikowanego procesu nawiązania stosunków pomiędzy RWPG a EWG i wypracowania oczekiwanych stosunków handlowych pomiędzy podmiotami. W artykule zaprezentowano również stanowisko Polski wobec EWG, która będąc członkiem RWPG nie mogła zrezygnować z pryncypiów państw socjalistycznych. Z biegiem czasu w różny sposób dążyła do rozwijania współpracy z EWG, zdając sobie sprawę, że tylko tą drogą może zahamować regres gospodarki polskiej i w dalszej konsekwencji wpłynąć pozytywnie na nastroje w społeczeństwie polskim.
EN
The main aim of this paper is to present the long and complicated process of establishing contacts between Comecon and the EEC and developing their trade relations. The paper also discusses the Polish attitude to the EEC at a time when Poland – as a member of Comecon – could not reject the principles that guided socialist states. As time went by, Poland sought different methods to develop its collaboration with the EEC, as it realized that this was the only way to avert the downturn of Polish economy, thereby exerting a positive impact on the attitude of Polish society in the long run.
PL
Zasadniczym celem artykułu było przedstawienie poglądów Mieczysława F. Rakowskiego na wieloaspektowy proces integracji europejskiej w latach 1958–1990. Uwagę skoncentrowano na „problemie niemieckim”, wojnie ideologicznej: kapitalizm – komunizm, rozszerzeniu Wspólnot Europejskich o kolejne kraje w latach siedemdziesiątych i osiemdziesiątych XX wieku.
EN
The main aim of the article was to present the views of Mieczysław F. Rakowski on the multifaceted process of European integration in the years 1958–1990. Attention was focused on the “German problem”, the ideological war: capitalism – communism, the enlargement of the European Communities to new countries in the 1970s and 1980s.
EN
In the first half of the 1950s, the authorities and the scientific community of the Polish People’s Republic noticed the growing importance of electronic computing. The freedom of Polish science and the research and development sector was hindered by limited access to western centers, as well as a trade embargo on computers and measuring and testing equipment. This deficit was compensated to a small extent by the scientific and technical contacts developing in the 1960s with the USSR and with other partners from the Comecon. Documentation obtained mostly in Western European countries and, to a lesser extent, in the USA by Polish intelligence served as an additional source of knowledge for the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic and the newly opened production centers. However, the greatest successes in acquiring know-how were achieved not through the use of illegal methods, but through official negotiations with Western partners. The culminating moment of the ‘democratic’ (free) development of the computer industry in the Polish People’s Republic was when the ELWRO company signed the contract with the British ICT (later ICL) company in 1967. Unfortunately, it coincided with the inauguration of talks by Moscow in the Eastern Bloc on the unification of computer systems, the socalled RIAD, during the Comecon forum. The interests of the computer industry of the USSR as a superpower and the Polish People’s Republic as its satellite were on a collision course for a while. The inside story of the accession of the Polish People’s Republic to the RIAD program was reconstructed as a result of analysis of documents created in the Polish institutions supervising the Polish computer industry in its first developmenal phase (preceding Edward Gierek’s 1970–1980 tenure and RIAD). To supplement and verify the above sources, the author also selectively used other archives, which in perspective can be very useful for understanding the factors behind the creation of RIAD and determining the role of Poland in this program.
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